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 This study examines and defends moderation as a moral, political, and 
philosophic virtue. I argue that modern political theory, despite its success in curbing 
certain excesses, is unable to account fully for our contemporary struggles with 
immoderation because it fails to treat moderation as a holistic virtue. To address this 
theoretical deficit, and to recover the unity of a virtue that has become fragmented and 
neglected in our age, I turn to the treatment of moderation found in Plato’s Charmides 
and Republic—the two dialogues in which Socrates asks and answers the question: what 
is moderation? I argue that Plato’s Charmides is not an early dialogue to be left behind as 
we move on to the Republic. Rather, it is through the interplay between the two dialogues 
that a full picture of moderation as a harmony of the city and soul emerges.  
Lessons learned from the Charmides must be remembered in order to temper the 
utopian ambitions inspired by Plato’s Republic. Moderating our own hopes for a world in 
which reason reigns, we see the need for cultivating both self and civic restraint in the 
absence of a perfectly harmonious whole. Nevertheless, moderation in the form of a 
genuine harmony orchestrated by reason remains a model of excellence, best embodied 
by Socrates himself. Understanding moderation in this light, we can see most clearly the 
sources in human nature of what Plato’s Socrates calls the “many limbs” of 
immoderation, from hedonism to tyranny. More important, in understanding Socratic 
moderation we recover a compelling vision of the virtue.
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A Contemporary Case for Recovering the Classical Account of Moderation 
 
The primary aim of this dissertation is to recover an understanding of moderation, 
or sōphrosunē, as a classical virtue in all its complexity. Although moderation does not 
always play a prominent role in contemporary moral and political discourse, it is still a 
virtue necessary for citizens of a liberal democracy. Moreover, since moderation does not 
spring naturally from the soil of humanity, but requires careful cultivation, it is especially 
in need of our attention. As one of the central virtues of classical thought, moderation 
receives sustained consideration by the greatest political philosophers of antiquity. But 
above all, it was Plato who canonized moderation’s place in the tetrad of cardinal 
virtues—wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation—and it is in his writings that we find 
the most developed presentation of the virtue.1  
As will be discussed further below, sōphrosunē has a breadth and depth of 
meaning that our contemporary use of “moderation” or “temperance” fails to capture. 
Edith Hamilton describes the matter well when she says, “The truth is that this quality, 
                                                 
1 As classicist Helen North argues, “Plato contributed more generously to the 
development of sophrosyne than did any other writer of any period.” Helen North, 
Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature, Cornell Studies in 




this sōphrosunē, which to the Greeks was an ideal second to none in importance, is not 
among our ideals. We have lost the conception of it.”2 While a full account of how we 
have moved from the classical concept of sōphrosunē to today’s understanding of 
moderation is beyond the scope of this study, my limited purpose in this introduction is to 
highlight a pivotal transformation that can be seen in the meaning of moderation from the 
ancient to the early modern period. This transformation has emphasized a part of what the 
ancients understood by moderation—but only a part. Seeing the change moderation 
undergoes in modern political thought will help explain how we have arrived at the 
strange position we find ourselves in today, having achieved one sense of moderation at 
the expense of another.  
 
Moderation’s Place in Modernity 
One important sense of immoderation is religious and political extremism. Many 
prominent early modern political philosophers saw this as the most dangerous form of the 
vice, and so were most concerned with the form of the virtue that would resist it. 
Measured by the standard of preventing religious and political extremism, it cannot be 
denied that the modern project has been in large part a success. At least today within the 
United States, where that movement has exercised so much of its influence, the poles of 
                                                 
2 Quoted in W. Thomas Schmid, Plato’s Charmides and the Socratic Ideal of Rationality 




our political and religious divisions exist within a relatively circumscribed and peaceful 
sphere.3  
The theoretical foundations of this conception of moderation can be seen in the 
writings of some of the most influential early modern political philosophers. Both 
Thomas Hobbes and Montesquieu attempted to cultivate moderation in individuals 
largely as a means to achieving this kind of widespread political and religious 
moderation, the ending of civil and religious strife for the sake of security and prosperity. 
The success of their attempts depended in large part upon the ability to redirect much of 
human passion and competition away from the factious and violent realm of political and 
religious struggle and toward more sober and mundane goods and goals. This redirection 
was achieved in large part through an emphasis placed upon the ameliorative effects of 
commerce. Nevertheless, while a large degree of moderation on this grand political and 
religious scale has been achieved, especially as capitalism and acquisitiveness have taken 
on a life of their own, we find ourselves facing a problematic increase of immoderation 
within the private realm. Human desire being a many-headed Hydra, the attempt of the 
moderns to lop off what may be its most dangerous heads has lead to the growth of 
others.  
But what place, exactly, was moderation intended to have in modern life? Modern 
liberalism differs radically from the classical tradition insofar as it rejects the exercise of 
                                                 
3 See, for example, Stephen Macedo, “Transformative Constitutionalism and the Case of 




virtue as the proper end of a polity. But it still requires that its citizens possess certain 
virtues as the means to the ends that the state rightfully pursues: security, comfort, and 
freedom. Thus one can find even within the work of Hobbes, the great debunker of 
classical virtue and the philosophic precursor of liberalism, a recognition of the 
importance of certain virtues and an attempt to inculcate them.4 Hobbes’ teaching on the 
need for a new morality is most evident in his articulation of the laws of nature. Although 
the first of Hobbes’ laws of nature are fairly straightforward (first, seek peace; second, be 
willing to form contracts toward that end), they become more didactic as the list 
proceeds. And while all the laws of nature derive their legitimacy from the single aim that 
Hobbes regards as legitimate, namely the need for self-preservation, one begins to see 
that many more natural laws are needed to channel and tame the less peaceful passions so 
as to make them accord with this end. We find, for example, that the laws of nature 
exhort us to be grateful, complaisant, and forgiving, as well as to avoid contumely, pride, 
                                                 
4 For all his infamously illiberal theories, such as the absolute right of the sovereign, 
Hobbes can be credited with paving the way toward liberalism insofar as we find within 
his thought the emergence and defense of the primacy of individual rights, a development 
crucial to the political and moral outlook that welcomes the liberal view of the state. The 
basis of the Hobbesian state is, after all, the consent of individuals. Its purpose is to 
protect their rights and ensure, above all, their security, while allowing as much freedom 
as possible. For a more thorough discussion of Hobbes’ liberalism, see J. Judd Owen, 





and arrogance. Indeed, they even forbid drunkenness and other forms of intemperance 
that might lead to our destruction.5  
Thus, on Hobbes’ account, moderation includes a form of private temperance. But 
even the other natural laws mentioned above could be seen as falling under the umbrella 
of a new kind of moderation. As Peter Hayes argues, Hobbes, with his “bourgeois 
moderation,” aims to create a “new social order…that depends upon the mutual 
observance of moderate behavior.”6 To this end, Hobbes’ natural laws “provide precepts 
of behavior in civil society that form the social equivalent of private temperance.”7 Hayes 
does not go so far as to say that private temperance is actually achieved, for, as he 
explains, Hobbes’ concern is not so much how we feel as how we act. We can be as 
inwardly proud or greedy as we want, so long as we realize that it is worthwhile to 
restrain ourselves when doing so serves the long-term interest of civil order. Hayes 
argues, “This calculated split between belief and behavior takes selfishness beyond 
ruthless competition to become a form of enlightened self-interest that looks to long-term 
consequences and reciprocal benefits.”8 But what is important to note is that contrary to 
classical notions of the virtue, here no emphasis is placed upon moderation as the 
                                                 
5 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, ed. Edwin Curley (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1994), I.xv.  
 
6 Peter Hayes, “Hobbes’s Bourgeois Moderation,” Polity 31 (1998): 55.  
 
7 Ibid., 56. 
 




achievement of harmony between reason and appetite within the soul. Moderate 
behavior, far from being the expression of desire that has been tempered through and 
through, is simply an instance of pragmatic restraint.  
If one can discern the beginnings of a distinctly modern understanding of 
moderation in liberalism’s great precursor Hobbes, it is even more explicit in those more 
traditionally recognized as liberalism’s defenders. Most notable is the understanding of 
moderation found in the work of Montesquieu. As we will see below, Montesquieu’s 
emphasis upon the spirit of commerce brings to light a form of individual moderation that 
is akin to Hobbes’ understanding.9 Along with commerce, the virtue of moderation comes 
to play an especially prominent role in the work of Montesquieu, who provides the bridge 
to our contemporary situation insofar as he was of great influence upon the founders. As 
Thomas Pangle notes in The Spirit of Modern Republicanism, “no moral virtue receives 
such regular and oft-repeated praise from the Federalist [as moderation]; and no virtue 
had been accorded an equal importance in the Spirit of the Laws, the work to which the 
new Publius refers more often than to any other.”10  
                                                 
9 Along similar lines, Radasanu describes Montesquieu’s moderation as “Machiavellian.” 
See Andrea Radasanu, “Montesquieu on Moderation, Monarchy and Reform,” History of 
Political Thought 3, 2 (2010): 288.  
 
10 Thomas Pangle, The Spirit of Modern Republicanism (Chicago: The University of 




Several scholars have noted that the role and importance of moderation in 
Montesquieu’s Spirit of the Laws evolves and grows as the work progresses.11 
Moderation first appears as the principle of aristocratic republics: an ability of the ruling 
class to exercise the enlightened self-restraint required to hide rather than flaunt their 
superiority over the populace: “modesty and simplicity of manners are the strength of 
nobles in an aristocracy.”12 Initially nothing more than the defining principle of 
aristocratic republics, moderation becomes the defining trait of all non-despotic, i.e. 
superior, political systems.13 The connection between these two uses of the term 
“moderation” can be seen, as Pangle explains, when one considers the need for all 
governments to restrain themselves from harming their citizens’ security.14 But, as 
Montesquieu argues, more effective than the restraint and moderation exercised by 
aristocrats are the safeguards provided by governmental checks and balances.15 Thus, in 
Craiutu’s words, we find in Montesquieu’s thought a completion of “the transition from 
                                                 
11 See, for example, Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 90 and Aurelian Craiutu, A Virtue 
for Courageous Minds: Moderation in French Political Thought, 1748-1830 (Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2012), Chapter 2.  
 
12 Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, trans. Cohler et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2009), 3.4 and 5.8. See Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 89-90. 
 
13 See Montesquieu, Spirit of the Laws, 3.9-10. On this point see Pangle, Modern 
Republicanism, 90 and Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds, 40. 
 





[moderation as] character trait to a fundamental constitutional principle.”16 When it 
comes to moderation in citizens themselves, that can be achieved through the “spirit of 
commerce,” which goes hand in hand with a concern for property rights and thereby for 
security.17 “The spirit of commerce,” Montesquieu argues, “brings with it that of 
frugality, economy, moderation, work, prudence, tranquility, order and regulation.”18 
It is this Montesquieuian spirit of moderation that most influenced the American 
founders, who viewed the individual virtue “not so much as a divine or noble and 
graceful coordination of appetite with reason for its own sake, but rather the enlightened, 
calm, and prudent pursuit of security and ease…”19 Moderation in this sense, along with 
                                                 
16 For an especially illuminating discussion of moderation as the virtue of political 
institutions, see Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds, Chapter 2. Craiutu notes that 
“What makes Montesquieu’s case interesting for us is that he no longer regarded 
moderation primarily as an exclusive virtue of well-ordered souls (a prominent theme in 
classical political philosophy, beginning with Plato), but as an essential feature of a 
certain type of government, that is, a moderate government.” It is worth noting that 
Montesquieu uses the very notion of harmony emphasized by Plato to describe a 
moderate form of government (on this point see Craiutu, 38-39 and 48-49). But it is 
precisely Montesquieu’s relative neglect of moderation as a virtue of well-ordered souls 
that makes him of particular interest to us.  
 
17 Ibid., 90. 
 
18 Montesquieu, The Spirit of the Laws, 5.6. Superseding the moderation possessed both 
by aristocratic regimes and by all forms of good government is the “moderation” 
possessed by the law-giver. For Montesquieu, moderation as the spirit of the lawgiver 
comes to mean something closer to prudential reasoning in the service of the modern 
ends of the state: security and protection of property. The moderate lawgiver possesses 
the ability to overlook the necessities of a strict justice in favor of the ends of property 
and security (Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 91). 
 
19 Pangle, Modern Republicanism, 92. See also Radasanu, “Montesquieu on Moderation,” 
288: “Montesquieu works to undercut traditional notions of moderation that call to mind 
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its co-worker commerce, both work toward softening political and religious fanaticism, 
furthering the project begun by Hobbes. But what is essential to see is the subtle 
transformation in the meaning of moderation that is achieved by this attempt to rein in 
our more fanatical passions. The understanding of moderation as the curbing of moral 
indignation and fervor in favor of complaisance and a willingness to get along for the 
sake of a shared interest in security begins to overshadow moderation in the sense of 
temperance, or self-restraint with regard to our desire for more.20 Thus, there arises a 
splitting of the virtue between moderation understood as a softening of moral indignation 
or a tempering of fanaticism, and moderation understood as temperance or frugality.21 In 
addition, we find an emphasis upon the external manifestations of moderation as opposed 
to the internal possession of it. Finally, to the extent that any form of this virtue is 
encouraged, it is viewed not as an end in itself, but as desirable only insofar as it 
promotes the security and prosperity of the individual and of the nation.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
continence and the ordering of the passions for the sake of living a good life. He wants to 
reclaim moderation for modern political philosophy and must redefine it in order to 
achieve his end.” 
 
20 Ibid.  
 
21 Pangle (Modern Republicanism, 92) notes that this fracturing of the virtue is illustrated 
in Benjamin Franklin’s articulation of virtues in his autobiography. He lists temperance, 
frugality, and moderation all as distinct virtues, with moderation requiring that one 
“avoid extremes” and “forbear resenting injuries so much as you think they deserve.” See 
Benjamin Franklin, The Autobiography of Benjamin Franklin (New York: Houghton, 




In light of the modern re-conception of moderation, I would argue that while we 
have achieved within the U.S. a large degree of moderation when it comes to political 
extremism and religious fanaticism, the other sides to this virtue, temperance and 
frugality, have seen better days. The unleashing of acquisitiveness and redirection of the 
passions from otherworldly aspirations to the commercial goods of the here and now has 
led to troubling excesses in the private realm, the results of which are beginning to create 
political consequences and concerns of their own. The neglect of these other meanings of 
moderation has proven to be—contrary to the vision of the early moderns—politically 
problematic. 
There is, in fact, a growing concern about our lack of moderation, a concern that 
can be seen in an increased awareness of the need for self-restraint. But before detailing 
some of these concerns, it is important to note that they are rarely discussed using the 
moral language of moderation; despite the fact that we need a fuller awareness and 
possession of this virtue, we are strangely loath to talk about it. This fits, of course, with 
the more general contemporary aversion to speak of virtue at all. Peter Berkowitz, in his 
work Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism, describes the way in which 
contemporary liberalism stands in a somewhat awkward position relative to virtue: 
“Despite the groundswell of enthusiasm for the study and practice of virtue, the mere 
11 
 
mention of the term still causes acute discomfort for many.”22 As Berkowitz explains, 
whether it conjures up “prudish nineteenth century Victorian morality” or the “musty 
metaphysical doctrines associated with Aristotle and Aquinas,” “virtue” just isn’t a word 
that sits easily with us.23  
This general aversion to virtue is especially conspicuous when it comes to 
moderation, and can be seen by surveying some of our most prominent contemporary 
political problems.24 On the most obvious level of temperance, one can note the growing 
concern over America’s obesity epidemic which, with childhood obesity rates tripling 
over the past three decades, is likely to be one of the biggest burdens on future health care 
costs.25 Such concerns have prompted Michelle Obama’s “Let’s Move” campaign, an 
attempt to combat childhood obesity, the stakes of which she takes to be “the physical 
and emotional health of an entire generation and the economic health and security of our 
nation.”26 Mrs. Obama’s proposed solution, which is by no means a bad one, is to try to 
                                                 
22 Peter Berkowitz, Virtue and the Making of Modern Liberalism (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1999), x. 
 
23 Ibid.  
 
24 Linda Rabieh makes this same case regarding the virtue of courage. See Linda Rabieh, 
Plato and the Virtue of Courage (Baltimore: The John Hopkins University Press, 2006), 
19.  
 
25 Obesity has been recently identified as one of the “top three social burdens generated 
by human beings.” See Richard Dobbs et al., “How the world could better fight obesity,” 
McKinsey & Company, http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/economic_ 
studies/how_the_world_could_better_fight_obesity. 
 
26 “Let’s Move.” http://www.letsmove.gov/. 
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get youth exercising more, eating healthier foods, making smarter choices, and 
establishing better habits. What is striking about reading her descriptions of this problem 
and how to fix it, however, is that while she points again and again to the fact of sheer 
excess and overindulgence, there is notably little said to suggest that what we might 
really need to cultivate is a capacity for restraint, and even less direction as to how that 
might be accomplished.27 At no point does either the vice of immoderation or the virtue 
of moderation arise in any explicit manner. Nevertheless, moderation is clearly a 
significant part of what the problem requires.28 
In addition to the need for moderation with regard to our eating habits, there is the 
need for moderation when it comes to our spending habits—a need that often sits in 
                                                                                                                                                 
 
27 Michelle Obama’s campaign at least encourages a kind of habituation that lends itself 
to moderation. More questionable are the long-term results of our most scientifically 
advanced solution to curbing the childhood obesity epidemic: weight loss surgery. The 
New York Times article "Young, Obese and in Surgery," follows the experience of a 
young woman who undergoes laparoscopic adjustable gastric banding. Afraid she will 
prove unable to follow the eating regimen that must accompany her procedure, the 
woman is told by her doctor, “The key is moderation.” She replies, unsurprisingly, “I’m 
not good at moderation.” Here the necessity of moderation is recognized, and yet no 
guidance is available for how to achieve it. See Anemona Hartocollis, "Young, Obese 
and in Surgery," New York Times, January 7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/01/08/ 
health/young-obese-and-getting-weight-loss-surgery.html.  
 
28 It is important to stress that moderation alone is not a complete solution to this 
multifaceted problem, but simply that it is a critical part of the solution. As stated in a 
recent Mckinsey Global Institute report, “Education and personal responsibility are 
critical elements of any program aiming to reduce obesity, but they are not sufficient on 
their own.” See Richard Dobbs et al., “How the world could better fight obesity,” 





uneasy tension with the early modern emphasis upon the acquisitiveness that drives 
capitalism. In William Galston’s work Liberal Purposes, he discusses what he calls the 
“liberal virtues,” among which is moderation. As Galston argues, modern market 
economies must strike a balance:  
…between ascetic self-denial and untrammeled self-indulgence… For although 
market economies rely upon the liberation and multiplication of consumer desires, 
they cannot prosper in the long run without a certain level of saving, which rests on 
the ability to subordinate immediate gratification to longer-run self interest.29  
 
For evidence that we lack the moderation necessary to strike this kind of balance, one 
need only consider the financial collapse brought on by the housing crisis, not to mention 
our inordinate national debt. We know neither as individuals nor as a nation how to 
restrain our desire for more, what the ancients referred to as pleonexia, a lack of restraint 
that is ultimately unsustainable.30  
The result is often political rhetoric that sidesteps the true problem. For example, 
President Obama, in a speech regarding the deficit, notes the tough choices that have to 
be made to reduce it, and the inconvenient fact that “most Americans tend to dislike 
government spending in the abstract, but like the stuff that it buys.”31 He does not, 
however, go so far as to suggest that we might need to restrain or moderate our desire for 
                                                 
29 William A. Galston, Liberal Purposes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1991), 223. 
 
30 Compare Sophie Bourgault, “Prolegomena to a rehabilitation of Platonic moderation,” 
Dissensus 5 (2013): 122-123.  
 





all that “stuff” in the first place. But if, as Galston argues, “the greatest vices of popular 
governments are the propensity to gratify short-term desires at the expense of long-term 
interests,” it is likely that the very demands we make of government are in need of 
moderation.32 In other words, our hopes and expectations as to what the government 
ought to provide too often exceed the bounds of what can reasonably be desired.  
 Moderation has also become a virtue of increasingly urgent importance in light of 
growing and global concerns about our environment. According to scientists in the 
Global Footprint Network, growth rates are currently rising at a pace that far outstrips the 
rate at which the earth’s resources can be sustainably replenished.33 We have an obvious 
and escalating need for more sustainable practices. It is thus unsurprising that thinkers 
concerned with environmental issues have identified moderation as a critical virtue. For 
instance, in his work Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress, John Barry 
gives moderation a place of high rank among the virtues that will be necessary for a new 
and more ecological morality. According to Barry, “In line with the classical view, green 
political economy holds that temperance and the avoidance of excess are virtues....”34 
While finding the excessively consumer driven model of economy problematic, he does 
not insist upon ascetic self-denial or the condemnation of consumption wholesale. Barry 
                                                 
32 Galston, Liberal Purposes, 224.  
 
33 See Thomas Friedman, “The Earth is Full,” 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/08/opinion/08friedman.html?_r=2&ref=opinion. 
 
34 John Barry, Rethinking Green Politics: Nature, Virtue and Progress (London: Sage 




recognizes the benefits of consumption, including, in a Montesquieuan spirit, its 
“‘civilizing’ effects.”35 The alternative to the status quo, he argues, “is not the abolition 
of consumption and the benefits derived from it, but rather the integration of consumption 
with production on the basis of self-reliance and moderation.”36 But how do we, as 
individuals and as a nation, achieve this moderation? 
In sum, we see in these instances of national and even global concern reasons to 
pay more attention to the virtue of moderation, and particularly to seek out a wider and 
richer notion of moderation than that to which we have become accustomed. The 
questions of how to teach our children self-restraint, of how to curb the human desire for 
more, of how to stop ourselves from placing unreasonable hopes and demands upon our 
government and even upon the planet we inhabit, are not easy questions to answer.37 If it 
is true that moderation is a virtue we will need more of in times to come, then we need a 
better understanding not only of what exactly it entails, but also of how it can be 
achieved. Moreover, for those of us who are skeptical as to the goodness of this virtue, 
we need an argument as to why it should be desired, both by individuals and the 
community. For these reasons, I believe there is much to gained by turning to the 
sustained study of moderation offered to us within classical political thought and 
especially the philosophy of Plato. Plato provides an account of the virtue unprecedented 





37 For a significant contribution to offering a Platonic perspective on these issues see 
Bourgault “Prolegomena,” 137 ff.  
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in his time and unsurpassed in ours. Through his thought we might recover a sense of the 
unity and depth of the virtue of moderation that has been lost. And as we will see, just as 
we live in a time in which the virtue of moderation seems in need of a revival and 
defense, so too did Plato. In coming to understand the case he made for moderation 
against a growing current of immoderation, we may find the guidance we need to re-
evaluate and recover moderation for ourselves. 
 
 
Study of Moderation in the Context of Classical Political Thought 
 
Although there is no shortage of scholarship on Plato and even a recent spate of 
work on the virtue of moderation, when it comes to the combination of the two—a study 
of moderation in Plato—there is a surprising gap in the literature.38 To begin with the 
second half of this equation, my study aims to complement a body of scholarship on 
moderation by providing a study of this virtue in Plato’s thought. Significant works on 
moderation include Aurelian Craiutu’s A Virtue for Courageous Minds, Harry Clor’s On 
Moderation: Recovering an Ancient Virtue in a Modern World, and Helen North’s 
Sophrosyne: Self-Knowledge and Self-Restraint in Greek Literature.  
                                                 
38 This recent increase of interest in moderation follows a long period of neglect. On this 




Craiutu’s book provides a fascinating study of moderation in French political 
thought from 1748-1830, particularly as a virtue of institutional and constitutional 
arrangements. He touches in an opening chapter on moderation in classical thought, 
recognizing its importance there, but looks for the most part to Aristotle rather than 
Plato.39 Indeed, scholars often turn to Aristotle for a discussion of moderation because of 
his doctrine of the mean. But when it comes to the actual virtue of sōphrosunē (as I will 
discuss further below), Aristotle gives a surprisingly limited account, one that lacks the 
scope of Plato’s treatment of the virtue. Moreover, Craiutu, in looking at moderation in 
modern thought, studies authors who “follow a trajectory away from an emphasis on 
moderation as a personal trait to a view of moderation as a virtue that inheres within 
political institutions and institutional arrangements.”40 My study by contrast stresses the 
importance, precisely because of this modern trajectory, of rediscovering a robust notion 
of moderation as a personal trait, or individual virtue. In doing so I aim to complement 
Craiutu’s ultimate goal of rediscovering what he calls the “lost archipelago” of 
moderation, providing a more holistic view of the virtue as found in Plato’s thought.41   
North’s work presents an impressively thorough, if compendious, account of what 
appears to be nearly every significant mention of the virtue, by name and by implication, 
                                                 
39 Ibid., 20-26. 
 
40 Craiutu, A Virtue for Courageous Minds, 3. 
 
41 Ibid., 1 and 238: “Political moderation forms a distinct and diverse tradition of thought, 
resembling an archipelago consisting of various ‘islands’ that represent a wide array of 
ideas and modes of argument and action, an archipelago whose precise contours are yet 
to be discovered and fully appreciated by political theorists.” 
18 
 
from the heroic and archaic periods to its use in patristic literature. On the whole, she has 
created a tremendous resource for anyone studying moderation. But her treatment of 
Plato, to which she devotes only a chapter, is by her own admission limited in its depth 
(with, for example, only eight pages on the whole of the Republic). In addition to 
expanding greatly upon North’s treatment of Plato, my interpretation of his dialogues 
diverges significantly from hers, which depends heavily upon an interpretation of his 
purported early works as being more under the influence of Socrates than his purported 
later works. North’s study, for all its virtues, fails to capture the complexity and richness 
of Plato’s teaching on moderation.  
In the spirit with which it explores and defends moderation, Clor’s work is closest 
to my own. His book offers a study of moderation as a political, personal, and 
philosophic virtue. On the whole, Clor provides an illuminating exposition and defense of 
the virtue for a contemporary audience, one with which I am largely in agreement. But 
Clor for the most part avoids close textual analysis of philosophical sources. Moreover, 
despite the suggestion of his title, Clor does not actually provide any extended analysis of 
the virtue as understood by the ancients. Insofar as he touches upon classical accounts of 
the virtue, his focus is (along with Craiutu’s) primarily on Aristotle’s doctrine of the 
mean. Without noting Aristotle’s strikingly narrow definition of sōphrosunē, Clor argues 
that “we can plausibly say that every Aristotelian virtue is a form of moderation.” Thus, 
he views Aristotle as providing a “comprehensive view of what moderation means,” in 
19 
 
contrast to “the narrower or more limited mode of definition” found in Plato’s Republic.42 
My study aims to show, contrary to this impression, that a more comprehensive view may 
be found in Plato’s thought. Although Clor’s work greatly complements mine, there is 
little overlap between our two studies as Clor is not primarily interested in Plato’s 
specific teaching on the virtue.   
Just as those who study moderation have yet to provide an extended study of the 
virtue as it is explored in Plato, so too have political theorists who study Plato largely 
failed to provide an extended study of the virtue in his work. One recent exception is 
Sophie Bourgault, who makes an insightful and persuasive case for the importance of 
studying Platonic moderation in her essay: “Prolegomena to a rehabilitation of Platonic 
moderation.” As Bourgault explains, “Apart from a few articles devoted to the early 
dialogue Charmides, there has not been any sustained study of Platonic moderation in 
political theory.”43 “And yet,” Bourgault continues: 
Ernest Barker considers sophrosyne to be “the motive of the whole State in the 
Laws,” Leo Strauss sums up the entire Republic as “an act of moderation,” 
Werner Jaeger regards moderation as the focal point of Plato’s paideia, Hannah 
Arendt refers to it as “one of the political virtues par excellence,” and R. F. 
Stalley insists that sophrosyne is “the raison d’être” of all institutions described in 
the Laws.44  
 
                                                 
42 Harry Clor, On Moderation: Defending an Ancient Virtue in a Modern World (Waco: 
Baylor University Press, 2008), 26-27. 
 





Bourgault provides a perceptive explanation for this surprising coincidence of recognition 
and neglect. In general, her article is a superb introduction to the virtue in Plato’s thought, 
and I am for the most part in agreement with her reading of the virtue. But “Prolegomena 
to a rehabilitation of Platonic moderation,” is, as the title admits, only a beginning.  
Further progress in understanding Platonic moderation has been made recently by 
Benjamin Lorch in his essay “The Choice of Lives and the Virtue of Moderation.”45 In 
this thoughtful study Lorch focuses on the problem of moral weakness or akrasia, 
examining moderation in Book IV of the Republic. Lorch carefully draws out the tension 
between moderation understood as mastery and moderation understood as harmony. But 
in addition to providing a more comprehensive treatment of moderation, I ultimately 
disagree with Lorch’s analysis of Book IV’s definitions, providing an alternate reading of 
moderation in the Republic. 
In sum, what all the above works inspire but fail to provide is a sustained analysis 
of Plato’s philosophic presentation of moderation. Before going into the specifics of my 
focus on Plato, I would like to make a few general remarks about the core questions 
driving my study of sōphrosunē in Plato’s thought, questions that I believe have been left 
open by the extant work done on moderation.   
 
                                                 
45 Benjamin Lorch, “The Choice of Lives and the Virtue of Moderation,” Interpretation 




What is Sōphrosunē? 
The question of what sōphrosunē is, while seemingly simple, is not easy to 
answer. As the discussion above illustrates, “moderation” in its modern and 
contemporary uses has a variety of meanings. In ordinary discourse, moderation is often 
understood as the avoidance of extremes. Indeed, this understanding is nothing new. As 
the inscription at the temple of Apollo at Delphi reads, “mēden agan” (nothing in excess). 
But while this is surely part of what moderation means, to have it stand for the whole 
would be misleadingly simple. If it were true, one might be inclined to conclude, 
“everything in moderation, moderation included.” But one could argue, as Aristotle’s 
account of the virtues makes clear, that there is no excess to avoid in the case of the 
virtues themselves. All of Aristotle’s virtues point toward a mean, understood not simply 
as a middle point or quantity (as 3 would be between 1 and 5), but rather to the proper 
amount of something as established by right reason (which could very well be closer to 
one extreme than the other).  
If one of the primary meanings of sōphrosunē in the classical context is the ability 
to have one’s desire, especially one’s desire for pleasure, be in accord with reason, then it 
is not necessarily the case that to be sophron would be to engage in all pleasures in some 
middling way.46 For example, as Socrates suggests at the end of Book One of 
                                                 
46 “But not every action admits of a mean condition, nor does every feeling, for some of 
them as soon as they are named are understood as having baseness involved with them, 
such as joy at others’ misfortunes, shamelessness, and envy…But just as there is no 
excess or deficiency of [moderation] or courage, because the mean is in a certain way an 
extreme, so there is no mean condition or excess and deficiency of those other things, but 
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Xenophon’s Memorabilia, his own moderation entails at once a near abstinence when it 
comes to certain pleasures and an indulgence when it comes to others.47 Furthermore, to 
suggest that moderation means simply nothing in excess fundamentally fails to answer 
the question of what moderation is or means. For by what standard do we judge what 
counts as excess and what does not? In short, moderation must entail knowledge of a 
more guiding and determinate sort than simply an ability to size up the middle way 
between two apparent extremes.  
The question of precisely what moderation is becomes even more complex when 
one considers its manifold applications. While Aristotle defines moderation narrowly, as 
a virtue which pertains only to the pleasures of the body (most precisely those involving 
touch), its meaning throughout classical thought is much more varied. Although these 
variations are scattered throughout Plato’s works, one gets the best sense of the variety of 
moderation’s meanings by turning to Xenophon’s Memorabilia.  
                                                                                                                                                 
however one does them one is in the wrong; in general there is no mean in excess and in 
deficiency, nor any excess or deficiency of the mean condition” (Ethics 2.6). All 
translations of Aristotle’s Ethics are from Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Joe Sachs 
(Massachusetts: Focus Publishing, 2002).  
 
47 Socrates asks Antiphon, “Do you think that anything is more responsible for my not 
being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust than that I have other things more pleasant than 
these that delight not only in their use but also by providing hopes that they will benefit 
always?” (Memorabilia I.6.8). All translations of Xenophon’s Memorabilia are from 
Memorabilia, trans. Amy L. Bonnette (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1994). For a 
study of moderation in Xenophon’s Memorabilia see Benjamin Lorch, “Moderation and 




In Book One, Chapter One of the Memorabilia, Xenophon lists seven sets of 
“what is” questions about which Socrates always conversed. Central in this list is the 
question, “What is moderation?” and moderation proves to be a central theme in the book 
as a whole. Its precise meaning, however, is not apparent. As Leo Strauss notes, 
“sophrosyne has a wide range of meaning extending from the high and profound 
moderation of a Socrates to mere self control regarding the pleasures of the body.”48 But 
just what does this “profound” moderation entail and what, if any, is its connection to the 
“mere self control” of bodily continence? The presentation of Socrates’ virtue as nothing 
more than an extraordinary degree of mastery over his body stands in marked contrast to 
the elevated understanding of moderation that we find in Book III, where Socrates 
describes moderation as indistinguishable from wisdom. More puzzling still is the fact 
that in the first chapter of the Memorabilia, moderation is understood in terms of one’s 
proper relation toward the gods. This form of moderation is touched upon through a 
discussion of moderation’s contrary: madness (I.1.16). The overriding impression 
Xenophon gives his readers is that Socrates, by contrast to the “mad” sophists and natural 
philosophers, was “moderate” concerning the gods.49  
                                                 
48 Leo Strauss, Xenophon’s Socrates (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004): 79. 
 
49 In this way, moderation first appears as part of Xenophon’s defense of Socrates against 
the charge of impiety. Xenophon insists that Socrates “did not converse about the nature 
of all things in the way most of the others did—examining what the sophists call the 
cosmos: how it is, and which necessities are responsible for the coming to be of each of 
the heavenly things” (I.1.11). Xenophon thereby distances Socrates from an activity that 
had come to be associated with impiety and atheism. As he goes on to explain, Socrates 
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As we see throughout the works of Plato and Xenophon, the most prominent of 
Socrates’ students, this single virtue of sōphrosunē applies to anything from how much 
one eats and drinks, to one’s desire for money, honor, or a beloved, to one’s proper stance 
toward the gods, and even to wisdom itself. Can the puzzle of this vast variation in the 
meaning of sōphrosunē be chalked up to simple equivocation or a matter of “family 
resemblance,” or is there some single thread that binds all these uses of moderation 
together? My study of moderation throughout Plato’s dialogues aims to find what unity 
there may be to this virtue.   
 
To What Extent Is Moderation Possible and How Is It Achieved? 
The second question I address is to what extent moderation, tentatively and 
perhaps only partially defined as having one’s desires in harmony with reason, is 
possible. In some sense and to some degree moderation is clearly possible. Most of us 
restrain our desires in one way or another some, if not most, of the time. But this very 
formulation points to the question I have in mind. To what degree is moderation, as 
opposed to self-restraint, possible? The difference between the two is outlined most 
clearly in Aristotle’s Ethics. In the case of self-restraint, one’s desire is fundamentally in 
conflict with reason, if subordinate to it, whereas to acquire the virtue of moderation is to 
have one’s desiring come to be in harmony with reason (Ethics 1119b15). This seems to 
                                                                                                                                                 





be the great promise of moderation: an un-conflicted soul. The moderate person has no 
need for self-restraint for such a person does not have desires that are at odds with his or 
her reasoning. Moderation then would seem not to be a matter of becoming one’s own 
master, for this would imply that there are still desires needing to be tamed, but rather a 
complete unity and harmony of the soul. Self-restraint is only necessary when one 
continues to be moved by certain pleasures that conflict with what one reasons to be 
good.  
On this account, the very need for self-restraint seems to be a sign of one’s failure 
to become truly virtuous, insofar as one’s character remains base. Even if we are able to 
restrain ourselves and obey principles which have not yet become a part of our nature 
(Ethics 1152a30), or which perhaps can never become a part of our nature, we seem to 
remain like children repeating and obeying the words of our tutors. In some way we are 
still unmoved by what we tell ourselves is good. In this light, it becomes a question how 
reliable our ability to restrain ourselves will be, especially in the absence of shame or fear 
of punishment for our misbehavior. We are more likely to be unrestrained in the moment 
and feel regret later (1150b30). To what extent can the soul be brought into the genuine 
unity of reason and desire that moderation promises?    
A related question is that of how one acquires moderation. In Xenophon we see 
reason to believe that moderation is difficult to achieve, or at the very least particularly 
difficult to maintain. In an attempt to explain the immoderation of Alcibiades, and 
ultimately Socrates’ failure to teach Alcibiades moderation, Xenophon says that those 
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who “claim to philosophize” think that no one who has become moderate would become 
insolent, “nor would anyone who had learned anything else that can be learned ever lose 
that knowledge” (I.2.19). Xenophon, by contrast, sees that 
just as those who do not practice forget verses composed in meter, so also 
forgetfulness occurs in those neglecting the speeches that teach. And when 
someone forgets the speeches that admonish, he has forgotten also what the soul 
experienced when it desired moderation. (I.2.21)  
 
Just what does the soul experience when it desires moderation? And what precisely is the 
content of the speeches that admonish, or the knowledge by which moderation is 
attained? What is the role of habituation in the acquisition of this virtue, and what 
practice is required for moderation to be maintained?   
 
What is the Proper Role of Moderation in Politics? 
 Xenophon’s need to defend Socrates on account of his failure to teach Alcibiades 
moderation becomes clear when one considers the political consequences that follow 
from a lack of the virtue. It is also especially within a political context that one sees why 
it is crucial to understand what kind of moderation is possible and how it can be 
achieved. Thus my third major question about moderation concerns its proper role in 
politics. Exploring this question will help us judge the place of moderation both in civic 
education and in political leadership. What kind of moderation do we want in our citizens 
and leaders, and how can we get it?  
One of the best places to see the political questions surrounding moderation is in 
Thucydides’ Peloponnesian War. From Athens to Sparta and Alcibiades to Archidamus, 
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the question of the proper possession of moderation, in populations at large and 
especially in political leaders, is one that runs throughout Thucydides’ account. The most 
obvious example of moderation in Thucydides’ work is Sparta. Led by Archidamus, the 
Spartans are often taken to embody the virtue as it is conventionally understood. As 
Thucydides notes early in his work, the Spartans were unique in their abstention from 
displays of luxury, both in private and in public affairs.50 In addition to their modesty, the 
character of Spartan moderation is said to consist in the calm with which they deliberate 
before taking action. According to Archidamus, such calm is not a sign of cowardice but 
rather a “wise moderation” thanks to which they “alone do not become insolent in 
success and give way less than others in misfortune” (1.84.1).51 But is this form of 
moderation truly wise? According to the Corinthians, Spartan “moderation” was 
exercised to the detriment of all of Greece and to Sparta herself, having allowed Athens 
free reign over the Hellas.  
That the Spartans possess a kind of moderation is indisputable, but their 
moderation, as Thucydides himself intimates, is problematic. The city has always been 
under a powerful compulsion to exercise moderation; even in times of peace they must 
remain severely disciplined and closely united, and must restrain any desire for foreign 
                                                 
50 The city and its citizens were both characterized by restraint; the former “not adorned 
with magnificent temples and public edifices” (1.10.2), the latter the first among the 
Greeks to adopt the “modest style of dressing… the rich doing their best to assimilate 
their way of life to that of the common people” (1.6.4). 
 
51 All translations of Thucydides are from The Landmark Thucydides, ed. Robert B. 




conquest given their preoccupation with an ongoing conquest of the enslaved helots at 
home. Since external constraints are largely responsible for Spartan moderation, one 
might wonder whether they choose their moderation not because they genuinely 
recognize it as a worthwhile virtue, but simply because they have no other choice. The 
weakness of this compulsory self-restraint can be seen most glaringly in the story of 
Pausanias, the Spartan commander whose desire is unleashed the moment he steps 
outside the Spartan sphere of influence. Even in the case of ordinary citizens, Spartan 
moderation seems to depend upon ignorance (in Archidamus’ words, they have too little 
learning to question the laws) along with severe military discipline and the power of 
shame to keep impulses in check. In Sparta we see a prime example of moderation that is 
the result of contingent external forces, as opposed to an internal harmony of passion and 
reason or a guiding knowledge possessed by its citizens.52  
Are there less problematic forms of moderation to be had in a city and can they be 
achieved in any other way? Or is severe Spartan discipline the surest way of rendering 
any population moderate? Moderation of a more promising sort can certainly be found in 
individuals in Thucydides’ work. Diodotus, for example, seems to possess a form of 
moderation that stems from a fuller understanding of human nature than that had by 
either the Spartans or the rest of the Athenians. A private man who intervenes once in 
politics to dissuade the Athenians from lashing out in revenge against the Mytilenians, 
Diodotus shows a grasp of the unique interplay between hope and desire that will always 
                                                 
52 Lorraine Smith Pangle, Virtue is Knowledge: The Moral Foundations of Socratic  
Political Philosophy (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2014): 171. 
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tempt humanity to act immoderately and against reason. But is the understanding of 
moderation possessed by individuals like Diodotus available to populations at large? And 
if not, what prevents it? Is there a compromise to be had between moderation as restraint 
grounded in habit and compulsion, and a more genuine moderation that springs from an 
understanding of the human condition and its limits?  
 
Is Moderation Desirable?  
The final question this dissertation addresses is that of whether moderation is truly 
desirable. While the notion of a harmony of the soul might have some immediate appeal, 
that is not to say its goodness is self-evident. As Helen North argues, the time of the 
Peloponnesian War marked more broadly a turning point in Greek thought away from 
simple praise of moderation toward a harsh critique of it.53 As Thucydides tells us, 
moderate individuals were the first to fall victim to the violence that spread over Greece 
following the Corcyrean civil war. In Thucydides’ account of the revolution in morality 
that swept across Greece in the wake of this strife, moderation ceased to be viewed as a 
virtue and came to be seen as a vice. As Thucydides explains, sōphrosunē came to be 
seen as nothing more than a “cloak for unmanliness” (3.82.4). The fate of moderate men 
ultimately serves to raise the truly radical question: Is moderation even a virtue? Not only 
might the moderate be seen as naively vulnerable in times of crisis, but even in times of 
                                                 
53 Helen North, “A Period of Opposition to Sophrosyne in Greek Thought,” Transactions 




peace one could wonder whether they are fools for denying themselves what they desire. 
One need not be a hedonist to scoff at the tempering of the passions entailed in 
moderation. It appears unlikely that the peaks of the human experience and achievement 
are reached by means of half-measures and lukewarm sentiments.54 Moderation, it seems, 
has always to contend with more captivating and powerful rivals.  
Because of this, I turn to Plato, whose work as a whole aims to vindicate 
moderation in light of such challenges. Indeed, Plato himself presents critiques of 
moderation in dramatic form through the mouths of his characters: hostility toward 
moderation finds perhaps its greatest expression in Callicles’ vehement attack upon self-
restraint in Plato’s Gorgias. And it is not only Plato’s villains who attack moderation: 
Socrates himself makes yet another case against moderation in the Phaedrus. Having first 
made a speech against eros and in favor of moderation, in the famous Palinode Socrates 
makes the case for madness over and against moderation. As Socrates explains, the 
ancients did not believe that madness was shameful or a term for reproach. To the 
contrary, erotic madness is given to human beings by the gods for the greatest good 
fortune and as the greatest gift. In short, divine madness as a source of guidance, insight, 
and inspiration is far superior to human moderation. Thus, while Plato’s corpus as a 
whole aims to vindicate moderation over madness and self-restraint over unleashed 
                                                 
54 In a critique perhaps put best by Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, chaos within the soul, not 
harmony, may be the true source of greatness: “I say unto you: one must still have chaos 
in oneself to be able to give birth to a dancing star.” Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spoke 
Zarathustra in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. and trans. Walter Kaufmann (New York: 
Penguin, 1976), 129. For a similar description of challenges that can be made against 
moderation (including a response to Nietzsche) see Clor, On Moderation, 10 and 48 ff.  
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hedonism, he shows himself to be neither unaware of nor entirely unsympathetic to 
arguments that can be made against the desirability of moderation.  
What then was his argument for it? This is the question I aim to answer in the 
following study of moderation in Plato’s Charmides and Republic—the two dialogues in 
which Plato asks and answers the question: what is moderation? Chapters 1 and 2 focus 
on the Charmides, Plato’s aporetic dialogue devoted to the virtue. Chapters 3 and 4 focus 
on the opening books of the Republic, culminating in an analysis of Book IV’s definition 








Introduction to the Dialogue: Context and Characters55 
 
 
The Charmides opens in the voice of Socrates, recalling a conversation he once 
had with Charmides and Critias.56 We know neither when Socrates is speaking nor to 
whom. There are a few textual clues as to who Socrates’ addressee may or may not be. 
For example, from the dialogue’s opening, one can gather that whoever Socrates is 
speaking to, he is familiar enough with Athens and Socrates’ circle to understand a 
reference to the wrestling school of Taureas and to know who Chaerephon is. And yet he 
seems unfamiliar with the details of Athens’ involvement in the war. There are various 
theories as to what kind of person might fit this profile. Christopher Bruell, for example, 
suggests that Socrates is addressing a foreigner who has been in Athens long enough to 
have become familiar with Socrates’ usual haunts and companions. But it is also possible 
                                                 
55 All parenthetical references in this chapter are to Plato’s Charmides, unless otherwise 
noted. Translations are from Charmides, trans. Thomas G. West and Grace Starry West 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1986) with the occasional emendation of my 
own.  
 
56 For helpful discussions of the division of Platonic dialogues between those narrated 
and those performed see Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 1964), 58 and Laurence Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2010), 5. Other dialogues narrated by 




that Socrates is speaking years after his conversation with Charmides took place. In this 
case his addressee could be a young Athenian, unfamiliar with the details of a battle that 
occurred before his time. Conclusions drawn from the few hints we have remain largely 
speculative.57  
If we can only speculate as to who this unidentified person is, doing so may miss 
the mark. Plato appears to have left the identity of Socrates’ audience purposefully 
ambiguous. In writing a frameless, narrated dialogue, in which Socrates confides in the 
listener to a surprising degree, Plato allows the reader to begin to feel as though Socrates 
were speaking to him or her directly. The form of the Charmides, which draws one in 
with an intimacy unrivaled by other dialogues, seems especially well suited to its 
subject.58 If all Platonic dialogues depend upon the active participation of the reader, then 
perhaps none more so than the Charmides, which ultimately encourages each individual 
to turn inward, in search of self-knowledge and the moderation it may bring.59  
                                                 
57 See Christopher Bruell, "Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge: An Interpretation of 
Plato's Charmides," Interpretation 6, 3 (1977): 142. For additional commentary on the 
unnamed addressee see Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 148-150, and 235-
236, who argues that the auditor is none other than Plato. For yet another argument see 
Benardete, who concludes the auditor is “a Theodorus.” Seth Benardete, “On Interpreting 
Plato’s Charmides,” in The Argument of the Action (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 2000), 231.  
 
58 See Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 7 and 172-173 n.13. Schmid notes that 
“the Charmides narrative is unique in the dialogues for its interior, subjective 
representation of Socratic eros.”  
 
59 As Jacob Klein puts it, “Usually it is not important to know how many people are 
listening and who they are. (In some cases it may well be.) But it is of crucial importance 
to realize that we, the readers, belong to them and belong to them in the sense of silently 
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This purposeful lack of clarity surrounding Socrates’ narration stands in marked 
contrast to the clarity with which Plato situates the narrative itself. When it comes to the 
conversation Socrates recalls, there is no question as to when it happened or who it 
involved. The context and characters of Plato’s dialogues often color their content, and 
this is especially so in the Charmides. Socrates recalls a conversation that took place 
during a turning point in Athenian history with two individuals who would have appeared 
far from neutral in readers’ eyes. To appreciate fully what it means to have Critias and 
Charmides in a dialogue on moderation, set as Athens enters the war that will end its 
empire, we must take a closer look at the remarkable context and characters of the 
Charmides.  
 
The Peloponnesian War 
 
 In the first line of the Charmides, Socrates recalls that he had just returned to 
Athens from the army camp at Potidaea. With this opening, Plato sets the stage of the 
Charmides against a backdrop of war.60 Socrates had been in Potidaea as part of an effort 
early in the Peloponnesian War to crush a revolt against the Athenian empire, a siege that 
would continue for well over a year. By the time Socrates returned to Athens in May of 
                                                                                                                                                 
active participants.” See Jacob Klein, A Commentary on Plato's Meno (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1965), 6.  
 
60 I agree with Schmid that the too often neglected prologue of the Charmides puts in 
place certain themes that are of use for understanding the dialogue more generally. For a 




429 it had been hit for the first time by the plague. Among those who returned with 
Socrates would have been Alcibiades, who claims to owe his very survival to Socrates.61 
But Socrates shows little interest in talking about Potidaea, much less the heroic acts he 
performed there. He is interested not in the state of things abroad with regard to the war, 
but in the state of things in Athens with regard to philosophy. And the virtue he will go 
on to discuss is not the wartime virtue of courage but rather moderation—what it is, and 
ultimately whether or not it is a virtue at all.  
In this way the Charmides brings to the fore a question that is on the minds of 
many during this time of extremes. As discussed in our introduction, a revolution in 
morality swept across Greece over the course of the Peloponnesian War, one in which 
moderation came to be seen more as a vice than a virtue.62 And yet, viewed from another 
perspective, the war could be taken as vindicating the virtue. After all, the Spartans, 
known for their moderation, conquered the Athenians, known for their pleonexia and 
hubris. But as discussed above, there is an inadequacy and even ugliness to the Spartan 
version of moderation, a form of restraint grounded in their need to maintain an ongoing 
oppression of the helots. In short, the war either calls into question the virtue of 
moderation altogether, or vindicates a version of it that is equally questionable. The 
challenge of the Charmides will be not only to determine whether moderation is a virtue, 
but what form the virtue must take to be truly good.  
                                                 
61 See Plato’s Symposium 220c-221c.  
 




By the end of the Peloponnesian War, moderation itself seems to be one of its 
many casualties. Its absence is nowhere clearer than in Athens, where the loss of the war 
gives rise to the rule of the Thirty, a group of oligarchs who come to power with Sparta’s 
support. The Thirty seem promising at first. Plato himself was encouraged and tempted to 
join them. But the actions of the Thirty quickly earn this regime the title Thirty Tyrants. 
Charmides and Critias were both among the Thirty’s ranks, with Critias playing an 
especially prominent role. Before turning to the dialogue proper, we must also take a 




As bright as he was beautiful, Charmides was a young man with enormous 
promise. Born into the upper echelons of Athenian society, he kept company with the 
city’s intellectual and political elite. In the Protagoras, for example, we find him with no 
less than Pericles’ sons, listening to Protagoras at the home of Callias, one of Athens’ 
wealthiest patrons of the sophists (Protagoras 315a). Socrates was also there that day, 
and we can imagine the impression he must have made on the young Charmides. Just 
three years later, the two would have the conversation we witness in the Charmides, by 
the end of which the young man vows to “follow and not abandon [Socrates]” (167d).63  
                                                 
63 On the dramatic dates of the Protagoras and Charmides see Debra Nails, The People of 
Plato: A Prosopography of Plato and Other Socatics (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing 
Company, 2002), 309-312.  
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Charmides in large part followed through with this intention. In the Symposium, 
Alcibiades goes so far as to say that Charmides became, like him, one of Socrates’ 
unrequited lovers (Symposium 222b). But whatever likeness Alcibiades draws between 
Charmides’ relationship with Socrates and his own, it is clear that there were some 
important differences. While Alcibiades “stopped [his] ears and took off in flight” from 
Socrates, refusing to “grow old beside him,” Charmides appears to have remained a 
closer companion.64 And while Socrates discouraged Alcibiades’ political ambitions,65 he 
encouraged Charmides to overcome the “awe and fear” that kept him from speaking 
before the Athenian Assembly, exhorting Charmides not to “neglect the city’s affairs, if 
due to [him] they can be in a somewhat better state” (Memorabilia III.7.9).  
We know little about Charmides’ actual involvement in political affairs prior to 
his falling greatly out of favor in 415, when he was one of many (including Alcibiades) 
accused of profaning the Eleusinian mysteries. Over a dozen men with Socratic 
connections were implicated in this profanation, which occurred shortly after the 
mutilation of the city’s herms.66 Not only were those involved charged with impiety, but 
                                                 
64 Symposium, 216a. All translations of Plato’s Symposium are from Plato’s Symposium, 
trans. Seth Benardete (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2001).  
 
65 Alcibiades describes it as follows: “[Socrates] compels me to agree that, though I am 
still in need of much myself, I neglect myself and handle instead the affairs of the 
Athenians” (Symposium 216a).  
 
66 See Thucydides 6.27-29, 53, 60-61. As will be discussed further below, Critias was 
implicated in the mutilation of the herms. For a full list of those implicated, see Nails, 




they were also suspected of plotting to overthrow the democracy.67 Charmides’ property 
was taken and he was condemned to death in absentia. It is unclear what Charmides did 
in the meantime, but, according to Debra Nails, the charges against him would have been 
largely forgotten by 407.68 In Xenophon’s Symposium, we find a lighthearted Charmides 
making the best of his poverty, which seems to have brought with it a kind of freedom 
and to have made him more trusted in the eyes of his fellow citizens. He notes that when 
he was wealthy, he was reproached for spending time with Socrates, but now that he is 
poor, “it’s no longer of any concern to anyone” (Symposium 4.32).  
If Charmides had become by this point a man trusted by his fellow citizens, or at 
least of little concern to anyone, he would not remain so for long. Following the end of 
the Peloponnesian War, he was chosen by the notorious Thirty to be one of the ten ruling 
in the Piraeus. We know few details about Charmides’ own actions as one of the ten, but 
he remains guilty by association with a regime that in Plato’s own words made the former 
government—flawed as it was—seem as “precious as gold” (Plato, Seventh Letter). 
Charmides’ close connection with Critias is especially incriminating, for while we know 
                                                 
67 Ibid. 
 
68 Nails explains: “It is Xenophon…well supported on this occasion by Diogenes…who 
describes the city’s reversal in 407, when Alcibiades III was recalled to Athens, his 
sentence overturned, the curse on him retracted, and compensation promised for his 
confiscated property. The profanation of which Alcibiades III, Charmides, Axiochus, and 
Adeimantus had been accused by Agariste III….was now treated as never having 
happened at all…Charmides, with less clout than Alcibiades III, may well have found 
himself in 407 back in a city depleted through long years of war, without resources at a 




little of the role Charmides played during that time, we do know that Critias was, as one 
classicist puts it, “at the forefront of what amounted to a reign of terror.”69 Charmides 
meets his death fighting alongside Critias in defense of the Thirty. 
 
Critias  
Critias became Charmides’ guardian after the death of the boy’s father.70 He too 
belonged to Athens’ elite. His genealogy could be traced to some of the first families to 
rule the city and he shared with Charmides ties to the famous lawmaker and poet Solon. 
Critias also makes an appearance in Plato’s Protagoras, counseling his companions not 
to take sides prematurely in the argument between Protagoras and Socrates, but rather to 
encourage the two to see their discussion through to its end (Protagoras 336d-e).71 In the 
Charmides we see that Critias, while not Socrates’ equal, is both intelligent and learned. 
He was a prolific writer, producing works of both prose and poetry.  
As with Charmides, our knowledge of Critias’ public record is blank until he is 
implicated in the impious acts of 415. Critias, a close companion of Alcibiades, was 
                                                 
69 Donald Norman Levin, "Critias," in The Older Sophists (Columbia: University of 
South Carolina Press, 1972), 241. 
 
70 Unless otherwise noted, the following factual references regarding Critias are from 
Nails, The People of Plato, 108-111.  
 
71 There is still some controversy as to whether or not the Critias who appears in the 
Platonic dialogue by that name as well as in the Timaeus is the Critias IV of concern to us 
here, or Critias III (the grandfather of Critias IV). For a convincing argument in favor of 
understanding the Critias of these two dialogues to be Critias III, see Nails, The People of 




accused but soon exonerated of participating in the mutilation of the herms. Still, he spent 
some time in exile from Athens, during which he supported a democratic rebellion in 
Thessaly. Whatever his sympathies for democracy may have been in Thessaly, they seem 
to have disappeared by the time he returned to Athens and became one of the Thirty.  
As Xenophon reports, when the Thirty came into power they were initially in 
charge of writing a constitution. But they delayed doing so, meanwhile appointing a 
Senate and other magistrates at their discretion. With what Xenophon describes as a 
desire to “become free to do just as they pleased with the state,” the Thirty obtained the 
backing of a Spartan garrison and began arresting not only “scoundrels and persons of 
little account,” but any who seemed a threat to their rule. In the guise of allowing broader 
participation in their rule, they brought 3,000 more into their ranks and then seized the 
arms of all other citizens. Having done this, Xenophon reports that the Thirty felt “at 
length free to do whatever they pleased.” In addition to murdering many Athenian 
citizens on the grounds of nothing more than personal enmity, they resolved that each 
member of the Thirty choose a metic to be put to death so that his confiscated property 
could be used to pay for their guards (Hellenica II.iii.1-22).72  
In all this Critias led the way, being singled out as the most cruel and bloodthirsty 
of the Thirty.73 Most damning is how he dealt with one of the few who spoke up against 
                                                 
72 All translations are from Xenophon Hellenica vol. 1 in Loeb Classic Library, trans. C. 
L. Brownson (London: Heinemann, 1919).  
 




their actions. Theramenes, a former friend of Critias and member of the regime, refused 
to pick a metic to be killed and openly objected to the unjust murders of innocent and 
worthy men. Critias, in defiance of both the will of the Senate, which sided with 
Theramenes, and the spirit of the rule of law, which held it illegal to kill any of the Three 
Thousand, struck Theramenes off the roll and had him killed (see Hellenica II.iii.15-56).  
 
Critias, Charmides, and Socrates 
Judged by his deeds as a member of the Thirty, Critias might easily be seen as the 
most wicked character to appear in a Platonic dialogue. And yet, were one to read the 
Charmides having never heard of him, it would be hard to imagine that he would go on to 
play a leading role in one of the most hated regimes to preside over Athens. Whatever his 
faults, Critias hardly looks the part of a tyrannical murderer—much less does Charmides 
appear destined to be his accomplice. Plato refuses to portray either individual as simply 
a villain, forcing readers to face the complexity of Critias’ and Charmides’ characters and 
to ask why these men took the paths that they did.  
One also cannot help but wonder what influence Socrates had on the direction 
they took. The ties between Socrates, Charmides, and Critias were well known. True, 
those between Critias and Socrates had worn especially thin by the time the Thirty came 
to power. But that did not stop many Athenian citizens from holding Socrates responsible 
for the man Critias had become, a contributing factor in the charges that led to Socrates’ 
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trial.74 According to Xenophon’s report of Socrates’ accusers, it was Critias, along with 
Alcibiades, who “harmed the city most,” after becoming Socrates’ associate. “For Critias 
was the most thievish, violent, and murderous of all in the oligarchy” (Memorabilia 
I.2.12). Xenophon does his best to distance Socrates from Critias’ later career and 
character, arguing that Critias was able to overpower his ignoble desires for as long as he 
had Socrates as an ally. Xenophon argues that it was Critias’ time in Thessaly away from 
Socrates that corrupted him, not their time together. Xenophon also makes it clear that 
Socrates had become an open critic of Critias, both in his personal conduct and as a 
leader of the Thirty (see Memorabilia I.2.29-39).  
Similarly, in the Apology, Plato’s Socrates goes out of his way to make it clear 
that he refused to act unjustly on behalf of the Thirty. Having been ordered along with 
three other men to arrest Leon the Salaminian, a just man who was going to be killed by 
the oligarchs, Socrates was the only one of the four to refuse. “The other four,” he 
reports, “went to Salamis and arrested Leon, but I departed and went home. And perhaps 
                                                 
74 If Aeschines is to be believed, Critias’ association with Socrates was the main cause for 
the latter’s execution: “Men of Athens, you executed Socrates the sophist because he was 
shown to have educated Critias, one of the Thirty who put down the democracy.” 
Aeschines, Against Timarchus 173, translation provided by Gregory Vlastos in “The 
Historical Socrates and Athenian Democracy” in Socratic Studies, ed. Myles Burneat 
(Cambridge: The University of Cambridge Press, 1994), 87-108. According to Vlastos, 
“This shows that half a century after Socrates’ death a lot-selected jury—a fair sample of 
Athenian public opinion—was expected to agree without argument that Socrates had 
been put to death because he had been the teacher of the man who stood in living 
memory as the leader of the most savagely anti-democratic regime Athens had ever 
known” (“The Historical Socrates,” 87-88). See this same essay for a detailed account of 




I would have died because of this, if that government had not been quickly overthrown” 
(Apology 32d).75  
These examples suffice to show that Socrates stood at some distance from the 
political activity of Thirty. But the same could be said of his relationship with the 
Athenian democracy. And all this still fails to answer fully the question of what influence 
Socrates had on Critias earlier in his life. In the Charmides, Critias appears fairly well 
versed in the hallmarks of Socratic thought. What effect did Socrates’ ideas have upon 
him? Were they somehow the source of Critias’ corruption? Is Socrates responsible for 
Critias’ immoderation? And when it comes to Charmides, what are we to make of 
Socrates’ apparent encouragement of his involvement in politics given his subsequent 
participation in a regime that Plato himself had the good sense to avoid? Was Charmides 
simply trying, as Socrates himself had prompted him, to do what little he could to make 
the city’s affairs in a somewhat better state? Or was he of the same mind as his guardian 
Critias? After all, he died alongside him in battle against those trying to overthrow the 
Thirty. How did someone so promising become involved in such a horrific regime?  
Ultimately we face the question pointed out by Xenophon: why did Socrates teach 
“his companions political affairs before he taught them to be moderate?” (I.2.17). Will 
this dialogue serve as a second “apology” for Socrates, or will he not be absolved of all 
responsibility for the fate of Critias and Charmides? What did Plato want us to learn from 
seeing the two as we do in this dialogue, knowing what would become of them? Will a 
                                                 
75 All translations of the Apology are from Four Texts on Socrates, ed. and trans. Thomas 
G. West and Grace Starry West (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998).  
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closer look at Critias and Charmides reveal the seeds of tyranny? How will this help us to 
understand what moderation is and what stands in the way of obtaining it? We will be 
looking for answers to these questions in our examination of the dialogue to follow.  
 
 
Socrates’ Self-Restraint and the Stripping of Charmides’ Soul 
 
The Charmides opens with Socrates recalling that he had been away from Athens 
for some time. Having arrived from Potidaea the evening before, he gladly visited his old 
haunts, in particular the wrestling school of Tauraeus, the one across from the temple of 
the Queen.76 He found many people there, some he knew, others not, and having arrived 
unexpectedly, was greeted by many. From their midst sprang Chaerephon—“that 
madman”—who, running over to Socrates, expressed great surprise and joy at his 
survival of a battle in which they heard so many had been killed.  
Out of the grim and foreboding background of war leaps the ecstatic Chaerephon, 
our first and largely comical instantiation of immoderation. What might be the serious 
meaning behind this laughable example of madness? How might it help illustrate by 
contrast what the sound-mindedness of moderation entails? Most obviously, Chaerephon 
lacks restraint. In this opening scene his outward actions perfectly express his inner 
                                                 
76 Hyland notes that the “physical proximity of the gymnasium, or ‘temple of the body,’ 
to the temple of the dead … may symbolize a forthcoming relation between sophrosyne 
and human finitude upon which we must subsequently reflect.” See Drew Hyland, The 
Virtue of Philosophy (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), 30.  
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emotions. As his heart leaps with joy, so too does his body. Charming as his transparency 
might be, it also betrays a problematic lack of self-control. Would it be as charming, for 
instance, if he reacted with the same immediacy and lack of reserve upon experiencing 
not joy, but anger? In this sense, Chaerephon’s madness represents an inability to place 
any distance between one’s inner thoughts or feelings and one’s outward appearance or 
actions.  
What of the thoughts and feelings themselves? There are two issues at work in 
Chaerephon’s reaction to Socrates’ return. The first is the simple, very human fact that 
Chaerephon is elated to find his beloved friend still alive. But the extreme joy 
Chaerephon feels on account of Socrates’ survival is bound to be replaced, sooner or 
later, by an equally extreme misery.77 As natural as happiness for the survival of his 
friend might be, Chaerephon’s reaction still bespeaks a lack of preparation for the 
inevitable. In this way his madness represents a failure to be resigned to human mortality, 
pointing to a connection between moderation and an acceptance human nature’s limits.  
Finally, Chaerephon is particularly surprised that Socrates, of all people, survived 
the battle. He seems to have thought that surely Socrates would be a goner. Is there 
something about Socrates’ virtues that Chaerephon fails to appreciate? We know from the 
Apology that Chaerephon had the highest esteem for Socrates’ wisdom, but he seems 
                                                 
77 Bruell notes the connection between Chaerephon’s madness and his joy at Socrates’ 
survival. See Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 142. The connection 
between excessive mourning and immoderation is explored more fully Socrates’ critique 




unaware of the full range of Socrates’ strengths and abilities, unable even to imagine how 
he survived.78 Does this point to a more serious connection between immoderation and a 
failure to grasp philosophic virtue in its relation to virtue more broadly understood? We 
will have to keep this question in mind as we continue through the dialogue. For now, it 
is interesting to note that Chaerephon, who leads Socrates over to Critias, unwittingly 
encourages the association that will prove more fatal to Socrates than any battle.  
In the section that follows we are prompted to reflect upon the human response to 
beauty, known for inspiring its own form of madness. After answering questions about 
the battle, Socrates pursues his own interest. He asks about the news in Athens, how 
things stand with philosophy, and whether any of the young have become distinguished 
for wisdom or beauty or both.79 Critias looks toward the door of the gymnasium, where a 
crowd is entering. “About the beautiful ones,” he says, “you’ll soon know. For those 
entering happen to be heralds and lovers of the one reputed to be the most beautiful” 
(154a). Critias explains that he is referring to his cousin Charmides. Socrates, swearing 
by Zeus, exclaims that he not only knows who Charmides is, but had previously noticed 
that even as a boy he was in no way ordinary. Critias says that Socrates will soon know 
what sort of a person he has become, and Charmides enters the room. Socrates says to his 
nameless companion,  
                                                 
78 According to Socrates’ testimony in the Apology, it was Chaerephon who asked the 
oracle at Delphi whether there was anyone wiser than Socrates (Apology 20e-21a).  
 
79 The word here translated as beauty is kalos, which also carries the meaning of noble 




Now nothing is to be measured by me, comrade, for I am simply a white line 
when it comes to those who are beautiful, because almost all who have just 
reached maturity appear beautiful to me. But especially then he appeared 
wondrous to me in both stature and beauty, and indeed, at least in my opinion, all 
the others were in love with him, so excited and confused had they become as he 
came in…Now this was not wondrous on the part of us men; but turning my 
attention to the boys, I noticed that none of them, not even the littlest, looked 
anywhere else, but all were contemplating him as if he were a statue. (154b-c) 
 
Here Socrates describes the near universal reaction to human beauty, but most interesting 
are the subtle ways in which Socrates’ own response differs from that of the others. 
Socrates says it seemed to him that “all the others” were in love with Charmides, and yet 
he gives no indication that he himself was similarly moved. While everyone else is 
watching Charmides, Socrates is busy watching everyone else and observing their 
reactions, having already observed his own. What allows Socrates to escape being 
entirely captivated by Charmides?  
 We can begin with what Socrates describes as his tendency to be a “white line,” 
or useless measure, when it comes to the beautiful.80 In Socrates’ eyes, all young boys are 
equally beautiful. Socrates’ broader, more universal appreciation of beauty allows him to 
see Charmides, beautiful as he may be, as simply one of an innumerable number of boys 
who, just reaching maturity, are bound to appear beautiful. He admits that Charmides 
struck him as an especially impressive instance, but he has still deprived Charmides of 
any claim to incomparable beauty. Perhaps this is what makes it easier for Socrates to 
                                                 
80 West and West helpfully explain this “proverbial expression taken from stonecutter’s 
idiom. The mason used a line rubbed with chalk to mark the stones. On white marble, a 
white chalk mark would be barely visible.” See West and West, Charmides, 15 n. 6. 




turn his eyes from the beautiful Charmides toward what seems to interest him more, 
namely how others react to this beauty.  
Socrates says it was especially wondrous that not only were the men mesmerized 
by Charmides, but so too were even the littlest of the boys. In other words, the force of 
Charmides’ beauty was not sexual, or at least not exclusively so. What is it about 
Charmides that enchants even children? Socrates says that they contemplated him as if he 
were a statue.81 Charmides appears as a living and breathing work of art—a walking 
embodiment of perfection. To borrow the words of Chekhov, he must have had  
that beauty, the contemplation of which—God knows why!—inspires in one the 
conviction that one is seeing correct features… [E]very movement of the young 
body all go together in one complete harmonious accord in which nature has not 
blundered over the smallest line.82  
 
But to return to the image of the statue, however beautiful the surface may be, there is 
nothing necessarily wondrous about the stone from which it is made. Charmides’ 
                                                 
81 Cf. Phaedrus 252d-e: “And so each person picks out from the beautiful ones his love 
after his fashion; and he constructs and adorns for himself a sort of statue of that one, as a 
god, for him to honor and celebrate.” Socrates lived during what has come to be called 
the period of high classical style in Greek sculpture. For a very interesting account of 
sculpture from this time, particularly its tendency to inspire wonder in the viewer, see 
Richard Neer, The Emergence of the Classical Style in Greek Sculpture (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago, 2010). 
 
82 This lovely description is from a similar scene in Chekhov’s short story The Beauties. 
There everyone from a young boy to even an old man, “gruff and indifferent to women 
and the beauties of nature,” finds himself moved by the beauty of a young woman. Here 
too the viewer’s thoughts turn to sculpture. He imagines the ideal woman would have to 
have all the same features, but that “the sculptor would need a great creative genius to 
mold them.” See Anton Chekhov, The Beauties, in Anton Chekhov’s Selected Stories (A 





beautiful body invites those who see it to imagine that an equally beautiful soul lies 
within, one that will complete the perfect harmony of his person.83 But is Charmides truly 
beautiful through and through? As becomes clear in the section to follow, Socrates knows 
better than to assume what he does not know.  
Chaerephon, never shy to speak his mind, tells Socrates that as beautiful as 
Charmides’ face might be, if they get him to strip, he will seem “faceless, so altogether 
beautiful is he in his looks” (154d). In response, Socrates concedes that Charmides is not 
a man to be withstood, if “he has one little thing besides” (154d). Charmides must prove 
to be not only beautiful with regard to his body, but well-born with regard to his soul. 
Socrates tells Critias that it would of course be fitting for Charmides to be of a good 
nature given the family he comes from, flattering Critias’ pride in the legacy of his 
lineage. Critias assures him that Charmides is not only a gentleman, but also philosophic 
and poetic. Socrates acknowledges that this beautiful quality, the one of being poetic, can 
be found in Critias’ family as far back as Solon. But Socrates still wishes to see 
Charmides’ soul for himself, and asks Critias to call the boy over so that they can “strip 
his soul and contemplate it before contemplating his looks” (154e). There would, he adds, 
be nothing shameful in Charmides conversing with him, especially in front of his 
guardian and cousin Critias. Critias agrees, but, perhaps in an effort to make clear that he 
will still be setting the parameters of the discussion, he calls Charmides over under a 
                                                 




strange pretense: Socrates is to pretend that he is a doctor who can cure the morning 
headaches Charmides has recently been having.  
The significance of Charmides’ headaches can only be realized if we keep in 
mind the fact that the plague—a disease that “first settled in the head”—had just struck 
Athens.84 The plague was noted for the indifference with which it visited its horrors upon 
the old and young, weak and strong. It would have been hard to suffer from a headache at 
this time without having some fear that worse symptoms were to follow. Charmides, in 
these circumstances, might not have felt the sense of invincibility that usually attends the 
young. There is then a very dark subtext to this ruse—Socrates is to play the physician 
capable of curing Charmides’ headaches at a time when doctors stood by helpless as 
scores died from the plague.85  
For the second time a grim reference is accompanied by comic relief. Socrates 
describes how much laughter was produced when, as Charmides approached, everyone 
tried to make room by shoving his neighbor aside, such that the man sitting on one end 
                                                 
84 Thucydides reports the plague as having arrived in Athens in the summer of 430. See 
Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 2.47.3 and 2.49.7 where he describes its symptoms. 
There is some speculation in the literature that these morning headaches are nothing other 
than hangovers, indicating Charmides’ lack of moderation. See, for example, Mark L. 
McPherran, "Socrates and Zalmoxis on Drugs, Charms and Purification," Apeiron: A 
Journal for Ancient Philosophy and Science 37 (2004): 14-15. I am indebted to Laurence 
Lampert for what I believe is the more compelling link he draws between Charmides’ 
headaches and the plague. See Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 162.  
 
85 Even this is an understatement. Thucydides notes that not only were physicians 
“ignorant…of the proper way to treat it, but they died themselves the most thickly, as 




had to stand up and the other was pushed so hard he fell off sideways. Again we find a 
humorous scene with a more serious meaning. The laughter that ensued was at least in 
part the diffusion of a very real tension in the room. Many wanted Charmides for 
themselves. At first Charmides’ beauty inspired an almost incapacitating awe. But awe 
quickly gives way to desire for the exclusive possession of the beauty one was at first 
content simply to behold.86 We see here the playful beginnings of a willingness to use 
force to obtain the beautiful object of desire.87 One can easily see how this playful 
competition, which took the shape of a harmless physical struggle ending in laughter, 
could come in much darker forms.  
The comic competition here comes to an easy resolution: Charmides sits between 
Socrates and Critias. What Socrates describes as happening next is worth quoting in full:  
Then indeed, my friend, I was in perplexity, and my former boldness, 
which I had as I was expecting to converse with [Charmides] quite easily, 
had been knocked out of me. For when, as Critias was saying that I was 
the one who had knowledge of the drug, he looked at me with his eyes in 
such an irresistible way and was drawing himself up to ask a question, 
while everyone in the wrestling school flowed around us in a complete 
circle—then indeed, O noble one, I saw inside his cloak, I was inflamed, I 
was no longer in control of myself, and I held Cydias to be wisest in erotic 
matters, who, speaking about a beautiful boy, advised someone that “a 
fawn coming opposite a lion should beware lest he be taken as a portion of 
meat.” I myself seemed to myself to have been caught by such a creature. 
Nevertheless, when he asked me if I had knowledge of the drug for the 
                                                 
86 Contrast this movement with the final rung of the Symposium’s ladder of love, where 
desire gives way to a simple beholding of the forms (see Symposium 211d).  
 
87 Schmid (The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 6) notes that the “theme of desire for 
beautiful or noble things (ta kala) and the willingness to use violent means to obtain 




head, with difficulty I somehow answered that I had knowledge of it. 
(155c-e) 
 
In this passage we catch a rare glimpse into the inner-workings of Socrates’ soul, which, 
compared to Chaerephon’s, is harder to read from the outside. One finds a similar scene 
with Thrasymachus in the Republic (see 336d-e). There Socrates claims to be nearly 
rendered speechless by fear rather than desire. In each case, it is hard to tell whether or 
not Socrates is exaggerating. Here it is possible that Socrates overstates the effect 
Charmides had upon him for the sake of the friend to whom he is relating his experience 
(note he addresses his audience twice in this sequence, once at 155c5 and again at 
155d3). This would not be the first time Socrates seems to exaggerate eros’ effects on 
him for the sake of a friend who may be more susceptible to such charms (consider 
Xenophon’s Memorabilia I.3.8-15). As it happens, Charmides himself will later accuse 
Socrates of doing this very thing (Xenophon, Symposium 4.27).88 But even if Socrates is 
not as susceptible to eros’ pull as others may be, he was surely not immune. Moreover, 
Plato, who so often abstracts from the body, here makes a point of drawing our attention 
to Socrates’ body. For these reasons, it seems worth taking Socrates’ story at face value 
so as to be able to draw from it whatever lessons Socrates wished to convey, even if by 
means of an exaggerated account. 
Given the speed with which Socrates, albeit with difficulty, recovers enough self-
possession to answer Charmides’ question, it would have been hard for anyone to have a 
                                                 




clear sense of what he had just experienced. But what exactly does Socrates experience 
and how does he recover so quickly? Having been able to withstand Charmides’ beauty 
moments ago, Socrates seems to have let his guard down and finds himself perplexed or 
at a loss when his confidence—or more accurately over-confidence—is suddenly 
knocked out of him. He had been able to resist the beauty of Charmides’ physical 
appearance earlier in part because he had turned his focus toward the question of 
Charmides’ soul. But now, athwart his best intentions, Socrates unexpectedly catches a 
glimpse of Charmides’ body and finds his own body inflamed.  
What is so striking about this passage is how Socrates describes in such detail the 
confluence of elements that created this moment in which he found himself 
overwhelmed. There is no way that Socrates could have known in advance what effect all 
of these factors in combination would have upon him—the way in which Charmides 
looked at him, Critias’ ruse, how all the others flowed around them—let alone anticipate 
the tipping point: his inadvertently seeing inside Charmides’ cloak. Something about the 
expression in Charmides’ eyes must have awakened in Socrates the same hope that 
Charmides had earlier inspired in everyone else—that Charmides’ soul may be as 
beautiful as his body. That combined with the power Critias’ ruse has given Socrates with 
regard to Charmides, the way in which Charmides looks to him and no other, seems to 
have elicited a reaction in Socrates that catches him by surprise. The scene brings vividly 
to light the limits of even the most self-possessed—there are certain things that are 
simply beyond our control. None of us can be fully prepared for the unanticipated 
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circumstances we might find ourselves in, as well as the unexpected and largely 
involuntary reactions we might have.89  
Short of being able to predict the future, no one can be entirely certain of how he 
or she will react in every case. Less important than Socrates’ immediate, reflexive 
response, is his extremely rapid recovery. How did he manage this? Upon becoming 
“inflamed,” Socrates said that he was no longer in control of himself, or, translated more 
literally, “I was no longer in myself” (155d). Here we have our first pointer to the strange 
fact of self-reflection, and the multiplicity of the self that it implies. To anticipate the 
definition of moderation that we will find in the Republic, one could say that in this 
moment the previous harmony of Socrates’ person is disturbed when division arises 
between the part of him that is dispassionately curious to learn about Charmides’ soul and 
the part of him that suddenly develops a keen interest in possessing Charmides as his 
own.90 What is important to note is that Socrates clearly associates his truest self with the 
former rather than the latter interest.  
                                                 
89 As Baumeister and Tierney put it, “Strictly speaking, ‘impulse control’ is a misnomer. 
You don’t really control the impulses. Even someone as preternaturally disciplined as 
Barack Obama can’t avoid stray impulses to smoke a cigarette. What he can control is 
how he reacts: Does he ignore the impulse, or chew a Nicorette, or sneak out for a 
smoke?” Roy F. Baumeister and John Tierney, Willpower: Rediscovering the Greatest 
Human Strength (New York: Penguin Press, 2012), 37.  
 
90 In Schmid’s words, in the scene that follows “Socrates [is] able, by means of his self-
control and recollection of Cydias’ wisdom, to reunify his momentarily fragmented self 





Self-reflection and its relation to self-knowledge will be explored in depth as the 
dialogue continues. For now, there are just a few points to be made. Socrates, in the very 
moment that he seems to have lost self-possession, still remained aware of that very fact, 
meaning he had not lost himself entirely—or, if he had, it seems only to have lasted an 
instant. For not only was he a keen observer of the wave of passion that washed over his 
body, but his mind was immediately occupied not by blind desire for Charmides, but by 
thoughts about a poet. He thinks of Cydias who had once warned that those approaching 
a beautiful boy, like a fawn coming opposite a lion, not be taken as a portion of meat. 
And he thinks to himself “Cydias is the wisest in erotic matters.” In the midst of 
experiencing an intense passion, Socrates is able to reflect upon the danger of that 
passion and call to mind a previous warning from a poet who he can now recognize as 
wiser than himself.91  
Needless to say, this is not the most natural train of thought one might imagine 
most men in Socrates’ position having. The ease with which Socrates moves from 
experiencing an intense passion, to observing that he is no longer himself, to reflecting 
upon his experience within the context of his wisdom relative to a poet’s, can only be 
explained when one considers the habits of mind Socrates has to have formed in the 
course of living a philosophic life, i.e. one guided by his love of wisdom.92 Every 
                                                 
91 Compare Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 146. 
 
92 Pangle provides a helpful description of the kind of knowledge Socrates possesses and 
its relation to self-control in Virtue is Knowledge, 125: “A wise person’s knowledge will 
be more steadily available because he has schooled himself to keep it in view, but at 
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experience, even one of what would otherwise be a blinding passion, becomes an 
opportunity for reflection.  
By virtue of this train of thought Socrates has recovered enough self-possession to 
play along with Critias’ ruse, professing to have knowledge of a drug to cure Charmides’ 
headaches. There is some debate in the literature as to the authenticity of the story 
Socrates goes on to tell. Critias could not have thought that Socrates actually possessed 
knowledge of how to cure headaches, and it would be an incredible coincidence if, as 
Socrates goes on to claim, he just happened to have come across such a cure while he was 
in the army. Still, as will be discussed more below, the story should not be dismissed out 
of hand as pure fiction.  
Socrates explains to Charmides that the drug is a certain leaf that accompanied by 
an incantation can make one healthy. Without the incantation, there is no benefit to be 
gained from the leaf. Charmides replies that he will take the incantation and write it 
down, to which Socrates responds, “If you persuade me, or even if you don’t?” (156a). 
This would seem to be Charmides’ first test in moderation—a virtue commonly 
associated with persuasion rather than force. The answer seems so obvious to Charmides 
that he laughs and says, “If I persuade you, Socrates” (156a).93 At this point it becomes 
                                                                                                                                                 
moments of temptation he will still need vigilance to do so, rather as a good hiker needs 
vigilance not to slip on a steep path, but being a good hiker, he will exercise that 
vigilance and will not slip.” See also 43. 
 
93 If it is right that Charmides knows that Socrates is not a doctor, then his laugh could be 




clear that Charmides knows Socrates’ name. In fact, he goes on to say “there is no little 
talk about you among those of our age, and as for me even as a boy I remember your 
associating with Critias here” (156a).94 Charmides not only knows Socrates’ name, but he 
has some idea of who he is—in short, he knows Socrates is no physician. Now that 
Socrates knows that Charmides knows this, he says that he can speak more frankly about 
the incantation, just what sort it happens to be and what power it has. Through the veil of 
Critias’ ruse, Socrates will go on to speak more frankly about what he might truly be able 
to offer Charmides.95 While he may not be a doctor of the body, he could prove to be one 
of the soul. 
Socrates asks Charmides whether he has noticed that when a patient has pain in 
his eyes, good doctors do not attempt to doctor the eyes alone, but treat the head as well, 
and also consider it mindless to treat the head without treating the whole body. 
Charmides responds that he has noticed this and agrees entirely with their method. (At 
this point, Socrates tells his nameless companion that he began, little by little, to regain 
his courage and come back to life. As Socrates regains control of the conversation, seeing 
how it can be steered toward an examination of the boy’s soul, he becomes more fully 
                                                 
94 Compare Laches 180e-181a.  
 
95 In the Protagoras Socrates speaks of the need to be a doctor expert in matters of the 
soul (313e). In the Gorgias (521e) Socrates draws an analogy between himself and the 
doctor. In the Phaedrus, Socrates draws an extended analogy between the medical art 
which treats the body and the rhetorical art which treats the soul, placing the same 
emphasis upon the necessity of understanding the whole that we will see in the discussion 
that follows (see Phaedrus 270b ff.) In Book IV of the Republic, we will see Socrates 




himself.) Socrates goes on to explain to Charmides that while he was in the army camp, 
he learned the incantation from one of the Thracian doctors of Zalmoxis, who are reputed 
to immortalize men.96 The doctor told Socrates that according to Zalmoxis, their king 
who is a god, just as one cannot care for a part of the body without caring for the whole 
of the body, one cannot care for the body without caring for the soul. According to 
Thracian medicine, everything both good and bad for the body and for the whole human 
being flows from the soul, which one ought to treat first and foremost, if the body is to be 
in a good condition. The soul must be treated with incantations, which are beautiful 
speeches. From such speeches moderation comes to be in souls, and once it is there, “it is 
easy to provide health both for the head and for the rest of the body” (157a).  
What of this remarkable account is Charmides meant to believe? Is Socrates here 
playing one quack, channeling another? Many commentators are inclined to view his 
story as pure invention. If Socrates were making this story up out of whole cloth, it would 
not be the only time he seems to have done such a thing (see Phaedrus 275b). But 
McPherran rightly argues that “this piece of text does not appear to be woven of purely 
fictional threads.”97 McPherran notes that the Thracians were believed to possess “special 
powers of music and healing,” Socrates had indeed been on military campaign near 
Thrace, and Zalmoxis was in fact a Thracian deity, whom Herodotus links to tales of 
                                                 
96 For a brief discussion of Zalmoxis see W. K. C. Guthrie, The Greeks and Their Gods, 
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1955), 174-176.  
 




immortality.98 It would have been up to Charmides, as much as it is to readers, to 
determine just which elements of this account might be true and which false. The very 
ability to do so might be a test of one’s moderation, if part of moderation proves to be, as 
it is tentatively defined later in the dialogue, an ability to distinguish knowledge from 
non-knowledge.  
Leaving aside for now the bolder claims of Socrates’ story, namely the hearsay 
accounts of Zalmoxis’ status as a god and of Thracian doctors’ ability to immortalize 
men, what are we to make of the basic theory in its own right? Take first the principle of 
Greek medicine: to successfully treat a part of the body, you must treat the whole. 
Needless to say, this is hardly a founding tenet of modern medicine. If someone comes to 
the doctor with cataracts, there is no doubt that this person’s eyes can be successfully 
treated without any attention needing to be paid to the rest of the body. Still, it is equally 
true that when it comes to many more prevalent and vexing diseases, it would be foolish 
to think the part could be treated on its own. In the case of heart disease (a leading cause 
of death worldwide), for example, we clearly have a part that could not possibly be 
treated without care given to the whole. If someone has heart disease, it is likely because 
he or she also has diabetes, hypertension, and high cholesterol. In addition to medication, 
any good doctor would have to encourage modifications in diet and exercise. In other 
words, our doctors must also “turn to the whole body with their regimens and attempt to 
                                                 




treat and doctor the part along with the whole” (156c). As a general principle, caring for 
the whole of the body as opposed to just a part is not as dubious as it might first seem.99 
What of the Thracian addition? Is there anything to the idea that one does not go 
far enough even in treating the whole of the body if no care is given to the soul? In this 
respect we may stand to learn as much from the Thracians as did the Greeks. To extend 
the case above, there is no pill a doctor could prescribe to induce the change of mind and 
spirit necessary to reverse a lifetime of poor diet and exercise. This case is not so 
different from one in which there is no benefit from the leaf without the incantation. It is 
not such a stretch to say that just as Thracian medicine calls for incantations that produce 
moderation along with the drug, we too may be in need of speeches that teach moderation 
in addition to even our most sophisticated medicinal cures. No medicine or surgery can 
produce virtue. For this we may very well need, as Socrates’ Thracian says, beautiful 
speeches.  
But so far we have only been speaking of the good that might come to the body 
from proper care of the soul. It must be remembered that the Thracian had promised 
much more. According to Socrates, he had said that everything both good and bad, for the 
body and for the whole human being, flows from the soul. Bearing this in mind, it seems 
all the more crucial to learn the beautiful speeches that produce moderation in the soul. 
                                                 
99 On this point see Sophie Bourgault, “Eros, Viagra, and the Good Life,” in The 
Philosophy of Viagra: Bioethical Responses to the Viagrification of the Modern World, 




But the nature and content of these beautiful speeches will remain a mystery.100 When 
Socrates goes on to explain to Charmides that he can only have the drug if he is first 
willing to chant the incantations that produce moderation, Critias intervenes. He insists 
that while Charmides’ headaches would “be a godsend for the youth if he will be 
compelled because of his head to become better also in his thought,” Charmides is 
already by far the most moderate of all his peers (157c-d).  
Socrates tells Charmides that it would be just if he were, as Critias says, second to 
none in all respects, adding that it would be hard to find two families in Athens more 
likely to produce someone “more beautiful and better than those from which you were 
born” (157e). Socrates goes on to trace Charmides’ lineage, distinguished “in beauty and 
virtue, and in the rest of what is called happiness” (157e-158a). He goes so far as to say 
that it is likely for him to be “first in everything,” and grants that in terms of looks he 
brings shame on none of his forebears. If his nature is, as Critias maintains, also 
“sufficient in terms of moderation and in other respects,” then blessed did his mother bear 
him (158b); he can skip the incantations and be given the drug right away. “So,” Socrates 
                                                 
100 A number of commentators assume that the speeches are the Socratic dialectic that is 
to follow, but there do not seem to be any grounds for making this assumption. See, for 
example, Matthias Vorwerk, “Plato on Virtue: Definitions of ΣΩΦΡΟΣΥΝΗ in Plato’s 
Charmides and in Plotinus Enneads 1.2 (19),” The American Journal of Philology Vol. 
122, No. 1 (2001):  32 fn. 12 and Bourgault, “Eros, Viagra, and the Good Life,” 13. C.f., 
Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 15. Schmid acknowledges the dialogue leaves 
this ambiguous. The word used here for charms, epōdai, is more often associated in Plato 
with the moral education that would need to precede training in dialectics. For more on 
the role of epodai in Plato’s work see George Klosko, The Development of Plato’s 




says to Charmides, “tell me yourself whether you agree with [Critias] and say that you 
already have a sufficient share of moderation, or that you are in need” (158c). With this, 
Socrates has brought the conversation to where he had wanted it to start: a stripping of 
Charmides’ soul to see whether he is as well born in this respect as he is with regard to 
his body.  
Before turning to Charmides’ answer, it is worth stopping to consider the line of 
thought raised by Socrates’ repeated emphasis upon Charmides’ and Critias’ shared 
lineage. Along with his name, the first thing Socrates wanted to know about Charmides 
was who his father is,101 and this is now the second time that Socrates has noted the boy’s 
illustrious family background (first at 154e-155a when he suggested Charmides’ poetic 
quality might be traced to his and Critias’ shared ties to Solon). In this latest case, 
Socrates goes on at length describing the two sides of Charmides’ family and why he 
should be bound to surpass all others in beauty and virtue. Socrates is clearly playing 
upon the aristocratic prejudice that virtue can be inherited along with looks. His emphasis 
upon Charmides’ family background, which would have involved what the Athenians 
considered “good breeding,” raises the vexing question of nature versus nurture. To what 
extent does possession of the virtue of moderation depend upon the disposition with 
                                                 
101 As West and West note, Socrates asks literally, “Who and whose [or, ‘of what’] is 
he?” pointing, as they say, to “a major theme of the dialogue: Who is Charmides…and 
who or what is responsible for his being such as he is?” See West and West, Charmides, 




which one happens to be born? Are there certain inherited, or natural prerequisites to the 
attainment of this virtue, or is it something that theoretically anyone could achieve?  
Returning to the text, what might have been the more immediate purpose behind 
Socrates’ lengthy praise of Charmides’ background? For one thing, Socrates seems to be 
trying to raise Charmides’ confidence, encouraging him in the thought that he already 
possesses all he could possibly need, setting him up for a potentially transformative 
revelation to the contrary. Socrates must have also been interested in seeing how 
Charmides would handle such high praise. In terms of what it reveals, Charmides’ 
reaction does not disappoint: “Blushing, Charmides first appeared even more beautiful—
for a sense of shame suited his age—and then he also answered in no ignoble way” 
(158c).102 Charmides explains that it is unreasonable (alogon) for him to answer. If he 
were to say that he is not moderate, not only would it be strange to speak against himself 
in this way, but it would also be strange for him to speak against Critias and many others 
who believe him to be so. Then again, to praise himself and say that he is moderate might 
seem in equally bad taste.  
Charmides’ blush is the second involuntary bodily reaction of the dialogue. It 
brings out more clearly than did Socrates’ case of inflammation the fascinating 
connection that obtains in human beings between soul and body, mind and matter. In 
                                                 
102 For a similar instance of a youth blushing on account of shame see Protagoras 312a. 
For a collection of instances of blushing in Plato’s work, see Paul W. Gooch, "Red Faces 
in Plato," The Classical Journal, 1987-1988: 124-127. Gooch curiously omits 




what Darwin calls the “most peculiar and most human of all sensations,” we find an 
involuntary reaction of the body caused by certain thoughts—thoughts crucially shaped 
by our opinions as to what is right and wrong, proper and improper.103 With Charmides’ 
blush we read upon his body the writing of his soul, but how exactly to translate it? 
In bringing Charmides to blush, Socrates has begun to succeed in what could very 
well be one of his main purposes in speaking to the boy: to make Charmides more self-
conscious and ultimately more self-reflective. Of course, the visceral self-consciousness 
revealed by Charmides’ blush is not yet the mature version Socrates might hope 
eventually to encourage. At present, Charmides’ self-consciousness consists primarily in 
a concern for how he appears not in his own eyes, but in the eyes of others. As Charmides 
eloquently explains, his dilemma consists in not wishing to offend or annoy, either by 
praising himself or by speaking against himself and those who praise him. It is worth 
noting that Charmides presents his dilemma as either to say that he is moderate or to say 
that he is not. It does not occur to Charmides to say that he does not know if he is 
sufficiently moderate because he thinks he knows that he is.  
Charmides believes himself to be moderate, but, in line with this moderation, is 
not so arrogant as to say so. His blush reveals the sincerity with which his pride is 
                                                 
103 Darwin continues: “We can cause laughing by tickling the skin, weeping or frowning 
by a blow, trembling from the fear of pain, and so forth; but we cannot cause a blush…by 
any action on the body. It is the mind which must be affected.” Charles Darwin, The 





followed by shame.104 Charmides shows that he possesses the elements of conventional 
moderation that he will go on to offer in his definitions for the virtue: quietness and a 
sense of shame. He recognizes that it is improper for him to speak; rather than loudly or 
arrogantly proclaim his moderation, he explains the alogos nature of his position. He is 
quiet because he possesses shame—the check upon hubris commonly understood to be 
nothing other than moderation.  
Charmides’ flushed cheeks make his body all the more beautiful because they 
reveal the beauty of his soul, a soul concerned with and touched by virtue. But Socrates 
makes it clear that this beauty is not without qualification—it suits his age. In other 
words, it is fitting for now, but he must eventually grow out of it into a more mature 
version. As we will see, the nature of Charmides’ nobility is not only conventional but 
also largely unreflective, and the very possession of it prevents him from questioning and 
investigating. Socrates will try to provide Charmides with a way around the conventions 
that hinder him.  
 
 
                                                 
104 Although I focus below on Socrates’ attempt to help Charmides mature beyond his 
feeling of shame, this is not to discount the importance of Charmides having felt shame in 
the first place. For a thoughtful account on Plato’s treatment of shame and its salutary 
effects, see Christina Tarnopolsky, “Prudes, Perverts, and Tyrants: Plato and the 
Contemporary Politics of Shame,” Political Theory 32, 4 (2004). In Socrates’ interaction 
with Charmides and later with Critias, we see examples of shaming that create the effect 
Tarnopolsky identifies: “a potentially salutary discomfort and perplexity in the 
patient…that is necessary for self-consciousness, self-reflection, self-criticism, and moral 





As a solution to Charmides’ dilemma Socrates proposes that they investigate 
together. Socrates suggests that if Charmides is moderate, then he should be able to offer 
some opinion as to what moderation is. “For surely,” Socrates says, “it is necessary that 
it, being in you, if it is in you, furnish some perception from which you have some 
opinion about it as to what and what sort of thing moderation is” (159a). Charmides 
supposes this is the case, and Socrates adds that assuming Charmides has knowledge of 
Greek, he should be able to say what moderation appears to him to be. Charmides’ 
response, “perhaps,” registers a legitimate doubt as to the ease with which he should be 
able to define moderation.  
In the first place, Socrates speaks of moderation as if it were no different from any 
other object which, when present, furnishes various perceptions from which one can form 
opinions. But in what sense exactly is moderation in someone, and what perceptions 
exactly could it furnish? Surely moderation is not some thing that one can smell, touch, 
taste, hear or see in any literal sense. At the very least, Socrates’ proposal shows that the 
act of self-reflection depends upon using language in a strange and largely metaphorical 
way. But this brings us to the question of whether it is so clear that with knowledge of 
Greek Charmides has all he needs to be able to express whatever it is that he finds within 
himself. It is far from obvious that all our experiences can be put clearly into words, 
especially our experience of the internal possession of a virtue. Even if moderation were 
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something that one knows when one “sees” it, or “feels” when one has it, it could still 
remain a challenge to capture whatever that is in speech. Moreover it is unclear that in 
recognizing moderation one is ever recognizing something as singular as the single word 
“moderation” might imply. With this one word we identify an indefinite number of 
experiences, impressions, reactions, and inclinations. The challenge in forming a 
definition is to find some general statement that captures what all these manifold 
instances seem to share. The gathering together of the similarities that run through our 
varied perceptions and the identification of those that are most essential is surely a more 
difficult task than Socrates has made it seem.  
If it is true that any raw experience of moderation (if there is such an experience) 
might be hard to capture in words, or that any general definition distilled from a variety 
of particular experiences might take some effort to reach, is it not more likely that 
Charmides will express in speech what he has heard in speech? And rather than first 
experiencing moderation as something announcing itself (in Greek) from within, 
Charmides’ first exposure to the meaning of moderation is likelier to have been in 
hearing others talk about it, in learning its meaning as he learned his language.105 
Socrates will soon confirm that this is the very version of the virtue Charmides offers in 
his first definition, namely “what they say” is moderation. For now, we can say that far 
                                                 
105 Compare Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 152: “[D]oes not ‘speaking 
Greek’—and therefore, what one has heard—have more to do with one’s opinion about 
moderation than Socrates’ formulation allows?” See also Lampert, How Philosophy 
Became Socratic, 171: “Charmides’ first answer…comes ultimately from what 




from making clear the ease with which Charmides ought to be able to say what 
moderation is, Socrates’ line of thought has raised the challenges involved in capturing 
the meaning of a virtue.  
 
Moderation as a Certain Quietness 
After some understandable hesitation and difficulty, Charmides offers his first 
definition of moderation.106 Moderation, in his opinion, is doing everything in an orderly 
and quiet fashion, not only walking in the streets and conversing, but everything else in 
the same way. In sum, moderation is “a certain quietness” (159b).107 Charmides 
essentially defines moderation as a particular way of carrying oneself, regardless of what 
one is doing. It is the very way we have seen him carrying himself: the opposite, for 
example, of how we have seen Chaerephon carries himself. If Chaerephon’s behavior 
indicated a lack of self-control, then Charmides may have captured something significant 
about how one who possesses moderation would appear. But this points to the difficulty 
with Charmides’ definition—it does not go far enough beyond the level of appearance. It 
is doubtful that Charmides himself is aware of whatever truth might lie beneath the 
surface of his own definition.  
                                                 
106 For a helpful discussion of how Charmides’ definitions relate to traditional 
understandings of the virtue see Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, Chapter 2.  
 
107 The word translated as “quietness” is hēsuchēi, which can mean quietly, gently, or 




Socrates is clearly interested in pushing Charmides beyond this first attempt at 
understanding the meaning of moderation, which he grants is in line with what many say. 
He begins his refutation by getting Charmides to agree that moderation is among the 
beautiful things. Then, through an ever-growing distortion of Charmides’ meaning, 
eliding first the difference between doing something quietly with doing something 
slowly, Socrates has Charmides concede that a number of activities are done more 
beautifully when done swiftly and keenly, rather than quietly, slowly, and with difficulty.  
How might one defend Charmides’ definition against Socrates’ refutation? 
Socrates clearly distorts Charmides’ meaning, dropping entirely his reference to orderly 
behavior.108 Charmides’ intention seems best captured by thinking of someone who does 
everything with a certain serenity or self-possession. Surely in proposing that being 
moderate meant acting in a quiet and orderly way, Charmides did not mean to define 
moderation as doing everything slowly and with difficulty. Even more problematic is the 
fact that the argument as a whole rests upon the false assumption that if moderation is 
among the beautiful things, any and every beautiful thing must be moderate. This would 
be akin to arguing that since human beings are living creatures, every living creature 
must be a human being. Socrates’ argument is so unsound that its main purpose could not 
possibly be to provide an adequate refutation of Charmides’ definition, leaving us 
                                                 
108 Kosmos is almost always a feature closely linked with moderation in Greek thought 
and will prove to be a central feature in Plato’s understanding of the virtue. For more on 
the relationship between moderation and order see North, Sophrosyne, especially 29. 
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wondering what its true purpose might be. A clue can be found in Socrates’ description of 
the way in which Charmides investigates for a second time.  
Socrates advises Charmides to “apply his mind more” and investigate 
“courageously,” and he notes that when Charmides makes his second attempt he pauses 
and courageously investigates (160d-e). Charmides proceeds with a slowness that is not 
ugly but fitting. It is evidence of the care with which, aided by courage, he investigates 
himself more thoroughly. By noting Charmides’ courage, Socrates draws our attention to 
the fact that if there is beauty to the way Charmides investigates here, it cannot be 
attributed solely to the presence of moderation. Correcting for the flaw in Socrates’ 
argument, we see that the most beautiful actions may be those that combine the virtues, 
striking a proper balance between them.  
But this brings us to the more fundamental question raised by Socrates’ first 
refutation. What of the unexamined assumption that every moderate action is beautiful? 
Must we not also question this? The idea that one might need to turn to a standard beyond 
beauty for identifying the virtue of moderation will be confirmed in the discussion that 
follows.  
 
Moderation as Reverence or a Sense of Shame 
For his second definition, Charmides says that moderation, in his opinion, is that 
which makes a human being feel ashamed and modest, and moderation is just what 
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reverence or a sense of shame is.109 Charmides’ second definition would seem to be more 
promising than his first. He has, just as Socrates encouraged him to do, tried to express 
what it is inside him that makes him moderate. As we saw earlier, his quietness was the 
result of his shame, which he here identifies as rooted in aidos. Strikingly, Socrates will 
refute this more promising definition even more quickly than he did the first. His 
argument is short enough that we can quote it in full. 
“Well then,” I said. “Weren’t you [Charmides] just agreeing that moderation is 
something beautiful?” “Quite so,” he said. “Then are the moderate men also 
good?” “Yes.” “So would that which produces men who are not good be a good?” 
“Of course not.” “So then it is not only something beautiful but also good.” “Yes, 
in my opinion.” “What then?” I said. “Don’t you trust that Homer speaks 
beautifully when he says, ‘Respectfulness is not good for a needy man’?” “I do,” 
he said. “Then reverence, it seems, is a non-good and a good.” “It appears so.” 
“Then moderation would not be reverence, if it does happen to be the good while 
reverence is something no more good than bad.” (160e-161a) 
 
In the final line of Socrates’ argument he puzzlingly refers to moderation as “the good.” 
Could moderation possibly be the good? Or is it not more likely a good? But if 
moderation is simply a good, then would this mean that it could sometimes come into 
conflict with other goods?110 Or is there a way in which moderation could prove to be 
good in any and every circumstance? This seems to be the very question at issue with 
regard to reverence or a sense of shame in Socrates’ Homeric example. While a sense of 
                                                 
109 The word Charmides uses is aidos, which can also mean respect (for oneself and 
toward another). 
 
110 In the Euthydemus (279a ff.) Socrates along with Clinias identifies a number of goods 




shame is in many cases considered a good, in cases of pressing need, it can stand in 
conflict with other goods, such as survival or knowledge.  
But even if one argues that a person’s greater good is served by abandoning his 
shame, can one go so far as to say that in doing so one is acting beautifully? Does one 
even “speak beautifully” in suggesting this course of action? Would not the more 
beautiful speech be the one that counsels the more beautiful act, namely the refusal to 
abandon one’s sense of shame, whatever the circumstances? Socrates’ Homeric example, 
upon reflection, challenges Charmides’ assumption that the beautiful and the good always 
coincide.111 The immediate drama of the dialogue reflects this same tension, as we see 
Charmides’ reverence for Homer’s authority leads him to accept Socrates’ refutation with 
as much complacency as he did the first. Reverence stands in the way of the good that 
might come from questioning the argument.112  
                                                 
111 In his assumption that the noble and the good always coincide, the young Charmides 
shows himself to be more moral and, possibly, more naïve than the young Alcibiades. 
The latter, upon being asked by Socrates whether all beautiful things are good, or some 
good and others not, answers: “For my part, Socrates, I think that some of what’s 
beautiful is bad” (Alcibiades I 115a). All translations of Alcibiades I are from Socrates 
and Alcibiades, ed. Albert Keith Whitaker, trans. David M. Johnson (Massachusetts: 
Focus Publishing, 2003). 
 
112 As it happens, Socrates quotes this very same Homeric passage in the Laches (201b). 
There he tells Laches and Nicias that having recognized their need for a teacher of 
courage, they should not let anything prevent them from seeking one out. If anyone 
should laugh at them for needing a teacher at their age, they should confront them with 
Homer’s saying, that shame is no good for a man in need. It is worth noting that these are 




It soon becomes clear that Charmides has had enough of investigating himself for 
now. Having had his first two definitions of moderation dismissed by Socrates, he offers 
a third: moderation as “doing one’s own things” (161b). Abandoning entirely the 
procedure of looking for a definition of moderation based on what he sees in himself, 
Charmides again offers one that he has heard from someone else, this time not from the 
many but from one reputed to be wise. Socrates chastises Charmides for doing so—
calling him a wretch113—but he does not try to steer him back toward examining himself. 
In fact, the rest of Socrates’ dialogue with Charmides is geared toward drawing in Critias, 
whom Socrates immediately credits with Charmides’ newest definition.  
Critias is quick to disavow the definition, and Charmides asks Socrates what 
difference it makes from whom he heard it.114 Socrates concedes that what must be 
investigated is not who said moderation is doing one’s own things, but whether or not it 
is true. “Now you’re speaking correctly,” says Charmides. “By Zeus,” exclaims Socrates, 
                                                 
113 The term translated as “wretch,” although used somewhat playfully here, is a harsh 
term, meaning literally “defiled one.” Socrates will also call Critias a wretch before the 
dialogue is over. It is relatively uncommon in Plato—the only other dialogue in which it 
appears twice is the Republic, where Socrates uses the term once in relation to oligarchs, 
and again in relation to the tyrant (562d and 589e). Compare also the Theages, where 
Socrates calls Theages a wretch directly after his admission that he desires to be a tyrant 
(Theages 125a). See also Phaedrus 236e. 
 
114 Eisenstadt’s explanation for this disavowal—namely that Critias does not want to 
publicly admit that he agrees doing one’s own things, understood as ruling over others, is 
his understanding of moderation—is implausible given that Critias is later willing to 
accept the definition as his own. See Michael Eisenstadt, “Critias: Definitions of 
∑ΩΦPO∑ΥNH in Plato’s ‘Charmides’,” Hermes 136 (2008): 492-495.  
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apparently surprised by how quickly Charmides has turned from trusting a statement 
simply because the authoritative Homer said it, to no longer caring who speaks (161c).  
But, as Socrates suspects, Charmides knows and cares about this latest definition 
because he has heard it from another, more immediate authority figure: his guardian 
Critias. Perhaps Charmides, who once saw Socrates defeat the great Protagoras in 
argument, is eager to see whether he will call Critias’ authority on the matter of 
moderation into question. Charmides and Socrates even appear to become co-
conspirators, working together to prod Critias into taking Charmides’ place. It seems that 
for now Socrates has seen enough of what he was looking for in Charmides’ soul, and 
that he is happy to oblige in Charmides’ wish that he test, and likely refute, Critias’ 
understanding of the virtue. Before turning from Socrates’ conversation with Charmides 
to his conversation with Critias, which will take up the remainder of the dialogue, it is 
worth pausing to sum up what we have learned about Charmides.  
We have seen that Charmides is an extremely beautiful young man with a very 
illustrious family background. When he walked into the gymnasium, he wielded a certain 
power over everyone in the room, immediately becoming an object of awe and desire. 
And yet it is striking that despite all this he does not seem to be at all arrogant or willful. 
He possesses a modest and gentle nature, which fits with ease into the conventional 
mould of moderation. But perhaps because being beautiful in this way comes so naturally 
to him and is met with such unanimous praise, Charmides has had little cause to reflect 
upon his own virtue.  
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When the opportunity presents itself to investigate along with Socrates, 
Charmides, who took note of Socrates long ago, is extremely eager. And yet he proves 
reluctant to be an active participant in the investigation (158e ff). The courage with which 
he investigates in giving his second definition shows that he is not completely lacking in 
the boldness he will need to move from a conventional understanding of moderation to a 
deeper understanding of the virtue and of himself—but he will need a lot more of it. With 
regard to Socrates’ refutations, Charmides remains ever acquiescent, failing to object to 
even the most obvious exaggerations and distortions in Socrates’ arguments. As much as 
his modesty speaks in his favor, his very sense of shame, which manifests itself most in 
his deference to the authority and opinions of others, hinders him in the search for 
knowledge of himself and the meaning of moderation. The question seems to be whether 
Charmides is capable of maturing beyond the beauty and modesty that, for now, suit his 
age. In the passages to come, we will get some indication that he is not hopelessly 
subservient.115 Charmides shows himself willing to be at least playfully insubordinate, 
goading his guardian Critias into proving he knew what he meant when he said that 
moderation was doing one’s own things.  
                                                 
115 Lampert also notes that Charmides has not “escaped the conventional,” but by contrast 





CHAPTER 2: CRITIAS 
 
We reached a turning point in the dialogue at the end of the previous chapter. 
With Charmides’ proposal of doing one’s own things as a definition for moderation, the 
focus of the conversation shifts from an examination of Charmides to an examination of 
moderation itself. This search for moderation is filtered through the lens of a new 
interlocutor: Critias takes Charmides’ place in conversation with Socrates. As the 
dialogue between these two develops, it becomes increasingly intellectual and abstract. 
Parts of the remainder of the Charmides are so abstruse that it can be difficult even to see 
how the discussion still relates to the topic of moderation. As several commentators have 
noted, the epistemological discussions that dominate the latter part of the Charmides 
would seem to find a more fitting home in the Theaetetus.116 Some even go so far as to 
maintain that the actual focus of the dialogue is not moderation at all, but rather 
knowledge.117 But it would be a mistake to think that moderation and knowledge, in 
                                                 
116 T.G.Tuckey, quoting Shorey, notes that “many feel the same distaste for [the latter 
parts of the dialogue] as they do for the subtler parts of the Theaetetus.” See T. G. 
Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides (Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1968), 1. Sprague, in the introduction 
to her translation of the Charmides, finds the “aridities” of the end of the Charmides earn 
it a greater resemblance to the Parmenides than to other early dialogues (Laches and 
Charmides, 53). See Plato: Laches and Charmides, trans. Rosamond Kent Sprague 
(Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992), 53. 
 
117 Charles Kahn for example, goes too far when he argues that "The search for moral 
knowledge ... takes a reflexive turn to self-knowledge that loses all contact with the 
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particular self-knowledge, are not intimately related.118 The challenge is to understand 
how. For this reason, as we proceed it will be important not to lose sight of the more 
familiar themes and questions surrounding moderation that arose in the first part of the 
dialogue.  
We must also be aware of a significant subtext to the conversation between 
Socrates and Critias. As alluded to earlier in the dialogue, Socrates and Critias have a 
longstanding association (156a). The ideas that unfold in the Charmides are clearly topics 
they have discussed before.119 And at several points Critias appears to be parroting a 
number of Socratic sayings. But we also see Critias trying to make his mark as an 
intellectual in his own right, offering his own interpretations of texts and oracles, 
interpretations that differ in significant ways from those of Socrates. The differences 
between how Socrates and Critias understand the meaning of moderation shed light on 
Plato’s conception of the virtue. 
 
Moderation as Doing One’s Own Things 
We ended the last chapter with Charmides offering his third and final definition 
for moderation: “doing one’s own things,” a definition he had heard from someone else. 
Socrates insists that whoever told Charmides that moderation is doing one’s own things 
                                                                                                                                                 
ordinary meaning of sōphrosunē." See Plato and the Socratic Dialogue (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), 191. 
 
118 On the relationship between virtue and knowledge see Pangle, Virtue is Knowledge.  
 
119 Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 178. 
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must have been speaking in riddles. To prove his point, Socrates interprets the phrase in a 
literal and laughable way. Socrates argues that the phrase sounds as if it means that a 
writer ought only write or read his own name, a weaver weave only his own cloak, a 
cobbler cobble only his own shoes.120 Each case is a matter of “doing something,” so, 
strictly speaking, this is what it would mean to do only one’s own things. Surely, Socrates 
contends, a city managed under a law that bid each to do one’s own things in this way 
would not be managed well.121 If to manage moderately is to manage well, then this 
doing of one’s own things could not possibly be moderation.  
For the first time in the dialogue, Socrates has brought in the good of the city as a 
standard by which one can judge whether or not something qualifies as moderate. The 
idea of moderation as a ruling art will be returned to at the end of the dialogue.122 For 
now we need only note that Socrates makes this mockery of “doing one’s own things” in 
order to goad Critias into the discussion. Did Charmides hear this ridiculous definition 
                                                 
120 Hippias the sophist appears to be someone who does, or makes, his own things in this 
way, from a ring on his finger to the shoes on his feet. In Plato’s Lesser Hippias (368b-c) 
Socrates says to him: “I once heard you boasting...You asserted that you had once come 
to Olympia, having all you had about your body as your own works.” Translations of the 
Lesser Hippias are from The Roots of Political Philosophy: Ten Forgotten Socratic 
Dialogues, ed. Thomas Pangle and trans. James Leake (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1987).  
 
121 Socrates introduces this very meaning of doing one’s own things in the Republic, only 
to replace it with the one person, one job principle (see 369e ff.).  
 
122 For a comparison of the two cities envisioned under moderation as it is understood 





from some fool, Socrates asks? Charmides insists that he heard it from someone reputed 
to be quite wise. “Then,” Socrates says, “more than anything he put it forward as a riddle, 
being aware that it is hard to recognize whatever doing one’s own things is” (162b). 
Although Socrates suspects that Charmides heard this definition of moderation from 
Critias, the original riddler he has in mind is likely none other than himself.123 For, as we 
will soon see, Critias does not appreciate the challenge involved in determining the 
meaning of doing one’s own things.  
Charmides, unable himself to explain what doing one’s own things might mean, 
says “perhaps nothing prevents the one who said it from knowing what he had in mind,” 
and, laughing slightly, he glances at Critias (162b). Socrates pauses in his narration to 
relate the following to his nameless companion:  
It had long been clear that Critias was anxious to contend and win honor before 
both Charmides and those present; and having held himself back with difficulty 
earlier, he now became unable to. In my opinion what I suspected is more true 
than anything, that Charmides had heard this answer about moderation from 
Critias. Now Charmides, not wishing himself to give an account of the answer but 
for Critias to, kept prodding him and pointing out that he had been refuted. But he 
didn’t endure this, and it was my opinion that Critias was angry with him, just as a 
poet is with an actor who recites his poems badly. So he looked at him and said, 
“Do you suppose Charmides, that if you don’t know what he had in mind who 
said that moderation is doing one’s own things, therefore he doesn’t know 
either?” (162c-e) 
 
Critias, who is able to contain himself only with difficulty, shares little of the form of 
moderation expressed in Charmides as quietness or modesty. Critias is capable of some 
                                                 
123 This is a point on which most commentators agree. If not directly from Socrates, it is 
possible Critias heard about Socrates’ emphasis upon “doing one’s own things” from 




self-restraint but is soon overcome by his desire for honor. Socrates likens him not to a 
philosopher but to a poet, one who reacts with anger when he hears his lines garbled by a 
bad actor. Critias is possessive over his own words, which he seems to care about more 
insofar as they represent him than insofar as they represent the truth.  
Earlier in the dialogue Critias seemed very warm, even fatherly, toward 
Charmides, gladly touting his talents. We see how quickly his attitude changes as soon as 
the boy becomes an embarrassment. One can certainly empathize with Critias’ desire not 
to be made a fool of, and it is hard to blame him for being irritated by Charmides, who 
has been acting a bit like a rascal.124 The difficulty is that Critias is unable to react to the 
situation with grace or patience. His response to Charmides would be witty were it 
delivered playfully rather than in anger. But Critias has a short fuse, and not much of a 
sense of humor; his excessive pride is easily wounded.  
Socrates has to calm Critias through flattery, appealing to the very sense of self-
importance and love of honor that were the source of his anger. It is no wonder, Socrates 
says, that Charmides at his age is ignorant. But surely Critias, because of his age and the 
care he has taken, will know what the one who said moderation is doing one’s own things 
meant. Socrates says he will gladly continue the investigation with Critias if he is willing 
to take over the argument from Charmides. Critias is willing and eager to take up the 
argument.  
                                                 
124 Beversluis, for example, thinks Critias’ irritation is “perfectly understandable.” See 
John Beversluis, Cross-Examining Socrates: A Defense of the Interlocutors in Plato’s 




In contrast to how Socrates’ search for moderation with Charmides began, there is 
no suggestion here that the procedure for examining moderation depends on Critias 
looking for moderation within himself.125 Socrates does not insist that Critias’ ability to 
say what moderation is depends on his possessing the virtue, although his ability to 
understand it might. With this change in procedure, it is important to recognize that the 
purpose of the conversation has also changed. To see this more clearly, it is worth 
reviewing how the investigation of moderation began. The topic of moderation was 
introduced in the context of the cure Socrates claimed to have for Chamides’ headaches. 
He spoke of a drug that must be accompanied by an incantation of beautiful speeches 
from which moderation comes to be in souls. It looked as though Socrates would have 
told Charmides the incantations had Critias not interrupted on Charmides’ behalf, 
insisting that the boy was already quite moderate. Socrates agreed that if Charmides was 
sufficiently moderate, they could skip the incantations and go straight to the drug. But 
when Charmides found himself unable to say tactfully whether or not he was in adequate 
possession of the virtue, Socrates proposed that they investigate together. The premise of 
this investigation is that if moderation is in Charmides, it will furnish some perception. 
From this perception Charmides should be able to form an opinion which, knowing 
Greek, he ought to be able to express.  
                                                 
125 Bruell notes that although Socrates has Critias accept this definition as his own, 
“Socrates had not spoken of or indicated a desire to examine or strip Critias” (“Socratic 
Politics and Self-knowledge,” 159). 
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So when Charmides asked Socrates what difference the source of his third 
definition made, Socrates should have answered that it made all the difference. The entire 
procedure Socrates had outlined, the aim of which was to find out whether Charmides 
possesses moderation, depended entirely on Charmides looking for moderation within 
himself.126 Instead of reminding Charmides of this, Socrates agrees with Charmides when 
he says that what matters is not the origin of the definition, but whether or not it is true. 
This marks an unstated turning point in the discussion, which shifts from an investigation 
of moderation within Charmides to an investigation of moderation itself.127 
But it is not just an investigation of moderation itself. Socrates makes a point of 
having Critias accept the new definition as his own. As we saw at the close of the last 
chapter, although Charmides does not say it, we have reason to believe that he wants this 
particular definition to be investigated because it belongs to Critias. Charmides wants to 
see whether Critias will prove any more resistant to Socrates’ refutations than he did. 
Socrates, for his part, is happy to oblige. He seems to recognize that for Charmides to 
pursue this matter any further, he first needs to be freed of Critias’ influence. Thus, the 
conversation that follows serves the dual purpose of drawing certain questions to 
                                                 
126 Compare Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 156: “For to continue the 
discussion in the way [Charmides] now proposed was to divorce it from the Socratic 
procedure for discovering whether or not he possessed moderation and to that extent to 
leave that question behind.” 
 
127 Bruell aptly warns that while the following discussion seems to be concerned only 
with the question of moderation, we must beware of how what follows is still shaped by 
Critias’ character and not “simply ‘philosophic’” (“Socratic Politics and Self-




Charmides’ attention, while also challenging Critias’ authority, thereby freeing 
Charmides to investigate for himself what the virtue of moderation is, and whether or not 
he has it.128  
 
Critias adopts “doing one’s own things” as his own 
When Critias agrees to take over the argument, Socrates asks him whether he also 
agrees with the previously stated claim, that craftsmen make something. Socrates had in 
fact spoken earlier of craftsmen doing something (161e), a difference Critias will soon 
put to use.129 For now Critias concedes that craftsmen do make something; they make 
their own things along with those of others and nothing prevents them from being 
moderate in doing so. How then, Socrates asks, can Critias still maintain that moderation 
is doing one’s own things? Wiser to Socrates’ switching of terms than Charmides was, 
Critias argues that in agreeing that nothing prevents those who make the things of others 
from being moderate, he has hardly conceded that those who do the things of others are 
moderate. Socrates then asks Critias whether he does not consider making and doing to 
be the same, thereby prompting Critias to elaborate his distinction between them.  
Critias begins by saying that he distinguishes making not only from doing but also 
                                                 
128 Schmid (The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 31) also recognizes that “Socrates might 
regard Charmides rather than Critias, as the person more likely to benefit from his 
dialogue with the latter.” 
 
129 The phrase “doing one’s own things” is “to ta heautou prattein.” The verb translated 




from working. He has learned from Hesiod that “work is no disgrace” (163b). In saying 
this, Critias argues, contrary to the obvious meaning of Hesiod’s words, that one should 
not understand Hesiod to suggest that there is nothing disgraceful about “work” like 
cobbling, fish selling, or prostitution. Hesiod must have drawn distinctions, as Critias 
does, between making, doing, and working. Critias goes on to argue that making can 
become a disgrace, when a thing is not made nobly. But when a thing is made nobly and 
beneficially, this kind of making may rightfully be called working and doing. And only 
things such as this can be considered one’s own, while everything harmful is alien.  
The essential distinction Critias has drawn is between making on one hand, and 
doing and working on the other. Nothing prevents one who makes things for others from 
being moderate, provided his makings are of the sort that are noble and beneficial—in 
other words, the kind of making that can properly be called a working or doing of what 
may truly be considered one’s own things. Rather than understanding “one’s own” as 
possessions literally belonging to oneself, like one’s name, shoes, or clothing, Critias 
interprets one’s own as that which is noble and beneficial as opposed to harmful. By this 
account, working and doing are equivalent; neither, if properly identified, can ever be a 
disgrace. Critias’ introduction of the term “working” is superfluous to his argument. He 
seems to have brought it in only so as to make use of Hesiod, putting his own especially 
aristocratic stamp on that famous poet’s words.130  
                                                 
130 See Hesiod, Works and Days 311. The reference to Hesiod is of particular interest 
since we know from Xenophon that Socrates was accused of using this very line to “teach 
his companions to be doers of mischief and skilled at tyranny.” According to the accuser, 
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Socrates had used the concern of the city as a whole to dismiss the first 
understanding of doing one’s own things. Doing one’s own things understood as each 
individual being radically self-sufficient was eliminated as a plausible meaning for 
moderation insofar as this did not make for a well-managed city. Indeed, it is hard to see 
how a group of entirely self-sufficient individuals could form a city at all. This 
conception of doing one’s own things seems to deny the foundation of necessity upon 
which, as Socrates suggests in the Republic, cities are built (see Republic 369b ff.). 
Socrates has implied that behaving moderately on the level of the individual must in 
some way be conducive to the well-ordered, moderate operation of a city as a whole. 
What then is the proper way of doing one’s own things within the context of a city? 
Socrates does not go on to evaluate Critias’ explanation of the phrase by the 
standard of the city, but what is revealed by doing so? Would a city be well managed 
according to a law that bid everyone to do one’s own things in the way Critias would 
have them? There is a way in which Critias’ definition fails to confront productively the 
necessities of a city. A city in which no one ever did any disgraceful works such as 
prostitution would doubtless be admirable, but a city ordered by Critias’ excessively 
                                                                                                                                                 
Socrates argued that with these words Hesiod “bids one to refrain from no work, however 
unjust or shameful, but to do even these for gain.” Xenophon, in a less than fully 
convincing defense of Socrates, claims that Socrates “thoroughly agreed that being a 
worker is both beneficial for a human being and good…those who do something good 
both work and are good workers, but those who play dice or do something else wicked 
and unprofitable he called idlers” (Xenophon, Memorabilia 1.2.56). On this point see 
Robert Bartlett, “An Introduction to Hesiod’s Works and Days,” The Review of Politics 




aristocratic standards would also seem to be one where all would go shoeless. Or, more 
likely, a certain subclass of individuals would be responsible for all such “disgraceful” 
works. The ordering of a city implied by Critias’ statement is characteristically 
oligarchic, marking off a gentlemanly class—those considered both noble and good—
from a lower class consigned to undesirable, but necessary work.131  
The extreme disdain Critias shows for the banausic arts and the laborers who 
attend to a city’s most basic needs hardly seems conducive to a well-ordered society, at 
least if that order is to be at all harmonious. Harmony is a standard we will see play a 
significant role in both the happiness and strength of a city as described in the Republic, 
where Socrates gives what has become his most well-known articulation of doing one’s 
own things. Doing one’s own things in Socrates’ city in speech amounts to each 
individual in the city doing the task to which he or she is most suited by nature. While an 
undeniable hierarchy is established by virtue of this principle, each part or class is 
acknowledged and valued as a contributor to the whole, a feature important in helping to 
prevent faction. In the Republic, Socrates identifies this understanding of doing one’s 
own things with justice, but especially insofar as it involves a harmony and friendship 
among the parts it proves indistinguishable from the definition Socrates first provides for 
moderation. This riddle in its own right will be discussed in our chapter on the Republic. 
Returning to the discussion at hand, solving the present riddle of what it could 
possibly mean to do one’s own things depends on determining the precise meaning of 
                                                 




“doing” and “one’s own.” Socrates had emphasized how difficult it is to know the 
meaning of this phrase, but Critias has given no indication that he appreciates the 
challenge. For Critias, doing one’s own things means doing what is noble and beneficial. 
Still, precisely what Critias means by these words remains so unclear that he might as 
well be speaking in riddles. From what he has said so far, we can only gather that, in 
Critias’ mind, not all activities are dignified enough to be properly called doings, and 
what is harmful cannot properly be considered one’s own. But this leaves us far from 
knowing the positive content behind doing one’s own things in Critias’ understanding. 
What precisely does Critias have in mind when he refers to the noble and the beneficial?  
 
Moderation as the Doing of Good Things 
Socrates suggests one possibility for what Critias might have meant. He says that 
just as Critias was beginning, he almost understood his argument: “you call things good 
that are kindred to oneself and one’s own, and you call the makings of good things 
doings” (163d). After referring to Prodicus, from whom he has heard ten thousand such 
distinctions among names, Socrates tells Critias to “set down the names however you 
wish, but only make clear to what you are referring whatever name you say” (163d). Go 
back again from the beginning, Socrates says, and define it more plainly—the doing or 
making (however Critias wants to name it) of good things, is this what he says 
moderation is? Critias agrees. So, Socrates asks, he who does bad things is not moderate, 
but he who does good things is? Critias responds by asking Socrates whether, in his 
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opinion, this isn’t so. Socrates retorts that it is not his own opinion, but what Critias says 
that is under investigation.  
At this point it is worth pausing to notice that something strange is going on. In 
the first place, the definition Socrates has disguised as a simple summing up or 
clarification of Critias’ argument is significantly different from what Critias had said. 
And the fact that Socrates stresses that he almost understood Critias’ meaning, and only 
as he was just starting to speak, suggests that in the end what Critias meant was quite 
different from Socrates’ first suspicion of what he might mean. In other words, Socrates 
thought Critias’ distinction was going to hinge on the good—if it had, he would have 
understood him. But Critias said nothing about the good. Socrates’ apparent clarification 
of Critias’ statement marks a new beginning insofar as it introduces the good, whereas 
Critias has only spoken of the noble and the beneficial. Critias then has every reason to 
ask Socrates whether the notion that doing one’s own things is doing the good things is 
his opinion on the matter, since Socrates is the one to have made that suggestion. And it 
is all the more strange for Socrates to insist in response that they are investigating not 
what he thinks but what Critias has said, since Socrates knows full well that Critias never 
said anything about the good.  
This switch from what Critias had spoken of, the noble and the beneficial, to 
Socrates’ suggestion of the good is not inconsequential, especially if we keep in mind 
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what we observed in the earlier discussion between Socrates and Charmides.132 It is far 
from clear that the good, the noble, and the beneficial always coincide. Many 
commentators, in their eagerness to reduce Critias to the tyrant he will become, read 
Critias especially critically here, attributing to him an equation of one’s own with the 
good, a position that amounts to nothing more than a “calculating, narrow egoism.”133 
This sort of interpretation either ignores completely, or quickly passes over, the concern 
Critias has shown for the noble, as well as his love of honor, attachments not captured by 
a “calculating, narrow egoism.” It is important to see that Critias’ love of the noble and 
attachment to honor, both potentially admirable elements of his character, are part and 
parcel of what we saw earlier to be an excessively oligarchic inclination. As Socrates will 
bring out later (169b), Critias, son of Callaeschrus, is a mix of both beautiful and ugly 
qualities.  
Given Critias’ clear interest in honor and the noble, it seems most likely, as 
Critias suspects, that this new emphasis on the good is Socrates’ opinion on the matter. 
As we will see, this is just the first of many instances in which Socrates will steer the 
                                                 
132 Compare Lampert (How Philosophy Became Socratic, 182), who notes that “Socrates’ 
substitution of good for kalon and useful anticipates just where the fundamental 
difference between them will be found: in their respective notions of the good.” 
 
133 For example, Schmid (The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 34) insists that “Critias’ 
underlying thought is clear: the true meaning of sōphrosunē does not consist in making or 
even doing what is beautiful; it rather focuses on the idea of procuring benefit for oneself 
and avoiding all harm as “alien.” Schmid goes on to describe Critias as a “decadent 
aristocrat,” with no genuine concern for nobility. Lampert gives a similar interpretation of 
Critias, also describing him as operating on the basis of a “private, calculating egoism” 
(How Philosophy Became Socratic, 181).  
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conversation with Critias. Still, what is meant by the good remains a mystery. Socrates 
insists that Critias use whatever term he likes so long as he makes the object it refers to 
clear. Not only has Socrates done his own dubious switching of terms, but we have yet to 
find out what should be attached to each of them. Whatever Socrates’ intentions might 
be, Critias is willing to accept the words as his own. Whether Critias understands how 
this view differs from his own remains to be seen.  
For now, Critias asserts that the one who makes bad things is not moderate, 
whereas the one who makes good things is, and he gives his new definition of the virtue: 
the doing of good things is moderation. Socrates says that perhaps nothing prevents 
Critias from speaking the truth. Having been the source of this new definition, it is not 
surprising that Socrates finds it more promising. But the fact that Critias may speak the 
truth does not mean he understands it. This discrepancy between knowing and not 
knowing will be the thrust of Socrates’ next query. Socrates says he wonders about 
something: does Critias believe those who are moderate are ignorant of being moderate? 
Critias does not believe so. But Socrates reminds Critias that he had earlier said that 
nothing prevents craftsmen who make the things of others from being moderate, and he 
goes on to raise a problem for Critias’ position.  
Socrates begins by gaining Critias’ agreement on the following points: A doctor 
who makes someone healthy makes beneficial things both for himself and for the one he 
doctors. In doing this, the doctor does what is needed, and the one who does what is 
needed is moderate. Socrates then asks Critias whether it is necessary for the doctor to 
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recognize when he is doctoring beneficially and when not, as well as for each of the 
craftsmen to recognize when he is going to profit from the work he is doing and when 
not.134 When Critias answers, “perhaps not,” Socrates points out that sometimes the 
doctor will not know himself whether he has done something beneficially or harmfully. 
“And yet having done it beneficially, as your argument has it, he did it moderately” 
(164c). Critias admits he had said this. Socrates then asks him whether it seems that 
“sometimes he who does something beneficially does it moderately and is moderate, but 
is ignorant of being moderate himself” (164c). Critias is adamant that this could not 
possibly be so.  
Just what is Socrates driving at with this argument? As noted above, Socrates 
begins by reminding Critias that he has said that nothing prevents the craftsman who does 
his own things from being moderate. The force of this argument is to suggest that a 
certain kind of ignorance may prevent the craftsman from being moderate in doing his 
own things. What is the precise nature of the ignorance in question? At first it sounds like 
Socrates is suggesting that a doctor may cure a patient just by luck. Such a case seems 
analogous to the possibility that Critias happened to be speaking the truth about 
moderation without fully understanding how or why. He would be similar to the doctor 
who does the beneficial thing in treating a patient without even realizing it, an act that 
would not seem to be in keeping with the individual’s status as a doctor. The point here 
seems similar to one made by Thrasymachus in the Republic—an expert qua expert must 
                                                 




be understood as someone who is fully aware of what he or she is doing, and does not 
just happen upon it by chance. Thrasymachus asks Socrates, “Do you call a man who 
makes mistakes about the sick a doctor because of the very mistake he is making?” 
(Republic 340d). As Thrasymachus summarizes: “in precise speech…none of the 
craftsmen makes mistakes. The man who makes mistakes makes them on account of a 
failure in knowledge, and in that respect is no craftsmen” (Republic 340d-e). A doctor, 
insofar as he or she is a doctor, cures by knowledge, not by luck.  
But the second example makes one wonder whether some amount of chance 
might not always be involved in profiting as a craftsman as well. When Socrates asks 
whether every craftsman must know when he is going to profit and when not, he hints at 
more significant limits to knowledge, limits he will return to at the end of his 
conversation with Critias when the dialogue comes full circle (174b). The first difficulty 
in this case can be seen especially clearly if one considers the example of the worker 
Hesiod had in mind: the farmer. The farmer surely knows what is needful insofar as he is 
a farmer—he must plant his crops and tend his land. If all goes well, he and whomever he 
sells his crops to are bound to benefit. But how could he ever be certain that he will profit 
when he remains entirely at the mercy of the weather? Once we grant our limited ability 
to predict the future, the sphere within which we can know with certainty our ability to 
profit radically shrinks.135 If, as Socrates suggests here, being moderate involves doing 
what is needed, insofar as we have to act in the present without certainty as to whether we 
                                                 
135 See Xenophon, Memorabilia I.1.6-8.  
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will benefit or profit in the future, the crucial knowledge to have would be this awareness 
both of what we know and of the limits to what we can know—that is, knowledge of our 
ignorance. 
But a farmer or doctor or craftsman could be ignorant in an even more 
fundamental way than in regard to the future. As Socrates has indicated earlier in the 
dialogue, more important than the body is the soul. And insofar as one tends to things of 
the body, one fails, as Socrates puts it in another dialogue, to know oneself and to do 
one’s own things. In conversation with Critias’ friend Alcibiades, Socrates puts the point 
this way:  
So farmers and craftsmen fall far short of knowing themselves. For they don’t 
even know what belongs to them, it seems, but something further removed than 
what belongs to them, at least as far as their arts are concerned. For they know the 
things that belong to the body, the things with which the body is tended…So if 
moderation is knowing oneself, none of these is moderate because of his art. 
(Alcibiades I 131a-b) 
 
Without a clear picture of one’s true self, one cannot know the good. One could be doing 
either the beneficial or the harmful without, as Socrates puts it, knowing himself what he 
is doing.136 Here we see why Socrates embedded this phrase gignōskei heauton within his 
argument. He succeeds in cornering Critias while at the same time offering him a phrase 
                                                 
136 In the above points I have followed Bruell (“Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 
163) who writes: “For while one might say that the doers of good things are moderate 
only insofar as they know the goodness of what they do, an uncertainty about the 
goodness of what he does belongs to the artisan as such. He cannot know, without 
divination, whether his work will have a successful outcome; he does not know as artisan 
the goodness of the end his art serves (e.g., it is not by his science that a medical man 
knows the goodness of health); and he does not know by his art the circumstances in 




which serves as a trap door through which Critias escapes. Critias latches on to this 
concept and turns his focus to a new definition of moderation: knowing oneself.137 Critias 
proceeds to argue that being moderate is nearly equivalent to knowing oneself, so it is 
impossible for someone to be moderate without knowing it.138 To come to see the true 
meaning of doing’s one’s own things, we must understand what one’s own means in the 
most significant way. We must consider a good that goes beyond the limited ends toward 
which each of the arts aim, asking what is the ultimate good for ourselves? Having raised 
this question, Socrates then offers Critias—and Plato his readers—the key of self-
knowledge.139 
 
Knowing Oneself and Moderation 
Critias heeds Socrates’ prompting, taking advantage of his mention of the doctor 
knowing himself to launch into his second extended speech. He insists that he would 
rather take back what he had previously said than concede that someone who is ignorant 
                                                 
137 As Tuckey (Plato’s Charmides, 24) puts it, Critias’ reply “gives the impression that he 
is thinking: ‘Oh, of course! Why didn’t I think of that before?’” See also Kahn, Plato and 
the Socratic Dialogue, 190 fn. 13. See also Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 
185. 
 
138 Bruell (“Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 165) understands the problem here to 
be one of boasting—a vice incompatible with moderation.  
 
139 Beversluis (Cross-Examining Socrates, 146) thinks the lack of knowledge in question 
is the doctor’s inability to know whether or not his or her patient will be cured, but that “a 
temperate doctor is not one who cures his patients but one who does his best to cure them 
by conscientiously doing what is in their best medical interests.” This underestimates the 




of himself is moderate because “this is almost what moderation is: knowing oneself” 
(164d). Having earlier supported his argument with a novel interpretation of Hesiod, 
Critias now finds grounds for his position in what appears to be an equally eccentric 
interpretation of the Delphic inscription:  
This inscription in my opinion was put up as if it were a greeting of the god to 
those entering, instead of ‘rejoice,’ in the view that this greeting, ‘rejoice,’ is not 
correct, and that they should not exhort each other to this, but to be moderate.140 
Thus the god addresses those entering the temple somewhat differently than do 
human beings. Such was the thinking of the one who put it up when he put it up, 
in my opinion. And he says to whoever enters nothing other than ‘be moderate’ he 
asserts. He says it, of course, in a rather riddlesome way, like a diviner. For ‘know 
yourself’ and ‘be moderate’ are the same, as the inscription and I assert. Yet 
someone might perhaps suppose they are different, which is what happened in my 
opinion to those who put up the later inscriptions ‘Nothing too much’ and ‘A 
pledge, and bane is near.’ For they supposed that ‘Know yourself’ is a counsel, 
not a greeting by the god for the sake of those entering. And then, so that they too 
might put up counsels no less useful, they wrote these and put them up. (164d-
165a) 
 
In telling this story Critias seems to be trying to outshine Socrates, whom he would have 
heard years ago offer his own account as to the origins of the Delphic inscriptions. 
During the conversation depicted in Plato’s Protagoras, at which both Critias and 
Charmides were present, Socrates describes the seven wise men as having “offered up the 
first fruits of wisdom to Apollo at the temple of Delphi, where they wrote the things that 
indeed all recite, ‘Know Thyself’ and ‘Nothing in Excess’” (Protagoras 343a-b).141 
Critias here offers his own account of the inscriptions.  
                                                 
140 The customary Greek greeting khaire translates as “rejoice.”  
 
141 All translations of the Protagoras are from Protagoras” and “Meno,” trans. Robert C. 
Bartlett (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004). 
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According to Critias, the one who wrote the key inscription wrote it to be a 
greeting worthy of a god. Critias’ suggestion is somewhat puzzling, but it can be 
understood at least in part with the help of one of Plato’s letters. In a letter to Dionysius, 
Plato explains his reason for avoiding the customary greeting of wishing the other joy in 
favor of his own preferred way of beginning letters to friends by wishing they do well (eu 
prattein). Plato chastises Dionysius, who was said to have addressed the god at Delphi in 
the usual way, wishing him joy and a tyrant’s life of pleasure. Plato, by contrast, insists 
that he would never exhort a man, much less a god, to enjoy himself, since gods live lives 
beyond pleasure and pain, and for men, pleasures are only the source of harm, “breeding 
stupidity, forgetfulness, senselessness, and hubris in the soul” (Plato, Third Letter).  
Here Critias provides a similarly improved greeting. Better than wishing someone 
rejoice, a god would wish for the other to know himself. The inscription is meant not as a 
counsel but as a greeting from one knower to another. In this way, Critias presents 
himself as pious, but his piety is marked by his own relatively exclusive understanding of 
what the god at Delphi had in mind.142 Critias attributes to the god a wisdom superior to 
                                                 
142 A number of scholars interpret this passage in light of the belief that Critias is an 
atheist (for example, Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 38 and Lampert, How 
Philosophy Became Socratic, 188). This belief is largely grounded in the assumption that 
Critias was the author of the satyr play Sisyphus. A single fragment from this play 
remains, one in which the character Sisyphus describes a clever man who invented the 
gods to keep human beings in order. There are a number of problems with interpreting 
Critias and this passage in light of this fragment. First, it is unclear whether Critias or 
Euripides authored the play. Second, even if Critias had been the author, ascribing to him 
the beliefs of one of his characters is problematic. This is especially so when, as Sutton, 
referencing Dihle, notes, nothing in any of the other preserved fragments of Critias’ 
writings confirm the theory that he is an atheist. For a summary of the ways in which this 
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that of most, but not all, human beings. The god, according to Critias, emphasizes 
knowledge and in the same spirit seems to speak especially to would-be knowers. Critias’ 
claim is that “know thyself” is a riddlesome way of saying “be moderate.” Traditionally 
the phrase “know thyself” meant to know one’s place, especially in relation to the 
gods.143 Critias’ interpretation of the inscription as a greeting rather than a counsel levels 
the traditional hierarchy between gods and human beings—at least those superior human 
beings who, like Critias, are in the know. Despite being a mere mortal, Critias certainly 
seems to think that he knows the mind of the god fairly well, at least no less well than the 
person who transcribed the god’s inscriptions.144  
Critias is adamantly attached to his new definition. He tells Socrates that he is 
taking back everything he had said before. Maybe Socrates had been speaking more 
                                                                                                                                                 
fragment and its relation to Critias’ own beliefs has been interpreted see Dana Sutton, 
“Critias and Atheism,” The Classical Quarterly Vol. 31, No. 1 (1981): 33-38. As the 
dialogue progresses, Socrates repeatedly draws attention to Critias’ belief in prophecy 
(174c and 174a1), making it implausible that he was an atheist (this is not to say his faith 
was orthodox).  
 
143 See North, Sophrosyne, especially Chapter 1.  
 
144 Offering an explanation for the origin of the Delphic inscriptions is not necessarily an 
impious act—their origin was apparently always disputed. According to Eliza Gregory 
Wilkins (“‘Know Thyself’ in Greek and Latin Literature”, 5-6), “The original authorship 
of the sayings is an open question now as of old.” Wilkins summarizes the status of the 
Delphic inscriptions origins by quoting Porphyry: “Whether Phemonoe, through whom 
the Pythian God is said to have first distributed favors to men, uttered this (gnothi sauton) 
. . . or Phanothea, the priestess of Delphi, or whether it was a dedication of Bias or Thales 
or Chilon, started by some divine inspiration . . or whether it was before Chilon . . . as 
Aristotle says in his work on Philosophy, whosoever it was . . let the question of its origin 




correctly, or maybe Critias had been, but either way nothing was especially clear. But 
now, if Socrates disputes that moderation is oneself knowing oneself (to gignōskein auton 
heauton), Critias is willing to give an account of it. This response reveals more about 
Critias’ character. We see here the high premium he places on knowledge, a point that 
will be reinforced throughout the remainder of the dialogue. And in keeping with the 
value he places on knowing, it seems laudable that Critias is willing to let go of 
something he said earlier, rather than insist stubbornly upon the truth of what has now 
been shown to be incoherent or obviously false. 
The difficulty is that Critias’ willingness to admit he may have spoken incorrectly 
seems rooted in an overconfidence that he could not possibly be thinking incorrectly. He 
gives no indication of feeling himself to be at all confused or uncertain. Critias feels no 
need to ensure that there is no contradiction between the thought that prompted him to 
speak as he did earlier and the one that prompts him now to speak in a contradictory way. 
Critias fails to take each aspect of his and Socrates’ speech seriously enough to become 
aware of or concerned by his own inconsistencies. Rather than try to reconcile his 
previous speech with his current position, Critias is happy simply to abandon his previous 
argument. In this way he shows a lack of care for himself, a point Socrates will draw 
attention to later in the dialogue. Critias prides himself on the importance he places upon 
knowledge, but he refuses to recognize anything that might indicate his own lack of it. 
His very pride in being a knower prevents him from becoming one.  
Socrates begins to consider Critias’ new definition in the following way. If 
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moderation is a kind of recognition (gignōskein) then it must be a kind of knowledge 
(epistēmē) and must therefore be of something. Critias responds that it is indeed a kind of 
knowledge, namely knowledge of oneself. Without commenting on this reply, Socrates 
goes on to give examples of two other kinds of knowledge (epistēmē), medicine and 
architecture. Medicine is a knowledge, namely the knowledge of health, which produces 
the condition of health, which is a benefit to us. Architecture is a knowledge of building 
houses, which produces houses which are a benefit to us, and so on with the other arts 
(technē). If moderation is a knowledge (epistēmē) of the self, then what noble result does 
it produce that makes it worthy of the name?  
Critias replies that Socrates is not enquiring correctly by assuming that all forms 
of knowledge are alike. What product, for example, do the arts (technē) of calculation or 
geometry produce that is akin to a house produced by house-building or a coat by 
weaving? The distinction Critias draws between different kinds of sciences, practical and 
theoretical, seems a legitimate one and a point that Socrates concedes.145 But if doctoring 
produces the health of the body, one wonders whether moderation might not produce the 
health of the soul.146 For now, however, Socrates drops entirely the question of what 
moderation provides for us that makes it worthy of the name. He instead steers the 
conversation in a different direction.  
Before moving forward, it is worth noting that Critias could have objected when 
                                                 
145 The Stranger draws the same distinction in Plato’s Statesman (see 258d-e).  
 




Socrates first equated recognition of oneself with knowledge. Depending on what one 
means by the terms, one is not necessarily a form of the other.147 In the passages to 
follow we will be prompted to reflect upon the nature and spectrum of knowing, from 
opinion to knowledge, perception to science. As Socrates suggested earlier in the 
dialogue, we need to remain aware of what precisely is being referred to whenever a 
word is being used, keeping in mind that there are different kinds of knowledge and 
different ways of knowing. In the section that follows, to help avoid making Charmides’ 
mistake of assuming we know the exact meaning of a word just because it is familiar, I 
will often refer to the original Greek terms at issue. 
 
Knowledge of Knowledge 
Directly after Critias drives home the point, with which Socrates agrees, that the 
knowledge that comprises moderation, namely knowledge of oneself, is different from 
the other forms of knowledge, Socrates says the following: But in each of these cases, I 
can point out to you what the knowledge is of, different from the knowledge itself. For 
example, calculation is concerned with the even and the odd, which are themselves 
distinct from calculation. Similarly, weighing is concerned with the heavy and the light, 
which are themselves distinct from weighing. What then, Socrates asks, is moderation a 
                                                 
147 For discussions of this step in the argument see Tuckey, Plato’s Charmides, 30-31, 
49-50, 57; Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, 95-96; and Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of 




knowledge of that is different from moderation itself?148 In this way, Socrates sets Critias 
up to argue that the knowledge at issue differs from all other knowledges in this respect 
as well—that it has itself as its subject. Critias takes the bait: He says Socrates has come 
to the very way in which moderation differs from all the other knowledges, for while the 
others are knowledges of something else and not of themselves, it alone is a knowledge 
both of the other knowledges and itself of itself. Notice Critias here adds knowledge of 
the other knowledges, whereas Socrates will soon add and emphasize knowledge of non-
knowledge. 
 Now why might Socrates have driven the argument in this direction? After all, 
Critias had provided a subject for the knowledge that is moderation, namely the subject 
of the self. The self would seem at first glance to be a subject of knowledge as distinct 
from the knowledge that comprises moderation as even and odd are from the knowledge 
that comprises calculation. Why then does the conversation turn from the comprehensible 
notion of self-knowledge to a more abstract discussion of knowledge of knowledge? As 
we will see, the discussion of knowledge of knowledge brings out what is strange about 
the apparently accessible idea of self-knowledge. For in taking the self as the object of 
our knowledge, we are attempting to know as an object what is in its essence a subject.149 
And if what we mean by the self is primarily a knower, then in speaking of knowledge of 
the self, we are speaking of a peculiar kind of reflexive knowledge, a knowledge of a 
                                                 
148 Compare Republic 438c-d.  
 




knower. But to what extent and about what things are we knowers? As will be confirmed 
in the section to come, Socrates wants Critias to reflect on whether or not knowledge of 
knowledge is possible. In other words, do we know what we think we know, and what 
kind of certainty is available to us?  
But Critias has his own theory as to what is motivating Socrates. After 
maintaining that moderation is a knowledge of other knowledges and itself of itself, 
Critias accuses Socrates of being far from unaware of this and contends the following: 
“for you are doing, I suppose, what you just denied you were doing. You are attempting 
to refute me and letting go of what the argument is about” (166c). Socrates responds as 
though he is shocked by such an accusation: 
“What a thing you are doing,” I said, “by believing even if I do refute you, that I 
am refuting for the sake of anything other than that for the sake of which I would 
also search through myself as to what I say, fearing that unawares I might ever 
suppose that I know something when I don’t know. So I do assert that this is what 
I am doing now: investigating the argument most of all for the sake of myself, but 
perhaps also for my other suitable companions. Or don’t you suppose that it is a 
common good for almost all human beings that each thing that exists should 
become clearly apparent just as it is?” (166c-d) 
 
Critias says he very much thinks so, and Socrates tells him in that case to be courageous 
and, without caring who is being refuted, to apply his mind to the argument. This is the 
second time Socrates has had to urge his interlocutor to be courageous in his search for 
the truth. The first was when Socrates told Charmides to be courageous in his self-
examination (160d). The goodness of having things revealed as they are is not as obvious 
to us as Socrates makes it seem. Courage is needed in our attempts to make each thing 
that exists become apparent just as it is because we fear what we might find and what we 
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stand to lose.  
Critias’ immediate fear is a loss of his good reputation. But he is emboldened 
enough to reassert his belief that moderation alone is knowledge itself of itself and of all 
the other knowledges. Now as we saw, Socrates had set Critias up to argue that 
moderation was a knowledge of itself, but “of other knowledges” seems to have been 
Critias’ own addition. Critias stresses moderation as an all-encompassing or ruling 
knowledge. Socrates, by contrast, highlights the importance of knowing what one doesn’t 
know, asking whether moderation would not also be a knowledge of non-knowledge.150 
Altogether, Critias replies. That established, Socrates draws the following conclusion:  
Then only the moderate one will himself both know (gignōsko) himself and be 
able to examine both what he happens to know (eidos) and what he does not; in 
the same way it will be possible for him to investigate others in regard to what 
someone knows and supposes, if he does know, and what he himself supposes he 
knows but does not know. No one else will be able to. And this is what being 
moderate and moderation, and oneself knowing (gignōsko) oneself are: knowing 
(eidenai) both what one knows and what one does not know. (167a)151  
 
Critias agrees that this is what he is saying. What exactly has he agreed to? In the 
first place, Socrates has distinguished two kinds of knowing or capacities to know. He 
says that the one who is moderate, and only this one, will both know (or recognize) 
himself (eauton gnōsetai) and be able to examine what he happens to know (eidenai) and 
                                                 
150 The importance of this difference is noted by Lampert. How Philosophy Became 
Socratic, 200 ff.  
 
151 Dyson and Schmid both take this to be the most significant definition of moderation 
offered in the dialogue. See M. Dyson, “Some problems concerning Knowledge in 
Plato’s ‘Charmides,’” Phronesis 19, 2 (1974) and Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of 
Rationality, 105.  
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what not. In other words, there is a kind of self-knowledge or recognition that is 
distinguished from the ability to examine what one knows and does not know. This 
ability in turn seems distinct from but connected to an ability to examine the claims of 
knowledge made by others. Socrates speaks here of an ability to examine claims to 
knowledge, both one’s own and others’. In other words, his emphasis is on an activity of 
investigation rather than on the static possession of a body of knowledge.  
It is worth considering this passage in light of the long statement Socrates made 
just preceding it. Socrates had insisted that his refutations of Critias were for the sake of 
the same end as his examinations of his own opinions. The motivation in each case is a 
fear of thinking that he knows something that he does not in fact know. Socrates here 
describes the very activity he himself is engaged in—a refutation of others that is 
somehow intimately connected with his examination of his own opinions and is an 
important element in his quest for self-knowledge.152 Self-knowledge, for Socrates, is not 
a Cartesian effort to be carried out simply by reflecting upon one’s self by oneself. For 
reasons that are not yet clear, one needs to know others to know oneself.  
 
Back Again 
It is important to keep this goal of self-knowledge in mind, for it illuminates a 
number of the strange features of the passages to follow. In the arguments to come, 
                                                 
152 For another suggestion that Socrates’ dialogues with others are connected with his 




Socrates will examine the possibility of knowledge of knowledge, but in such a way as to 
allow us to reflect upon what it might mean to know ourselves. At this point, Socrates 
marks at least a partial break in the argument: “Back again,” he says, “third time for the 
Savior” (167a). Now that they have located a potential definition for moderation—a 
knowledge of itself, the other knowledges, and non-knowledge—two things must be 
considered anew: First, whether this kind of knowledge is possible, and second, if it is 
possible, what benefit comes from it. Of course, Socrates is here speaking of 
investigating the possibility and benefit of the very aim he described himself as pursuing 
at 166b.153 The benefit as he described it there was that things would come to be seen 
clearly as they are. But at this point Socrates claims to be at a loss. The perplexity 
Socrates presents to Critias centers around the reflexivity of the kind of knowledge (the 
knowledge of knowledge) that they have proposed moderation entails. Socrates suggests 
to Critias that this kind of reflexivity seems impossible in other all cases. There are two 
parts to the argument Socrates makes. It will be worth describing them both in full, 
before taking a closer look at their meaning.  
Socrates begins by asking Critias to consider the possibility of a series of 
                                                 
153 Schmid (The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 43) notes, “the drama of the Charmides 
makes evident, at the very beginning of the inquiry into the possibility and benefit of self-
knowledge—an inquiry that will end aporetically—that some form of knowledge of 
knowledge and ignorance is possible.” Eisenstadt (“Definitions of ∑ΩΦPO∑ΥNH”) 
observes that the possibility of knowledge of knowledge and non-knowledge is noted at 
the very beginning of the dialogue as a whole, when Socrates notes that he knew some of 
the people present at the gymnasium and did not know (and presumably knew he did not 




analogous examples, each entailing an activity or capacity that is directed at itself rather 
than at its characteristic object. The examples are as follows: a seeing that does not see 
color, but sees itself and the other seeings and non-seeings; a hearing that hears no sound, 
but hears itself and the other hearings and non-hearings; a kind of perception of 
perceptions and of itself that perceives nothing of what the other perceptions perceive; a 
kind of desire that is a desire of no pleasure, but is of itself and of the other desires; a 
kind of erotic love such that it happens to be a love of nothing beautiful, but is of itself 
and of the other loves; a kind of fear that fears itself and the other fears, but fears not 
even one of the terrible things; an opinion that is an opinion of opinion and of itself, but 
which opines nothing of what the others opine.  
Socrates gains Critias’ agreement as to the impossibility of each of these kinds of 
reflexivity. He then points out that if these cases are impossible, it would be strange if 
there is, as they assert, “a kind of knowledge such that it is a knowledge of nothing 
learned, but is a knowledge of itself and of the other knowledges” (168a). Still, rather 
than deny that there is such a thing, Socrates insists they investigate further. He extends 
the problem of reflexivity to a second set of examples, presenting the following line of 
argument: The knowledge of which they have been speaking is a knowledge of 
something; in other words, it has a kind of power or capacity (dunamis) so that it is of 
something. Socrates then draws an analogy between this power and, for example, the 




What would be the result if one directed this kind of capacity toward itself? If the 
greater were greater than itself, it would also be less than itself. Socrates extends this 
problem to other instances: double and half; more and less; heavier and lighter; older and 
younger. Socrates wonders, will everything else if it “has its own power with regard to 
itself also have that being with regard to which its power is?” (168d). Returning to the 
examples with which he began, he concludes that if hearing is going to hear itself, it must 
have a sound. Likewise, if vision is going to see itself, it must have color. Socrates asks 
Critias whether he sees that of the things they have gone through, those of the second set 
(the contraries) seem impossible, while the existence of others (presumably those of the 
first set), they strongly distrust. Critias agrees, and Socrates concludes:  
However, hearing and seeing, again, and further, a motion itself moving itself, 
and a heat kindling, and again, all such things, might afford distrust to some, but 
perhaps not to certain others. Some great man, my friend, is needed, who will 
draw this distinction capably in everything: whether none of the things that are 
has itself by nature its own power with regard to itself except knowledge, but has 
it with regard to something else, or whether some have it and others don’t; and 
again, if there are some things that themselves have it with regard to themselves, 
whether among them is a knowledge that we assert is moderation. (168e-169a) 
 
What is the meaning of this line of argument? Critias is most adamant in his 
denial of the first of these possibilities—a seeing that sees no color, but sees itself and the 
other seeings and non-seeings. Strictly speaking, this denial is correct, as Socrates 
confirms toward the close of the argument: seeing, if it is going to see itself, would have 
                                                 
154 West and West (Charmides, 42 n. 53) explain that the genitive tinos is the word used 
in both the expressions “of something” and “than something,” making for a seamless 
transition between these arguments in the original Greek.  
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to have color—a quality it obviously lacks.155 But in the conclusion to this line of 
argument Socrates hints at another kind of seeing, one that makes a kind of reflexivity 
possible. He says: “So you see, Critias, that of the things we have gone through, some 
appear impossible…” (168e).156 A literal seeing that sees no color is impossible, but 
Socrates here draws attention to a different kind of seeing, one that goes by the same 
name, but is not bound to objects with color. There is no literal seeing of seeing, but there 
is a seeing with the mind’s eye. Similarly, although there is no hearing with the ears that 
hears no sound, we can hear our own thoughts or a tune we sing to ourselves.  
Not only can we see what has no color and hear what has no sound, but we can, as 
Socrates indicates in his third example, more generally perceive our own perceiving.157 
We can be aware of our own awareness. In other words, human beings possess not only 
perception but also apperception. It is important to recognize that this kind of perceiving 
is akin to the perceiving of our senses, but not identical to it. If then a certain kind of 
perception of perception is possible, the suggestion is that so too might a kind of 
                                                 
155 J. Noel Hubler in “The Perils of Self-Perception: Explanations of Apperception in the  
Greek Commentaries on Aristotle,” The Review of Metaphysics 59, 2 (2005): 296, puts 
the point as follows: “Sight is not visible because it does not materially receive the form 
of its object. Sight does not become red when it sees red. If it did, it would be visible. 
Since it is not colored, it cannot be the object of its own power, for the proper object of 
vision is color. Hence the power of sight cannot perceive its own operation.” Hubler is 
here summarizing Alexander’s summary of the relevant passage in Aristotle’s De Sensu 
III.ii. 
 
156 This point is observed by most commentators. See, for example, Schmid, The Socratic 
Ideal of Rationality, 95 and Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 205. 
 
157 Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 90. 
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knowledge of knowledge be possible. In each case, one needs to bear in mind that while 
the same words are being used, what they signify may be similar but not identical. The 
kind of knowledge one would have of knowledge might be akin to, but not the same, as 
the other kinds of knowledge.  
Socrates follows his examples of perception with the examples of desire, wish, 
eros, fear, and opinion, asking in each case whether reflexive cases are possible. It is easy 
in many of these cases to imagine the capacity directed toward itself. For example, when 
in the depths of ennui one might desire desire, and it is not uncommon for a person to 
speak of loving love. The fear of fear itself, is of course an idea with which Roosevelt has 
made us familiar. And, most obvious of all, it is possible to have an opinion about 
opinions—for example, about their status in relation to knowledge. The purpose of these 
examples cannot then be to rule out the possibility of reflexive powers. What other 
purpose might they serve? The passage as a whole seems meant to direct our attention 
toward the nature of the human self, especially of the soul, and to urge us to reflect on 
what it means for the self to have this reflexive power. That all these examples point in 
this direction is confirmed when Socrates sums up the argument. “Hearing and seeing,” 
he says, “and further a motion itself moving itself, and a heat kindling, and again, all such 
things, might afford distrust to some, but perhaps not to certain others.”158 This 
                                                 
158 This distinction reminds of one drawn by Socrates in the Theaetetus between the 
initiated and uninitiated, the latter being those who “believe that nothing else is except 
whatever they are capable of getting a tight grip on with their hands, but actions, 
becomings, and everything invisible they don’t accept as in the class of being” 
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penultimate example of motion moving itself is the definition of the soul offered in both 
the Phaedrus (245d-246a) and in the Laws (895a-896b).159  
The reference to heat kindling reminds of Socrates’ description of his own person 
becoming inflamed earlier in the dialogue. Recall in that context we saw Socrates 
exercise self-control or self-mastery, on the way to achieving what seemed a kind of 
moderation. With his next set of examples, Socrates prompts us to puzzle over the very 
notion of self-mastery, for if we are masters of ourselves, are we not also slaves to 
ourselves?160 This is the kind of question raised by Socrates’ final set of reflections, 
beginning with the greater and the less.161 The question of whether or how we are able to 
stand in relation to ourselves in this way is especially pertinent to the virtue of 
moderation. Socrates puts the point this way in the Republic: “Moderation is surely a 
certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of pleasures and desires, as men say 
when they use—I don’t know in what way—the phrase ‘stronger than himself’; and some 
                                                                                                                                                 
(Theaetetus 155e). All translations of the Theaetetus are from Plato’s Theaetetus, trans.  
Seth Benardete (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984).  
 
159 See Klein, Plato’s Meno, 25; Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 175; and 
Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 98. 
 
160 See Clor, On Moderation, 27-28: “The concept of moderation presupposes both the 
necessity and possibility of a kind of self-mastery…But as Plato noted, there is a 
perplexity here. What is controlling what? That the ‘I’ which masters and the ‘I’ which is 
mastered are one and the same is an unintelligible proposition. It must be that some part 
of me is in control of some other part. The self is divided.”  
 
161 Schmid recognizes there may be a connection between this discussion and moderation 
itself, but fails to make the correct connection. See Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of 




other phrases of the sort are used…” (430e). Socrates insists that there is something 
ridiculous about the phrase “stronger than himself,” “if the same himself is referred to in 
all of them” (431a). Of course, we see Socrates in this dialogue describe himself as being 
“outside of himself,” a phrase that would seem no less ridiculous.  
The phrase is less ridiculous if we are referring to different parts of ourselves, and 
this is how Socrates will go on to explain moderation in the Republic. But it is important 
to see here yet another problem. If there are different parts of ourselves, especially parts 
that are at odds with each other, with which do we most identify? As Bruell points out, of 
the sets of examples Socrates provides, we seem to identify more with the second set than 
the first: “we remain what we are without the ability to see and hear, but not without the 
ability to desire, want, love, fear and think.”162 So, although I am the one seeing, I am not 
my sight. My identity is more aligned with the part of me that is aware of my perceptions 
than with the various parts of me that see, hear, smell, taste and touch. But this distinction 
is less clear in the case of desires, wishes, longings, fears and opinions. It can be much 
more difficult, perhaps impossible, to disentangle a person’s identity from the desires, 
wishes, longings, fears and opinions that he or she has.  
This observation can help us to see more clearly what is at stake for Socrates in 
self-knowledge, or what the weight is of the particular fear he expressed earlier in the 
dialogue—the fear of thinking that he knows something he does not know. Insofar as one 
holds in one’s heart a false conviction, without knowing it to be false, one fails to know 
                                                 
162 Bruell, “Socratic Politics and Self-knowledge,” 175. 
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one’s true self. Part of achieving knowledge of ourselves involves standing at a certain 
critical remove or distance from our own experiences. To gain perspective on our own 
experience, we need to be in a position to perceive our own perceptions and have 
opinions about our own opinions—in other words, to acquire the kind of theoretical 
distance that allows for self-reflection. This ability is crucial for the virtue of moderation, 
and its partner self-restraint.163 But this kind of distance and self knowledge can be 
especially difficult to attain. In part, it is more difficult because it may strike us at first as 
easy or obvious. We have access to our own thoughts and feelings in a way we do not 
have for those of others. For example, we saw early in the dialogue that a person like 
Chaerephon is fairly transparent when it comes to the outward expression of his inner 
sentiments, but it is much harder to read a typical person’s thoughts. Still, it may prove 
harder than one would anticipate to know our own thoughts. As Socrates has suggested 
more than once, it takes a certain courage along with a real effort to apply one’s mind to 
oneself, and to articulate with clarity and precision the nature of one’s own inner 
experience. One risks through this process losing elements of one’s own self-
understanding that one holds dear. As we saw in Charmides’ case, he may need to part 
with his own impression of himself as someone possessing virtue. Critias may need to 
part with his view of himself as a knower.  
If we return to the drama of the dialogue, we will see that Critias is soon brought 
against his will to this very realization. Socrates concludes this line of argument by 
                                                 
163 On the importance of self-consciousness and psychological distancing for moderation 
see Clor, On Moderation, 75-81. 
113 
 
emphasizing that some great man would be needed to determine which things have this 
reflexive power and which not, and whether knowledge is among those things that do. 
Socrates insists that he himself is not up to this task, and that while he divines that 
moderation is something beneficial and good, until knowledge of knowledge is shown to 
be both possible and beneficial, he cannot accept it as the definition of moderation. He 
implores Critias, who maintains that moderation is a knowledge of knowledge, and 
particularly of non-knowledge, to demonstrate that this is both possible and beneficial. In 
effect, he invites Critias to prove that he is that great man, the great man he surely 
believes—and wants everyone else to believe—himself to be.  
Critias fails to live up to this challenge. Socrates relates the following to his 
companion:  
When Critias heard this and saw me in perplexity, then, just as those who see 
people yawning right across from them have the same happen to them, so he too 
in my opinion was compelled by my perplexity and was caught by perplexity 
himself. Now since he is well-reputed on every occasion, he was ashamed before 
those present, and he was neither willing to concede to me that he was unable to 
draw the distinctions I called upon him to make, nor did he say anything plain, 
concealing his perplexity. (169c-d) 
 
Whatever Critias said to try to conceal his perplexity, Socrates does not bother to relate it 
to his companion. Socrates has succeeded in bringing Critias to a moment of aporia. But 
whereas Socrates actively investigates and admits the possibility of his own lack of 
knowledge and perplexity, Critias can only be brought to do so by a form of a passing, 
involuntary reaction, which Socrates likens to a yawn. His attachment to his own honor 
and reputation prevents him from genuinely addressing his true condition. In stark 
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contrast to Socrates, Critias fails to embrace the recognition of what he does not know as 
an important feature of his self-knowledge.  
 
Knowledge of What? 
 At this point, Socrates has succeeded in embarrassing Critias, who is unable to 
recover or find a graceful transition. They have reached enough of an impasse that 
Socrates has to intervene “so that the argument might go forward” (169d). He proposes 
that they simply assume for now that knowledge of knowledge is possible—they can 
investigate another time whether or not that is actually the case. The remainder of the 
dialogue will be geared toward bringing out what Critias hopes to gain from a knowledge 
of knowledge, and trying to disabuse him of these hopes.  
Socrates begins by turning to what had been their second concern (after 
considering the possibility of knowledge of knowledge), that of benefit, by way of 
wondering exactly what knowledge of knowledge is the knowledge of? What is its 
content? Specifically, Socrates asks, how does one by virtue of knowledge of knowledge, 
know what one knows or what not, as opposed to merely that one knows or that one does 
not? It is unclear whether a knowledge of knowledge provides us with any of the content 
that typically makes knowledge beneficial.  
How are we to make sense of this strange turn in the argument? The suggestion 
seems to be that strictly speaking, someone with a knowledge of knowledge will have the 
ability to distinguish only between what is and what is not knowledge. In short, if 
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moderation is nothing but a general knowledge of knowledge, then whoever possesses it 
will be unable to recognize any particular knowledge as the particular knowledge that it 
is. For example, a person with knowledge of knowledge placed in a room with a doctor 
and an architect would be able to recognize that each possessed knowledge, but not have 
any clue as to who to go to for a headache. In investigating others, such a one would only 
be able to determine that a person either has or does not have some kind of knowledge, 
but in the case of having knowledge, would not be able to know what kind of knowledge 
the person has.164 It then becomes a question whether the person with a knowledge of 
knowledge will be of any use when it comes to investigating others in regard to any 
particular claims to knowledge. It seems more likely that one would need not a general 
knowledge of knowledge, but a specific knowledge of particulars. In other words, only 
the expert could properly judge the merits of one who claims expertise.  
The core suggestion that one would need to know something about the subject 
matter of the various arts or knowledges to distinguish between them is sound. But how 
much would one have to know? To get over the hurdle Socrates erects here, namely being 
able to distinguish between someone claiming to be a doctor and someone claiming to be 
an architect, one would need only the most elementary acquaintance with each art, say 
                                                 
164 Dyson puts it as follows: “The basis of the whole argument is the proposition that 
[knowledge of knowledge] can distinguish only that, of a given selection one thing is 
knowledge and another is not…From the viewpoint of [knowledge of knowledge] these 
entities [of which the selection is composed] will be no more than, as it were, so many 
unspecified lots of knowledge and ignorance, and [knowledge of knowledge] will tell its 
possessor only that, of these unspecified lots, this one is knowledge etc.” See Dyson, 




the ability to tell the difference between a stethoscope and a hammer.165 That knowledge 
of knowledge might need this basic supplement seems no great mark against it. The 
greater difficulty comes out in the example Socrates goes on to provide.  
Socrates returns to the case of the quack versus the doctor. Someone with 
moderation, understood as nothing other than the knowledge of knowledge, would not be 
able to distinguish the quack from the true doctor, insofar as each has a kind of 
knowledge. In other words, someone may claim to have knowledge of medicine, but only 
actually possess knowledge of how to be a good charlatan. To be a successful quack, one 
would actually need to know a fair amount about medicine, or at least how to speak as if 
one does. In investigating such a person, wouldn’t one need to know a fair amount about 
the subject matter of their professed knowledge? It seems likely one would need to know 
at least as much as, if not more than, the person pretending knows. In common practice, 
we grant that experts are needed to investigate professed experts, an activity that involves 
delving into the details of the subject matter.  
Still, in the process of such an investigation, it would be of great benefit to have a 
knowledge of knowledge, if by that we mean an awareness of what qualifies as 
knowledge and what does not and an ability to question others as to whether they really 
know what they think they know. The mistake is to divorce this knowledge of knowledge 
                                                 
165 Ibid., 110: “Plato first takes the inability of K.K. [knowledge of knowledge] to 
identify anything else than knowledge to ensure that its possessor will also fail to identify 
the entities…But it is a mistake to assume that the identification of the lots lies only in 
the province of K. K….In short, the entities to be approved as knowledge or ignorance do 
not exists in a vacuum but are contextually identified.”  
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from knowledge as we ordinarily encounter it, i.e. as knowledge of a certain sort, with a 
particular content. Socrates, as he continues, subtly draws attention to the absurdity of 
taking too far the idea of knowledge of knowledge divorced from any particular 
expertise. For in actuality, his argument has not granted those who practice the arts any 
knowledge or expertise at all. If the one who is moderate is the only person with a claim 
to knowledge of knowledge, then none of the practitioners of the arts have knowledge. 
The one who has knowledge of knowledge has knowledge without substance, and the 
ones who practice the arts would have substance without knowledge. In other words, 
knowledge of any actual subject is nowhere to be found—no one knows anything.  
The idea of knowledge of knowledge appeals to Critias because it seems to be a 
shortcut to mastering all the other knowledges.166 But Socrates brings out here the fact 
that no such shortcut exists. One needs to delve into the details of the particular kinds of 
knowledge, in addition to bearing in mind the question of what qualifies as knowledge in 
general. This leads one to wonder, of all the particular kinds of knowledge in which one 
could become an expert, which matters most?  
 
A Life Without Error 
After bringing out these difficulties, Socrates asks Critias what benefit moderation 
is to them. For had it been able to provide what they had hoped, not only the ability to 
know what one knows and does not know, but also to be able to investigate others in this 
                                                 
166 Compare West and West, Charmides, 49-50, n 61.  
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regard, the result would be “grandly beneficial” (171d):  
We would live through life without error, we ourselves and those who have 
moderation, and all others who were ruled by us. For we ourselves would not 
attempt to do what we didn’t have knowledge of, but we would find those who 
had knowledge and hand it over to them. And to others whom we rule we would 
not turn over anything to be done except what they would do correctly when they 
did it; and this would be what they had knowledge of. And a household managed 
by moderation would be beautifully managed, as would a city so governed, and 
everything else that moderation would rule. For with error taken away and 
correctness leading, it is necessary for those so situated to do beautifully and well 
in every doing, and for those who do well to be happy. (171e-172a) 
 
Critias is enamored with this idea of a ruling knowledge and is unable to see why 
it might not be possible. We see how quickly he has forgotten the aporia he was brought 
to earlier. But what exactly is the nature of the kind of rulers Socrates has described? 
Many mistake this picture for the one we see in the Republic, assuming that Socrates is 
here proposing the rule of philosopher kings.167 While it certainly bears some 
resemblance, it is important to see that what we find here is a pale reflection of 
philosophic rule. Indeed, the difference between this picture and the one we find in the 
Republic speaks to one of the fundamental differences between Critias and Socrates. The 
city envisioned here in the Charmides is a picture of scientific, not philosophic rule—a 
city run by technocrats, not philosophers. Nothing is said about how the ends of the city 
are directed, only that the means to all its given ends will be pursued without error. Of 
course, Critias, not being philosophic himself, would not be the first to appreciate this 
difference.  
                                                 
167 Kahn (Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 205) describes this city as a “caricature 
version of the Platonic polis.”  
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Critias fails to see that no single person will ever be able to possess this ruling art. 
He is enchanted by and drawn to a vision of absolute political rule. But what reflection 
upon the discussion up to now has revealed is that politics is and will always be a realm 
of imperfection and uncertainty. Even the best rulers must always rely on and trust the 
knowledge of others, the competency of whom they can never be entirely certain. The 
realm of politics will never be free from error.168  
Perhaps sensing that Critias is not convinced of this impossibility, Socrates will 
go on to investigate whether having this kind of knowledge—if it were possible—would 
benefit us. But before doing so, he gives us a glimpse of what he suggests is a lesser, but 
more realistic way of thinking about this knowledge of knowledge. He asks Critias the 
following:  
Does what we are now discovering moderation to be—having knowledge of 
knowledge and non-knowledge—have this good: that he who has it will learn 
more easily whatever else he learns and that everything will appear more distinct 
to him, since in addition to each thing he learns, he will also discern the 
knowledge? And that he will examine others more beautifully about whatever he 
himself has learned, while those who examine without this will do it more weakly 
and poorly? (172b) 
 
Critias unenthusiastically answers that this might be so. In the thrall of a more exalted 
vision of moderation and the capacity to know, he fails to see how greatly one might 
benefit from this “lesser” version of knowledge of knowledge.  
Since Critias clearly has not been convinced of the impossibility of possessing 
                                                 
168 For a longer discussion and perceptive analysis of the nature of Critias’ immoderation 
see Paul Stern, “Tyranny and Self-Knowledge: Critias and Socrates in Plato’s 
Charmides,” The American Political Science Review 93, 2 (1999): 399-412. 
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moderation in the grand sense, Socrates turns to the question of its benefit. He 
emphasizes the strangeness of his own realizations that he is about to present, realizations 
which Critias will also find strange, especially coming from Socrates. Indeed, it is 
surprising for Socrates of all people to appear, as Critias soon puts it, to be dishonoring 
knowledge. But Socrates insists that it is not clear to him that moderation as it has been 
defined, that is, as a knowledge of knowledge, produces a good for them.  
Socrates, with what seems here to be a faux humility, concedes that he may just 
be being foolish, but that it is “necessary to investigate just what appears and not to pass 
by indifferently if one is concerned for oneself even a little” (173a). Critias agrees that 
this is beautifully spoken, although it is worth recalling the many times throughout the 
dialogue that we have seen Critias fail to care for himself in this way. Still, he does at this 
point seem genuinely interested in and troubled by whatever it is Socrates may have in 
mind. Exaggerating the tentative nature of the suggestion to follow, Socrates asks Critias 
to “hear [his] dream” (173a). 
In Socrates’ dream, he imagines a world ruled by moderation, as they have now 
defined it, one in which everything is done according to knowledge. In such a world, no 
one would be deceived by someone claiming to be a pilot who was not, or someone 
pretending to be a doctor or general, or anyone else claiming to have a knowledge he 
lacked. As a result, more than now, our bodies would be healthy, and those at sea and in 
war would be safe. And all our things, clothing, shoes, and possessions would all be 
made more artfully, having employed true craftsmen. Socrates then adds a capstone to 
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this knowledge, conceding, if Critias wishes, that divination too is a kind of knowledge, 
of what is going to be, and that in this case too moderation could establish true diviners. 
In this way, the human race would act and live knowledgably, for moderation would 
never let non-knowledge find its way in as a fellow worker. This much Socrates says he 
can follow. But, he says, “that in acting knowledgeably we would do well and be 
happy—this we are not yet able to learn my dear Critias” (173d).169  
Socrates’ dream of a world ruled by moderation, as they have here defined it, 
stresses the benefits to be gained by our bodies and in our physical possessions, but says 
nothing about any benefit that would be procured for our souls. A world ruled in this way 
improves our mortal condition, but is far from providing a solution to it. Insofar as this is 
the case, Socrates underscores that to live without error is not necessarily to do well and 
be happy.  
Here Critias appears more surprised than he has been in the entire conversation. 
He tells Socrates that he will not easily find another meaning of doing well if he 
dishonors knowledge. In a comic reply, Socrates asks Critias to teach him one small 
thing—what does he mean by knowledgeably? Is he referring to the kind of knowledge 
involved in shoemaking? Or perhaps working with bronze (173e)? Socrates agrees that 
                                                 
169 The example of the pilot is strange and stands out, in part because the art of piloting 
has not been previously mentioned in the dialogue. Also, it is hard to imagine a case in 
which someone would want to deceive another in this way. Surely a fake pilot would not 
want to face the consequences of having convinced others of his or her expertise if doing 
so meant being out in the middle of the ocean without any actual knowledge of how to 
pilot a ship. It may be that this is a stand-in for political rule, given the ship of state 
analogy Socrates will use in the Republic.  
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the happy man is defined well as one of those who live knowledgably, but he presses 
Critias to identify which of the knowledges it is that makes one happy. Perhaps, Socrates 
says, Critias has in mind the diviner, “one who knows everything that is going to be” 
(174a). Critias says the he has in mind him, and someone else. “Who?” Socrates asks. 
But before Critias can answer, Socrates offers the case of one who “might know, besides 
what is to be, also everything that has happened and what is now, and be ignorant of 
nothing” (174a)—a person possessing an omniscient, god-like form of knowledge.  
Socrates again urges Critias to identify which knowledge makes such a person 
happy. Which one is it in particular? Tell me, Socrates says, “the one that I particularly 
speak of” (174b emphasis added). Critias answers, “the knowledge of good and bad,” and 
Socrates responds by calling him a wretch, accusing Critias of having dragged him in a 
circle (174b). Of course, as we have seen, it is Socrates who has led the argument around 
in this circle, which began with his suggestion that doing one’s own things is doing the 
good things, and now ends with an emphasis upon the importance of knowing what the 
good is.  
To the very end Critias clings to his idea of a ruling knowledge of knowledge, 
suggesting that the knowledge of the good and the bad is simply one more kind of 
knowledge that can fall under its domain. Critias fails to appreciate both the primary 
importance of knowing the good and the difficulty with which one might come to know 
it. When it comes to knowing what moderation is, Socrates concludes that they are 
“unable to discover whichever of the things that are that the lawgiver set this name upon, 
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‘moderation’” (175b). Socrates’ fear that he was investigating nothing useful about 
moderation was right all along. He blames his own failure to inquire beautifully as having 
caused moderation, which had been agreed upon as most beautiful, to appear 
unbeneficial. Notice Socrates suggests here that if he had the lesser version of knowledge 
of knowledge and non-knowledge described above, i.e., an ability to investigate more 
beautifully, they may have been able to discover what moderation is.  
Socrates summarizes for Critias all that they have conceded in their argument, 
without knowing it to be true: that there is a knowledge of knowledge, that such a 
knowledge can recognize the works of particular knowledges; that someone can know 
what he does not know. The argument, he says, has hubristically made “apparent to us 
that what we were long agreeing to and fabricating together and setting down to be 
moderation is unbeneficial” (175d). Socrates has demonstrated to Critias that knowledge 
of knowledge without knowledge of the good is unbeneficial. And, although he says here 
that they have not shown that it is possible to know what one does not know, he has also 
pointed out the extent to which this argument has shown that they do not know what 
moderation is.  
Socrates turns back to Charmides, and laments what a shame it would be if 
Charmides were most moderate in his soul and yet would not profit from it. But he 
concludes that it is more likely that he is just a poor inquirer, and that moderation is some 
great good—if Charmides has it, he is blessed. But see, Socrates says, whether you are 
moderate. Charmides responds by here admitting what at the start of the dialogue he 
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would not admit: he does not know whether or not he is moderate. How, he asks, could 
he know what neither Socrates nor Critias could discover? And yet, he adds, he does not 
quite believe that Socrates does not know—and he wishes now to hear from him the 
Thracian incantation, the one that makes a person moderate. Critias takes this as evidence 
of Charmides’ moderation, and bids him to submit to Socrates and not abandon him. The 
dialogue ends with Charmides playfully, but also portentously, expressing his willingness 





 Charmides and Critias 
When introducing this dialogue, we wondered whether Plato wrote it in part to 
defend Socrates against suspicions that he had corrupted Charmides and Critias. It is 
difficult to read the Charmides without looking for some explanation as to how these two 
men became members of the infamous Thirty Tyrants. With what may be our own desire 
to exonerate Socrates, it is particularly tempting to look for some clear and unambiguous 
indication of crooked minds and warped souls. If Charmides and Critias were simply bad 
seeds, then Socrates could not have either caused or prevented their growing into tyrants.  
Certainly we find character flaws in both Charmides and Critias. Commentators 
are understandably eager to point them out, and most give negative appraisals of the 
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pair.170 When it comes to Charmides, Hyland wavers between seeing him as nothing but a 
young carouser who by nature fails to possess moderation and granting that he may 
possess the virtue in some form.171 In either case, he thinks Charmides is not nearly as 
intelligent as Critias advertises him to be.172 Zuckert and Schmid are especially harsh in 
their verdicts on the young Charmides. The former argues that the “intellectually lazy” 
Charmides neither “values nor possesses intellectual independence or self-control.”173 
The latter ultimately argues that “Charmides does not prove to be sophron at the end of 
                                                 
170 Notable exceptions to this general trend are Beversluis, Kahn, and Tuckey. In his 
attempt to defend all of Socrates’ interlocutors against a long-held pro-Socrates bias, 
Beversluis (Cross-Examining Socrates) provides an important counterpoint to many 
studies. But he tends to go too far in defending Charmides and especially Critias. I agree 
with Kahn’s suggestion that in this dialogue Plato “wants to present Critias as a relatively 
young man who has not yet begun his sinister political career, and to show Charmides as 
a modest teenager of unlimited promise.” But I think Kahn goes too far in arguing that 
“Plato seems to go out of his way to depict Socrates on terms of intimate friendship with 
both men” (Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 185-186). As I will argue below, this is 
much more true with regard to Charmides than Critias. Finally, although I think Tuckey 
(Plato’s Charmides, 4) is absolutely right to say that both characters are portrayed as 
“human and sympathetic,” it is not quite right to say that in the dialogue “there is no hint 
of their later enormities.” 
 
171 Hyland, The Virtue of Philosophy, compare 42 with 56. Lampert (How Philosophy 
Became Socratic, 172, 176-177) similarly concedes that Charmides possesses moderation 
“in the common sense.” But Lampert ultimately argues that Charmides is unlikely ever to 
escape convention and that he “will always do the things of others, particularly of his 
present and future guardian Critias.” 
 
172 Ibid., 60. 
 
173 Catherine Zuckert, Plato’s Philosophers: The Coherence of the Dialogues, (Chicago: 




this conversation, quite the contrary.” Schmid concludes that Charmides represents 
“spoiled youthful beauty-appetite incarnate.”174 
These especially critical interpretations of Charmides have the aforementioned 
benefit of absolving Socrates of any guilt with regard to Charmides’ future conduct. By 
reducing Charmides to the immoderate tyrant he will one day become (before he has 
done anything fully to warrant this judgment), one is able easily to argue that Socrates 
could not have corrupted someone who is already corrupt. But one difficulty in judging 
Charmides this way is explaining why, according to Plato and Xenophon, Socrates 
continued what appeared to be a friendly association with him. In the Symposium (222b), 
Plato’s Alcibiades suggests that there must have been quite a bit of interaction between 
Charmides and Socrates subsequent to the conversation we witness in the Charmides. In 
the Theages, Plato has Socrates himself mention a time when he freely offers Charmides 
friendly advice (Theages, 128e). Xenophon describes a time when Socrates acted on 
behalf of Plato and Charmides (Memorabilia III.6.1). He also reports numerous 
interactions between the two, including a conversation in which Socrates praises 
Charmides’ ability to give sound guidance to those with whom he converses in private. 
Socrates goes so far as to encourage Charmides to extend his influence by becoming 
more involved in politics (Memorabilia III.7).175  
                                                 
174 Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 151. Lampert (How Philosophy Became 
Socratic, 177), while not quite as critical, does maintain that Charmides “will have 
nothing to do with philosophy. Therefore, Socrates will have nothing to do with him.” 
 
175 See also Xenophon’s Symposium. 
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All these interactions had to have happened after the encounter described in the 
Charmides. If Charmides as we see him in this dialogue is already as hopelessly 
degenerate as certain commentators make him sound, why would Socrates have remained 
so involved with him, praise him, and encourage him to have more influence on the city’s 
affairs?176 In my view, the condemnations of Charmides described above go too far—
certainly farther than Socrates went in his own criticism. Yes, Socrates playfully rebukes 
Charmides, calling him a wretch when he offers his third definition for moderation, the 
one which is Critias’ rather than his own. But this is after Socrates has praised Charmides 
for courageously examining himself in order to produce his second definition. When 
Charmides looks to Critias, he deserves rebuke, but when Charmides looks into himself, 
he shows promise.177  
Socrates’ patient understanding of the young Charmides’ failings stands in 
marked contrast to Critias’ impatient reaction, not to mention that of those commentators 
who are no less severe in their appraisal of the boy. Socrates gracefully forgives 
Charmides’ shortcomings, excusing his ignorance on account of his age—as should we. It 
is unfair to expect a teenager either to know or fully to possess moderation, especially by 
any Socratic standard. Socrates certainly does not expect as much. Moreover, we must 
                                                 
176 This is not to suggest that Plato’s dialogues are bound in every way by historical facts, 
much less that they are simply transcripts of actual events. Plato would have been free to 
use his artistic license to depict Charmides as worse than he actually was in order to bring 
out a lesson about immoderation. But, as I will argue below, based on the content of the 
dialogue itself, this does not appear to be the choice that Plato made.  
 
177 Compare Tuckey (Plato’s Charmides, 4): “Charmides is represented as a paragon of 
youthful virtue. The only bad suggestion about him is his close association with Critias.”  
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not forget that this is the very virtue we as readers are trying to understand, presumably 
because of our own ignorance and the sheer difficulty of the matter. In evaluating 
Charmides’ performance and character as revealed in this dialogue, we must not only 
keep in mind his age, but also his audience. Charmides may be willing to bear some of 
Critias’ anger, even to provoke it, but he is still clearly concerned not to go too far in 
embarrassing himself, his admirers, and, most of all, his guardian. A public conversation, 
one presided over by the critical, proud, and short-tempered Critias, could not possibly 
have been an environment especially conducive to genuine self-reflection, particularly for 
someone like Charmides.  
To his credit, Charmides seems to have sensed fairly quickly that he did not have 
as firm a grasp on what moderation is, and whether or not he possesses it, as he first 
assumed. The discomfort caused by this realization explains why he wanted to take 
himself out of the spotlight and turn the conversation over to Critias. But it was not just a 
matter of wanting to direct attention away from himself; he wants to see whether Critias 
knows any better than he does.178 Socrates is equally eager to turn from Charmides to 
Critias, not because Charmides is without promise, but so that his promise might be 
realized. Socrates recognizes that Critias’ hold on Charmides must be broken before 
Charmides can reach his full potential. This recognition is a large part of why Socrates is 
eager to engage and eventually refute Critias, always with a view to how Charmides 
                                                 
178 This point is missed by Schmid (The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 69) who reads 





might benefit. By exposing Critias’ lack of knowledge, Socrates helps liberate Charmides 
from Critias’ influence as well as from the shame that at the start of the dialogue prevents 
him from fully confronting and admitting his own ignorance. Once Charmides is shown 
Critias’ ignorance, he feels free to admit openly his own (176a).  
Critias, by contrast, is never willing to admit his own ignorance. Quite the 
contrary, he tries to hide it (169c-d). And in Critias’ case, he should be ashamed. Socrates 
is right in suggesting that because of Critias’ age and the care he has taken—or by this 
point should have taken—more is to be expected of him than of Charmides. As with 
Charmides, commentators are quick to point out Critias’ faults, and in his case they are 
more justified.179 It is easier to bridge the gap between the Critias of the Charmides and 
the Critias of the Thirty Tyrants. We see, for example, in Critias’ treatment of Socrates 
and Charmides at the opening of the dialogue a certain willingness to use and manipulate 
others. Throughout the dialogue, he shows himself to be a prideful honor-seeker. He has 
an elevated opinion of himself and of his own capacities, in particular his capacity to 
know. Most problematic is his attachment to the idea of a kind of ruling knowledge.  
Given what we know about the absolute rule Critias exercised as a member of the 
Thirty Tyrants, it seems likely that he ultimately deemed himself that single great man, 
the one in possession of knowledge fit for ruling others.180 This unfortunate fact seems to 
                                                 
179 Schmid is again a good example of a particularly harsh appraisal. He describes Critias 
as “sophistic-poetic/beautiful willful-tyrannic/ugliness incarnate” (The Socratic Ideal of 
Rationality, 151). 
 
180 Compare Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 208. 
130 
 
be vividly portrayed in Xenophon’s account of the execution of Theramenes, described in 
our introduction to the dialogue. As noted above, Theramenes was a member of the 
Thirty Tyrants who refused to obey orders to kill one of Athens’ metics (for no other 
reason than to steal the dead metic’s money). Theramenes criticized the regime’s unjust 
murders of innocent and worthy men. In Theramenes’ trial, he persuaded the Senate of 
his innocence. But Critias defied both the will of the Senate and the spirit of the rule of 
law, which held it illegal to kill any leading members of the regime, striking Theramenes 
off the roll of Three Thousand, and having him killed (see Hellenica II.iii.15-56). Critias 
justified this action by declaring himself the only one capable of seeing through 
Theramenes’ deception of the Senate. Xenophon reports Critias announcing the 
following: “Senators, I deem it the duty of a leader who is what he ought to be, in case he 
sees that his friends are being deceived, not to permit it” (Hellenica II. iii.51). Critias 
thought not only that he knew, but that he could recognize ignorance in others. It appears 
Critias believed himself possessed of a knowledge of knowledge and non-knowledge, a 
ruling knowledge that allowed, in the end, for no discussion or debate. 
Still, it is important to balance Critias’ faults as we see them in this dialogue with 
an acknowledgement of his virtues. Critias is intelligent and often more competent than 
most of Socrates’ interlocutors. He correctly identifies and corrects what are a few rather 
sophistic moves in Socrates’ arguments (see 163a-b and 165e-166a). He has, in short, a 
certain level of intellectual sophistication. This is no surprise if we remember that Critias 
was a prolific and accomplished writer. He is a man who had an appreciation for and 
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devoted a significant amount of time to intellectual pursuits. In this way he has more in 
common with Socrates, and Plato, than most.  
Critias’ intellectualism is important to recognize because it is part and parcel of 
his particular brand of immoderation. Critias’ enthusiasm is for a kind of ruling 
knowledge. We see in the Charmides his interest in a line of thought that could—and 
does—get taken in a dangerous direction. The thought, though, is far from foreign to both 
Socrates and Plato. The temptation to have knowledge rule through philosopher kings is 
explored in depth in the imagined city of Plato’s Republic. Plato was not only interested 
in philosophers ruling in imagined cities; he tells us in his Seventh Letter that he was 
tempted to rule alongside Critias and Charmides when the Thirty first rose to power.181 
One wonders whether in the picture Plato paints of Charmides in this dialogue we are 
meant to see someone not so different from Plato himself. For Charmides seems in key 
respects a truly promising young man, one who has the sense, at least at the end of this 
dialogue, to follow Socrates, not Critias.  
In sum, the picture Plato paints of Charmides and Critias does not make it seem as 
though their careers in the Thirty Tyrants were inevitable. It is important that we not 
condemn Charmides and Critias as if they were already tyrants. Doing so too 
conveniently removes from the table difficult and important questions. The dialogue is 
                                                 
181 That Plato needed to watch and wait to see how a regime with Critias and Charmides 
at its helm would be run is yet another indication that even by the time the Thirty came to 




unsettling in part because Plato does not present us with monsters.182 If evil is to be found 
in Charmides and Critias it is, in W.H. Auden’s words, an evil that is “unspectacular and 
always human” one that “shares our bed and eats at our own table."183 Plato, who in 
writing about Critias and Charmides, writes about his own kin, must have known this 
well.184  
By writing a dialogue on moderation with two intelligent and in many ways 
impressive individuals who we know went on to embody immoderation, Plato 
underscores just how difficult moderation is to achieve. Seeing why Socrates should not 
be blamed for Critias’ and Charmides’ immoderation requires seeing more fully all that is 
involved in acquiring moderation. We cannot know where Critias and particularly 
Charmides lost their way, but Plato gives us some sense of the long road that needs to be 
traveled to acquire moderation. To have a sense of all that moderation requires, it is 
worth reviewing what we have seen in the dialogue, especially in Socrates as a model of 
moderation.  
 
                                                 
182 On these points compare Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 220: “Critias is 
not the victim of an evil nature, nor did Socrates corrupt him by an evil doctrine. Instead, 
Socrates corrupted Critias by opening a path to the natural human dream of an 
enlightened human community founded and administered by enlightened knowers.” 
 
183 This quotation is from W. H. Auden’s poem “Herman Melville,” in W. H. Auden 
Collected Poems, ed. Edward Mendelson (New York: Vintage Books, 1991), 251. 
 
184 I disagree with Kahn (Plato and the Socratic Dialogue, 186), who, quoting Burnet, 
takes Plato to be “glorifying the whole [family] connection,” as well as expressing “pride 
in his own family.”  
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Socratic Moderation  
Socrates’ moderation is dramatically contrasted early in the dialogue not with the 
immoderation of either Charmides or Critias, but with what Socrates calls Chaerephon’s 
madness. As we saw, Chaerephon’s immoderation is characterized generally by a lack of 
self-possession. He is unable to place any distance between his inner thoughts and 
feelings and his outer appearance and actions. There seem to be two sources for his 
immoderation: death and desire. Chaerephon first displayed his madness in the excessive 
joy with which he celebrated Socrates’ escape from death at Potidaea and later with his 
inappropriate expression of desire for the beauty of Charmides’ body.  
In both cases, Socrates stands in marked contrast to Chaerephon. Socrates is able 
throughout the dialogue to remain composed and in possession of himself. Although not 
entirely without the same impulses as Chaerephon, Socrates is able to react to these 
impulses differently. Socrates was not indifferent to his own survival, but he does not 
give in to an excessive celebration of life as Chaerephon does. Socrates appears able to 
maintain possession of himself even in the face of death, an ability that helped him to 
survive in the first place. Alcibiades notes that at Potidaea, when Athenian soldiers were 
engaged in a chaotic retreat, Socrates proved to be more collected or “in his senses”185 
than even the brave general Laches (Plato, Symposium, 221b).  
This last point touches on another problem we had noted in Chaerephon: he 
seemed not to realize that Socrates is capable of such courage. Socrates’ courage serves 
                                                 
185 The word used is emphron. 
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as an important corrective to a prevailing opinion that moderation and courage are 
mutually exclusive, an opinion that became only more deeply entrenched as the war 
continued. Not only does Socrates possess conventional courage, but he has the 
intellectual courage necessary for moderation. As Socrates suggests multiple times to 
both Charmides and Critias, one needs to be bold and courageous both to engage in the 
self-examination necessary for attaining moderation and to admit what one does not 
know.  
We get a clearer picture of what lies behind Socrates’ composure when he relates 
his reaction to Charmides’ beauty. Like Chaerephon, Socrates is impressed by the beauty 
of Charmides’ body. But he is even more interested in the possibility of Charmides 
possessing a beautiful soul. Were Charmides to have both, Socrates says he could not be 
withstood by anyone. Even before Socrates has determined whether or not Charmides has 
a beautiful soul, he finds himself momentarily at Charmides’ mercy, caught off-guard by 
the strength of his own desire after inadvertently seeing inside Charmides’ cloak. But in 
contrast to Chaerephon, Socrates is able quickly to regain possession of himself. 
Socrates’ characterization of this experience as one in which he is outside of himself 
shows that he identifies his true self not with his physical desires—despite the fact that 
they are his—but with his thoughts, his questions, and above all his desire for wisdom. 
Socrates returns to himself through the wise words of Cydias, who warns against 
becoming a young beauty’s prey. Socrates’ moderation is the result of an ability to 
monitor and evaluate himself and to unify his temporarily fragmented identity by keeping 
135 
 
firmly in mind the concerns that are most important. Socrates knows himself and the 
kinds of activities through which he is most himself—he knows, in short, what it means 
to do his own things.  
We noted earlier that the habit of mind Socrates displays here is one that he seems 
to have developed from engaging in a lifetime of thoughtful reflection. We see the kinds 
of things Socrates has reflected upon in the questions and concerns he draws to 
Charmides’ attention, first in their own conversation, and then through his conversation 
with Critias. When Socrates first instructs Charmides to say what moderation is, he urges 
him to look within his own experience of the virtue and put this experience to words. We 
noted that the task Socrates has assigned to Charmides is much more difficult than it first 
appears. Charmides must look carefully at his own experiences and begin the hard work 
of introspection, identifying and disentangling his own impression of himself and of 
virtue from what he has learned from others.  
Socrates presses Charmides to think more clearly about what kind of benefit will 
come of being virtuous. In particular, Socrates draws his attention to the good and the 
noble and the possible conflict between them.186  His presentation of the hopes inspired 
by Thracian medicine, that a perfect soul might lead to a perfect body, and possibly to 
immortality, brings out the heights of the hopes Charmides may attach to virtue. But a 
shadow is cast over these hopes by the rest of the dialogue. Far from linking moderation 
                                                 
186 Pangle draws attention to this need for active self examination, in particular about the 
relationship between the good and the noble, in the context of Plato’s Gorgias in Virtue is 
Knowledge, 69: “Socratic medicine requires, it seems, not the passive acquiescence one 
gives a doctor but active engagement, questioning, and self examination.”  
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to the possibility of becoming immortal, Socrates and Critias are unable to show that it is 
of any benefit.  
Charmides’ challenge is to figure out what exactly moderation is and what kind of 
good it is. To do so, he needs to figure out what he is. What are the possibilities and 
limits that define our humanity? In order to determine who he is and what is good for 
him, Charmides needs to transcend his reverence for the ideas of others. But he also 
needs to beware that the pendulum not swing too far in the opposite direction. As 
Socrates suggests in his conversation with Critias, knowing oneself involves an 
investigation both of one’s own opinions and those of others, always maintaining a 
healthy skepticism as to the certainty of one’s own knowledge. As important as any 
answers Socrates finds is his awareness of the need to continually reaffirm them, 
continually doubting and re-securing his own knowledge.  
We see in Critias an example of the problem of being too self-assured and 
confident in one’s own knowledge. The Charmides provides us with a refutation of 
Critias and of his understanding of moderation as a kind of ruling knowledge that lacks 
knowledge of the good—an understanding which, far from capturing moderation, is a 
recipe for its opposite. For a true definition of moderation, one grounded not in what one 
knows, but in an awareness of ignorance and the corresponding desire to know, 
especially to know the good, we must turn to the Republic. The moderation we find there 
is not the ruling knowledge Critias wishes it to be. But it is a moderation that may deliver 
on the hope with which Socrates leaves Charmides: “that you yourself, so far as you are 
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moderate, are also that much happier” (176a).  
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CHAPTER 3: MODERATION IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC 
 
Introduction to the Dialogue  
 
Connections to the Charmides  
Plato’s use of narration is the first of a number of indications that the Charmides 
and Republic should be considered in relation to one another. The Republic, like the 
Charmides, is one of a small minority of Platonic dialogues that is both frameless and 
narrated by Socrates.187 It opens in Socrates’ voice:  
I went down to the Piraeus yesterday with Glaucon, son of Ariston, to pray to the 
goddess; and, at the same time, I wanted to observe how they would put on the 
festival, since they were holding it for the first time. (327a)188 
 
Socrates goes on to tell of how, while on their way to the Piraeus, he and Glaucon are 
accosted by Polemarchus, son of Cephalus, and a group of Polemarchus’ friends, 
including Glaucon’s brother Adeimantus. In a way that is reminiscent of Charmides’ 
suggestion that he would be willing to use violence against Socrates (Charmides, 176c), 
Polemarchus and his gang of friends playfully coerce the outnumbered Socrates and 
                                                 
187 The narration of the Republic differs from the Charmides in that Socrates never breaks 
his narration to speak directly to his present audience. On narrated dialogues see footnote 
56 above.   
 
188 All parenthetical references in this chapter are to Plato’s Republic, unless otherwise 
noted. Translations are often from The Republic of Plato, trans. Allan Bloom (New York: 
Basic Books, 1968), with occasional emendations of my own. 
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Glaucon into joining them at Cephalus’ home. The rest of the Republic is Socrates’ 
narration of the long conversation that was held there.  
In the Charmides we saw the dramatic date of the dialogue identified clearly in its 
opening reference to the battle of Potidaea. When is the “yesterday” to which Socrates 
refers in the opening of the Republic? The dramatic date of the Republic has long been 
debated because of what appears to be strong evidence for competing dates along with a 
number of anachronistic references within the dialogue. Debra Nails describes the 
scholarly debate on this subject as having reached a “contemporary standstill.”189 The 
two dates most commonly proposed are 411/410 or 422/421, but “there have been scores 
of arguments bearing on several dramatic dates for the Republic ranging from 424-
408.”190 Some conclude that Plato purposefully made it impossible to date the dialogue so 
as to make it timeless.191 
If the dialogue is meant to have a date, the one most interesting for our study has 
been recently proposed by Laurence Lampert. Lampert argues for the dramatic date of 
429, earlier than any of those previously noted.192 According to Lampert, Plato indicates 
                                                 
189 Debra Nails, “The Dramatic Date of Plato’s Republic,” The Classical Journal 93, 4 
(1998): 383.  
 
190 For an overview of the various positions taken on the dramatic date of the Republic as 
well as the difficulties one faces in trying to date the dialogue see Nails, “The Dramatic 
Date of Plato’s Republic.” 
 
191 Ibid., 183. See, for example, Kent Moors, “The Argument Against a Dramatic Date 
for Plato’s Republic,” Polis 7, 1 (1988): 6-31.  
 
192 For Lampert’s complete argument see How Philosophy Became Socratic, 405-411.  
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the dramatic date of the Republic in the dialogue’s first sentence, just as he did in the 
Charmides.193 In the opening line of the Republic, Plato has Socrates refer to a festival 
that is being held for the first time. At the end of Book I, we learn that this is the festival 
of Bendis (354a). As Lampert puts it, “[o]ne event and one event only fixes the dramatic 
date of the Republic—the day the Athenians introduced Thracian Bendis as an official 
god of their city cult.”194 Lampert’s persuasive suggestion is that with his opening 
reference to a widely known, singular event, “Plato made easy for his contemporaries 
[what] has become difficult for us.”195 If Lampert is right in his interpretation of this 
difficult matter, then the drama of the Republic, taking place in 429, occurs just weeks 
after the drama of the Charmides. This would, in Lampert’s words, make the Charmides 
the “unexpected introduction to the Republic.”196 
                                                 
193 Ibid., 11. 
 




196 Ibid., 241 and 11: “Charmides and the Republic are twinned dialogues with 
Charmides serving as a kind of introduction to the Republic.” Because Lampert’s focus is 
on the development of Socratic philosophy, despite emphasizing the connection between 
Plato’s Charmides and Republic, he pays little attention to the link of moderation. 
Schmid devotes a six page Appendix to the Republic, but ultimately believes “the 
intellectual worlds of the two dialogues are very different.” See Schmid, The Socratic 




Lampert’s argument for this particular link between the Charmides and the 
Republic is both plausible and persuasive, but not decisive.197 It is, as all proposed 
dramatic dates for the Republic are likely to be—and remain—controversial.198 
Fascinating as it may be, the possibility of a dramatic date of 429 is not the only reason to 
read the Republic alongside the Charmides. Leaving aside the disputed question of the 
Republic’s dramatic date, other close connections are to be found between these two 
dialogues. In addition to being among a handful of dialogues narrated by Socrates, the 
dialogues contain important ties between their characters. Plato’s Charmides and 
Republic are both rare dialogues in which Plato has his own relatives serve as Socrates’ 
chief interlocutors. As we saw in the Charmides, Socrates speaks with Charmides, Plato’s 
uncle, and Critias, Plato’s distant cousin. The family relation is even closer in the 
Republic, where Socrates converses for the majority of the dialogue with Plato’s brothers, 
Glaucon and Adeimantus.  
                                                 
197 There are a number of points on which Lampert’s argument could be disputed. For 
one, he insists that Plato’s reference to the festival of Bendis should trump all other 
references that date the dialogue because “Plato put it first” (How Philosophy Became 
Socratic, 405). There is something to this logic, but it is not necessarily the case that what 
comes first in a dialogue is more important than what comes later, or that Plato’s 
intention in mentioning this festival was to indicate the date of the dialogue. Even if one 
accepts that the opening reference to the festival should trump all other means by which 
we may date the dialogue, when the festival took place is also a matter of dispute. For an 
alternative argument see Nails, “The Dramatic Date of Plato’s Republic,” 388. 
 
198 Lampert himself acknowledges the need for an exegesis that confirms and supports his 
chronological claims: “That the exegesis can support the chronology means more for us 
than it would for Plato’s contemporaries, because chronological cues that sufficed for 




The fates of the characters in these dialogues are also closely intertwined.199 
Three of the men present at the Republic will later become victims of the Thirty. 
Niceratus and Polemarchus are both murdered, with Polemarchus’s brother Lysias just 
barely escaping the Thirty’s grasp. Lysias, son of Cephalus, writes of how his family, as 
metics, were those unjustly targeted by the Thirty for their wealth. Polemarchus was 
arrested and ordered to drink hemlock, “with no statement made as to the reason for his 
execution: still less was he allowed to be tried and defend himself.”200  
The fate that young men present during the Republic will one day suffer at the 
hands of unjust men adds gravity to the dialogue’s focus on the topic of justice. But it 
also points to the question of the relation between justice and moderation. As we saw in 
the Charmides, the injustice of men like Critias and the rest of the Thirty is rooted in their 
immoderation. In an attempt to “justify” the actions of the Thirty, Critias is even reported 
to have said, “It is not possible for those who wish to have a greater share (tois 
pleonektein boulomenois) not to put out of the way those most capable of preventing 
them.”201 Lysias brings vividly to light the consequences of this view in his case against 
                                                 
199 Lampert, How Philosophy Became Socratic, 249. 
 
200 See Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, 1-23; translation from Lysias, trans. W.R.M. Lamb 
(Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1930). In Balot’s words, “Whether oligarch or 
democrat, everyone agreed that the Thirty, driven by greed for power and wealth, had 
committed serious crimes against their fellow citizens.” Ryan K. Balot, Greed and 
Injustice in Classical Athens (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001), 220. On the 
relationship between the oligarchic revolutions and greed see 219-224.  
 




Eratosthenes, member of the Thirty: “my brother…was put to death by Eratosthenes, who 
was neither suffering under any private wrong himself, nor found him offending against 
the State, but merely sought to gratify his own lawless passions.”202  
This link between the vices of immoderation and injustice and their corresponding 
virtues, dramatically presented by Plato through his dark and often sobering use of 
historical figures, is explored in depth in Plato’s Republic.203 For although the Republic is 
most famous for its treatment of justice, the dialogue directs its readers as much, if not 
ultimately more, to a consideration of moderation. Not only does the importance of 
moderation for both the individual and the city rival and at some points seem even to 
exceed that of justice, but there is also the curious matter of justice itself being defined as 
almost indistinguishable from moderation.204 Thus, the most important, thematic 
connection between the dialogues for the purposes of our study is the attention paid in 
each to the virtue of moderation. In the following two chapters, I follow the thread of 
moderation throughout the early books of the Republic, ending with a study of Book IV’s 
definition of the virtue. There we find the answer to the question of the Charmides: what 
is moderation?  
                                                 
202 Lysias, Against Eratosthenes, 23.  
 
203 Balot, Greed and Injustice, 236 notes that “Plato’s representation of Thrasymachus’s 
views, along with the expansion of his position by Glaucon and Adeimantus, focuses 
attention on greed and injustice as the central moral problems he wants to address.” 
 
204 Roslyn Weiss in Philosophers in the Republic, Plato's Two Paradigms (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 169-172 provides thoughtful observations on many of the 




Moderation in Plato’s Republic  
Plato’s Republic is the text that fixes moderation’s place in the tetrad of cardinal 
virtues, defining the virtue as a harmony of the soul. This harmony is achieved when all 
the parts of the soul—the spirited, the desiring, and the reasoning—share the opinion that 
the reasoning part ought to rule (442c-d). No longer fraught by excessive and unruly 
desires, desires which seem inevitably to lead to disappointment if not disaster, a 
harmonious soul, one at peace with itself and moved only by what is in accord with 
reason, seems to hold a great promise for our happiness.  
But the Republic presents us with a number of images of moderation, some truer 
to its essence than others. Before we arrive at the apparently perfect picture of 
moderation found within Socrates’ city in speech, the first image of moderation in the 
Republic comes in the form of Cephalus. Cephalus—old and withered, drained of his 
desires by the passing of time—represents moderation as a lukewarm, uninspiring virtue, 
more fitting for the old than the young.205 Indeed, Cephalus calls into question our ability 
to achieve moderation in any time other than in old age, once the passions of our youth 
have abated of their own accord. And perhaps it is all the better that we can only be 
moderate when we are old; if the virtue entails nothing other than the deadening of desire, 
                                                 
205 Here I follow Bourgault in arguing that Cephalus is not genuinely moderate. See 
Bourgault, “Eros, Viagra, and the Good Life.” In this chapter I pursue Bourgault’s 
suggestion: “Cephalus may leave the room well before Book II of the Republic begins, 
but one could still envision the rest of the work as a long and detailed answer to the old 




then it is hard to see why anyone would be in a hurry to possess it. As Augustine says in 
his most famous prayer, “Grant me chastity and continence, but not yet.”  
Or might even “not yet” be too soon? Is moderation a virtue that we should ever 
desire, at any age? The attacks made against justice by Glaucon and Adeimantus reveal 
an even greater challenge to moderation than the one embodied by Cephalus. In their 
attack on justice, Glaucon and Adeimantus paint a picture of the good life as one that 
entails the pursuit and gratification of desire after desire, from money, to sex, to rule. 
Through the eyes of these two young men, it is hard to see moderation as anything other 
than a conventional hindrance to the pursuit of happiness, one to which only a fool or 
coward would submit. To make a case for moderation as both possible and desirable, 
Socrates must reveal it to be a more youthful and appealing virtue, answering the 
challenge that is posed implicitly by Cephalus’ life and explicitly by Glaucon and 
Adeimantus’ critique.  
The definition of moderation as a harmony of the soul is Socrates’ ultimate 
answer to this challenge. This harmony is achieved when all the parts of the soul—the 
spirited, the desiring, and the reasoning—share the opinion that the reasoning part ought 
to rule (442c-d). But this definition of moderation in the Republic stands in need of 
interpretation for more reason than one. In the first place, it is not the only definition of 
moderation that the dialogue provides. Before we arrive at Book IV’s definition of the 
virtue, we find quite a different one in Book III. There Socrates identifies the most 
important elements of moderation according to the multitude (hos plethe) as “being 
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obedient to the rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex and 
eating” (389e). This definition stands in stark contrast to the harmony of the whole soul 
described in Book IV. Few commentators address the connection between these two 
definitions, aside from noting the disparity between them. Roslyn Weiss, for example, 
notes how “unusual and surprising” Book IV’s definition of the virtue is, made only more 
surprising in light of the more conventional definition of Book III. According to Weiss, 
“nothing in the dialogue up to this point prepares the reader for moderation’s distribution 
throughout the soul,” in Book IV.206  
The following two chapters answer this puzzle and come to an understanding of 
moderation by making their way toward and then culminating in an examination of Book 
IV’s definition of the virtue. In the first part of the present chapter, I examine the false 
image of moderation presented by Cephalus and the attack upon moderation made by 
Glaucon and Adeimantus. The second part provides a study of the city in speech. After 
seeing why one must move beyond the “moderation” of the so-called healthy city, I trace 
the most important elements of Socrates’ education of the guardians with a view to 
moderation.  
Through my analysis of moderation in the Republic leading up to Book IV’s 
definition, I explain the presence of conflicting definitions within the dialogue, arguing 
that Book III’s treatment of the virtue does in fact prepare the reader for the definition 
found in Book IV. Not only do we see that Socrates’ examples in Book III reveal 
                                                 
206 Weiss, Philosophers in the Republic, 169-170. For an alternate interpretation of 
Socrates’ aim in Book IV see Chapter 5 of Weiss’ Philosophers in the Republic.”  
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moderation as a virtue that must address the whole soul, but our attention is also drawn to 
the problematic absence of reason in the more conventional rendering of the virtue. In 
Chapter 4 I turn to an examination of moderation as it is defined in Book IV. In this 
chapter I take a closer look at the concept of harmony through an analysis of Socrates’ 




The Challenge to Moderation 
 
Out with the Old: Cephalus’ “Moderation” 
As Aristotle puts it, “we measure our actions, some of us more, others less, 
against the yardstick of pleasure.”207 Nearly the first words out of Cephalus’ mouth place 
him in the “some of us more” category. Cephalus is eager to talk with Socrates, for, he 
says, “as the other pleasures, those connected with the body, wither away in me, the 
desires and pleasures that have to do with speeches grow the more” (328d). Socrates, for 
his part, is also “delighted” to talk with Cephalus, but whatever pleasure he gets from the 
conversation is tied to what he and others might learn from it. “The very old,” he 
explains, “are like men who have proceeded on a certain road that perhaps we too will 
                                                 
207 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1104b39. 
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have to take,” and we ought “to learn from them what sort of road it is—whether it is 
rough and hard or easy and smooth” (328e).  
In particular, Socrates wants to know how Cephalus finds the final stretch of the 
road. What is it like being old, having arrived at death’s doorstep? Having discovered a 
way to look upon old age favorably, Cephalus is pleased to tell Socrates that he, unlike 
many others, finds that this time of life comes as a relief rather than a burden. Most old 
men spend their final days lamenting and longing for the pleasures of youth, reminiscing 
about their past indulgences in sex, drink, and food—but not Cephalus. These others, 
who think they once “lived well but are now not even alive” (329b), are wrong to blame 
old age for their miserable state. For, Cephalus argues, if old age were to blame, then he 
himself and all who are old would suffer as they do. But, to the contrary, Cephalus 
happily embraces old age.  
Cephalus takes the goodness of this stage in life to have been expressed best by 
Sophocles. Upon being asked whether he could still have sex with a woman, Sophocles 
replied: “Silence, human being. Most joyfully did I escape it, as though I had run away 
from a sort of frenzied and savage master” (329c). Singing in tune with Sophocles, 
Cephalus claims that old age brings great peace and freedom, for once the “desires cease 
to strain and finally relax” one can “be rid of very many mad masters” (329d). Cephalus 
concludes that for those who bear old age badly, the fault lies not in their age but in their 
character or temperament (tropos): “If they are orderly and content (kosmioi kai eukoloi) 
149 
 
with themselves, even old age is only troublesome within a certain measure; if they are 
not, then both old age…and youth alike turn out to be hard for that sort” (329d).208  
Understanding Cephalus is our first inroad to understanding moderation in the 
Republic, but the picture he paints of this virtue is not especially clear. He says fairly 
plainly that the erotic passions are the despots of the soul, suggesting that he has been a 
slave to his desires no less than any other human being. Nevertheless, he takes pride in 
his own ability to stand apart from the many in the attitude that he, along with Sophocles, 
takes toward this servitude, viewing it as something to be escaped rather than embraced. 
Most believe a life of youthful passion, indulging in food, drink, and sex, is the best 
human life, and the one without such enjoyments hardly worth living at all. As Callicles 
of Plato’s Gorgias puts it, if to be without deeply felt erotic needs is to be happy, then 
“stones and corpses would be happiest” (Gorgias 492e).209 Those of this mind are faithful 
servants to their desires, happily possessed by youth’s mad masters and the pleasures they 
provide.  
Cephalus makes a point of distinguishing himself from such men. He is adamant 
in his assertion that character is at the root of this difference. Cephalus’ character seems 
to be defined by his ability to look upon the passions of his youth, not as the core of his 
                                                 
208 Cephalus characterizes the man of good character as one who is both kosmos (ordered) 
and eukolos (content). Recall this was part of Charmides’ first definition of the virtue, the 
part Socrates ignored in his refutation. Eukolos, on the other hand, appears to be 
Cephalus’ more idiosyncratic contribution. 
 
209 All translations of the Gorgias are from Gorgias, trans. James H. Nichols Jr. (Ithaca: 




being, or as expressions of his soul’s deepest yearnings, but as crazed usurpers, whose 
difficult and disruptive demands upset the peace of his otherwise placid soul. Although 
no stranger to the passions of youth, Cephalus’ general tendency and overall preference 
seems to be, as he says, to be both “orderly” and “content with himself.” We can 
conclude that Cephalus’ preference for the calmer pleasures afforded by an even 
temperament is what has allowed him to bear both the trials of youth and old age more 
easily than most (329d, 330a).  
More evidence of Cephalus’ character can be seen when Socrates presses him on 
the source of his wealth, wealth which many suspect is what truly makes old age easy for 
him. In response to Socrates’ questions about whether he earned or inherited all his 
money, Cephalus describes himself as a “sort of mean between [his] grandfather and 
father,” the former having built up a great fortune which the latter largely squandered 
(330b). While not greatly increasing what his father left him, Cephalus has earned over 
his lifetime more than he has spent, such that he can leave to his sons more than he 
himself inherited. Thus, although Socrates notes that Cephalus does not seem overly fond 
of wealth, as would be one who earned all his money, we do know that he has devoted 
some effort in his life to money-making and that he has been fairly successful.210  
The fact that Cephalus marks a mean between his father and grandfather lends 
some credence to the claim that he is of a measured character; he seems to have been 
                                                 
210 According to an account given by his son Lysias, Cephalus was invited by Pericles to 
Athens where he “established a successful shield factory that had over a hundred slaves 




drawn neither to excessive money-making nor to profligate indulgence.211 His bodily 
desires must not have held exclusive reign over his soul, having allowed the money-
loving part of his soul to take its turn at the helm.212 To whatever extent he was a 
playboy, Cephalus also managed to be a successful businessman, suggesting his 
indulgences were kept within bounds. By his own admission, Cephalus has been 
possessed by not one but many masters, but perhaps none required too much to be sated. 
Part of his ability to handle old age well seems to be, as we saw at the start, his ability to 
adapt to new pleasures as they come along (328d). In this way his character resembles the 
one that Socrates will later attribute to the democratic man. Such a person, despite living 
in large part by the rule of pleasure, achieves a kind of moderation by sheer dispersal of 
desire. And, as Socrates notes, the lucky ones are those who, especially as they get older 
                                                 
211 C. D. C. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato’s Republic (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 1988): 5.  
 
212 Scholars differ widely in their interpretations of Cephalus’ youthful and mature 
character. Reeve views him as “an attractive character,” and goes so far as to say his “life 
is not very different in character from Socrates’.” Annas, by contrast, thinks Plato here 
shows his “contempt” for a life devoted to money-making. Nussbaum takes Cephalus to 
have attached more importance to appetite than he himself knows, although she thinks 
that he is still genuinely relieved to be freed from the “problem” of erotic desire. Bloom 
takes him to have been “once very erotic,” but overlooks the fact that Cephalus is not 
simply an inheritor of wealth but also an earner of money. For reasons stated above, I am 
inclined to agree with Rosen’s interpretation of Cephalus as a man inclined to spend and 
indulge within his means. On the most important points, my reading is closest to that of 
Bourgault, who emphasizes that Cephalus’ “moderation is not genuine; his sophrosyne is 
merely accidental.” See Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 6; Julia Annas, An Introduction to 
Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981), 18; Martha Nussbaum, The 
Fragility of Goodness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 138; Bloom, 
Republic, 313; and Stanley Rosen, Plato’s Republic (New Haven: Yale University Press, 




and “the great disturbances” have passed away, readmit into their souls some of the 
formerly exiled speeches, those made in favor of simplicity, moderation, measure and 
order (661c ff.). In Cephalus we find this same mixture, allowing him to be, as Rosen 
puts it, a “temperate hedonist.”213  
Taking a wider view of Cephalus’ life as a whole, it becomes clear that he 
embodies a “sort of mean” in more ways than one. As we have already seen, Cephalus is 
neither frugal nor profligate, neither a libertine nor an ascetic. He is friendly to both 
Socrates and Sophocles, and yet by no means a philosopher or intellectual himself. He is 
a money-maker but not a money-lover. Even as a metic Cephalus embodies a kind of 
mean, marking a midpoint in status between the citizen and the foreigner, living in the 
Piraeus, the central point of exchange between Athens and the rest of the world.214 One 
could say that Cephalus is of such a middling, average character, that he does not whole-
heartedly give himself over to anything.215  
If Socrates’ purpose in speaking with Cephalus is to see whether this middle road 
he has travelled has been hard and rough or easy and smooth, then it would seem very 
                                                 
213 Rosen, Republic, 27.  
 
214 As Nails points out, reference to this hierarchy—citizen, metic, foreigner—is made at 
562e. See Nails, The People of Plato, 84. On the point of metics, Bloom directs readers to 
Xenophon’s The Athenian Republic. See Bloom, Republic, p. 469 fn. 23. According to 
Xenophon, the conventional hierarchy between free citizens, metics, and slaves, had 
largely been leveled in Athens, where one might easily mistake one for the other 
(Athenian Republic I.10-13).  
 
215 To borrow a distinction from Clor, Cephalus appears more mediocre than moderate. 
See Clor, On Moderation, 48-49.  
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much to be the latter. Both youth and old age have been relatively easy for Cephalus in 
large part simply because he appears to have been blessed with a relatively easy-going 
nature. But if this is a blessing, it is mixed at best. Toward the end of Socrates’ 
conversation with Cephalus, we learn that the path of his life has taken an unexpected 
turn. As he explains to Socrates, when a man nears the end of his journey, “fear and care 
enter him for things to which he gave no thought before” (330d). Launching into his 
longest speech, explaining why wealth is now such an asset to him, Cephalus seems less 
and less like someone who bears old age easily. He tells Socrates that while a man may 
laugh in his youth at the tales told of what Hades has in store for those who commit 
injustice, upon reaching old age such stories “make his soul twist and turn because he 
fears they might be true” (330e). One must then look back upon one’s life to see whether 
or not he has committed injustices. The one who has is weighed down by the anticipation 
of evil, while the one who has not is filled with “sweet and good hope” (330e). 
Although by no means an outright criminal, Cephalus is clearly concerned that he 
has not lived his entire life on the straight and narrow. And while he places some distance 
between himself and the man wracked by fear (not speaking here in the first person), it is 
safe to say a great dread has prompted Cephalus’ newfound piety. He values his wealth 
now insofar as it can help him repay his debts to gods and men and save him from 
committing further injustices (331b). But whatever taste of that “sweet and good hope” 
his new devotion might bring him, his continued need to sacrifice leads us to believe that 
Cephalus lives his last days not entirely free of “suspicion and terror” (330e). While 
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Cephalus is rid of the mad masters of his youth, his soul is far from tranquil, now at the 
mercy of extreme fear on one hand, and hope on the other.  
We see that Cephalus’ easygoingness has led him to be largely unreflective about 
the path his life ought to have taken. Cephalus managed to live the majority of his life 
oblivious to what would be his greatest concern at its end. Had he taken himself and his 
soul more seriously sooner, instead of laughing at the stories told of Hades that have now 
come back to haunt him, perhaps he could have confronted them more squarely than he is 
able to in his old age. Turning to speeches not for the pleasure they provide (cf. 328d), 
but rather the light they may shed upon the truth of what constitutes a good life, he could 
have reflected more deeply upon whether the fear most feel upon approaching death is 
due to a genuine premonition of things to come or simply to the “debility of old age” 
(330e). Was he a fool to laugh in his youth or foolish now to have the fears and hopes 
that he does? What path should his life have taken?  
These questions are not far from those that Glaucon and Adeimantus will soon 
pose to Socrates. If Cephalus lacked the seriousness necessary in his youth to pursue 
questions concerning the good life, both Glaucon and Adeimantus are more promising in 
this regard. Especially in the case of Glaucon, we see that his very intensity and refusal to 
be satisfied by anything other than the greatest good leads him to examine more closely 
than Cephalus has just what one’s truest good is. It is in their very seriousness that both 
Glaucon and Adeimantus have come to doubt the goodness of justice. Looking more 
closely at the challenge they pose to Socrates, we will see that a successful rebuttal of 
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their arguments requires not only a defense of justice, but also one of moderation. In the 
end, Socrates may be more successful when it comes to the latter than the former, 
sketching a form of moderation both fitting and appealing to youth, even one as inclined 
to immoderation as Glaucon.  
 
Glaucon and Adeimantus’ Critique of Moderation 
Glaucon enters the conversation at the start of Book II, wanting to be fully 
persuaded by Socrates that it is “in every way better to be just than unjust” (357a-b). He 
begins his argument by delineating three kinds of goods (357b-d). First, there are goods 
that are chosen not for their consequences but for their own sake, such as harmless 
pleasures. Second, are goods desired both for their own sake and for their consequences, 
such as thinking, seeing, and being healthy. Third, are goods chosen not for themselves 
but for their consequences, such as exercise, medicine, or work for money’s sake. 
Socrates must prove that justice is the second kind of good, against the suspicion of the 
many that it is the third. In order to provoke the best defense of justice, Glaucon plans to 
launch his best attack against it, adopting a position that is not his own, but one he would 
like Socrates to disprove.  
Glaucon’s attack has as its unspoken premise that immoderation is naturally good, 
a point that can best be seen in his account of the ring of Gyges. As the story goes, a 
shepherd happens upon a ring with the power to make its bearer invisible. Immediately 
upon realizing his new power, the shepherd commits adultery with the king’s wife, 
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murders the king, and takes over rule of the kingdom. Glaucon maintains that anyone 
with such a ring would do the same. Generally speaking, he argues that no one would 
stand by justice if able, without consequence, to take what belongs to others, stealing 
goods from the market, going into houses and sleeping with whomever he wants, and 
doing “other things as an equal to a god among humans” (360c). Every man, Glaucon 
claims, is naturally driven to get the better of another (359c) and desire will lead both the 
just and the unjust to the same place if they are each given complete license.216 
The Devil’s advocate account that Glaucon presents only makes sense on the 
assumption that men are by nature immoderate. They are greedy and grasping, driven by 
nature, as he says, to get the better of others.217 Acting on their immoderate desires, 
securing for themselves what they want, men achieve their greatest good—the good of a 
true man—and become happy (359b).218 The pursuit of these desires by those capable of 
pursuing them leads naturally to injustice because the goods Glaucon describes are 
limited and essentially unsharable. According to the picture Glaucon paints, men want to 
possess for themselves material goods, lovers, and absolute political power. And they 
want these things, not in some measure, but to the greatest extent possible, without any 
                                                 
216 For a more detailed analysis of this portion of the text see Christopher Dustin and 
Denise Schaeffer, “Looks Matter: Beholding Justice in the Republic,” The Review of 
Politics 68 (2006): 449-473.  
 
217 The word Glaucon uses is pleonexia, a common antonym for moderation. For an 
extended account of the role of greed in ancient Greece, see Balot, Greed and Injustice. 
 
218 This view is also expressed by Callicles of Plato’s Gorgias. See Balot, Greed and 




limits or restraints. It is no coincidence that Glaucon’s portrait of masculinity is one that 
would embrace the virtue of courage (andreia—literally “manliness” in Greek) and spurn 
the virtue of moderation (361b).219 It was not uncommon at this time for moderation to be 
seen as nothing but cowardliness (560d).220 Just as those too weak to do injustice praise 
justice, those who lack the manliness needed to fulfill their desires praise moderation, 
passing their own incompetence or softness off as a virtue.221 In short, Glaucon’s account 
assumes that all men want the same things; some are just more capable than others of 
securing what they desire. 
And yet, in painting this picture, Glaucon betrays a certain reservation about 
whether a life filled by the unrestrained pursuit of pleasure and power would be 
                                                 
219 It is debatable whether one who possesses the daring to do unjust deeds ought to be 
taken as possessing the virtue of courage. We are often loath to attribute any virtue to an 
individual who commits heinous acts. For an illuminating discussion of this question, see 
Rabieh, Courage. As will be considered later on, complications of a similar sort can arise 
in the case of moderation, which could be as much an instrument to unjust ends as 
courage. 
  
220 This is also the argument made by Callicles in Plato’s Gorgias 492a ff. See also 
Thucydides, Peloponnesian War 3.82.4 and North, “A Period of Opposition.” 
 
221 Compare Nietzsche’s Genealogy of Morals 13, where he describes weakness which 
has “come to masquerade in the pomp of an ascetic, mute, and expectant virtue, just as 
though the very weakness of the weak—that is, forsooth, its being, its working, its whole 
unique inevitable inseparable reality—were a voluntary result, something wished, chosen, 
a deed, an act of merit.” Nietzsche, On the Genealogy of Morals in On the Genealogy of 
Morals and Ecce Homo, trans. Walter Kaufmann & R. J. Hollingdale (New York: 




genuinely satisfying.222 Even the greatest immoderation would not be great enough. In 
the most important respect, one would remain all too human. As we saw with Cephalus, 
all mortal pleasures come to an end. The ring of Gyges was found on a corpse, and to a 
corpse it will eventually return; even the godlike power of doing whatever one pleases 
cannot save one from old age and death. Glaucon himself seems to recognize that there is 
something missing from his picture of the best life, referring vaguely to “other things” 
that would make one like a god among men (360c), but not quite knowing what they are. 
It is likely because he recognizes that there is something missing in what amounts 
to the life of an immoderate tyrant that Glaucon wants so badly to be shown that a greater 
happiness can be secured through devotion to justice. His desire for a good that 
transcends the goods pursued by a tyrant can be seen in the hypothetical case he goes on 
to describe. Imagine, he says, a perfectly just and a perfectly unjust man (360e-362c). 
The unjust man has everything, including a reputation for justice, while the just man has 
been deprived of everything, including his good reputation. The unjust man appears by 
all means to have a happy fate, while the just man is whipped and racked, has his eyes 
burnt out, and is finally crucified. Can Socrates convince him that the just man is still 
better off? Glaucon describes so extreme a case because he wants to be shown that pure 
devotion to justice is possible, and that it is a good so great that all ordinary goods should 
be sacrificed for it. In other words, Glaucon expresses the hope for a good that far 
surpasses all the goods promised in the unrestrained pursuit and fulfillment of one’s 
                                                 
222 See Devin Stauffer, Plato’s Introduction to the Question of Justice (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), 127.  
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tyrannical desires. Before looking more closely at the task Glaucon has set for Socrates, 
we will first turn briefly to the statement made by Adeimantus. 
Adeimantus supplements Glaucon’s argument in a way that gives more explicit 
attention to moderation. Rather than speculating as to what the deeds of those given the 
freedom to be unjust and immoderate might be, Adeimantus turns to the speeches made 
about the virtues. Consider, he says, what is said in prose and by the poets: “With one 
tongue they all chant that moderation and justice are fair, but hard and full of drudgery, 
while intemperance and injustice are sweet and easy to acquire, and shameful only by 
opinion and law” (363e-364a). Here, for the first time, moderation comes explicitly under 
attack. Why take the hard road if it is more profitable to be unjust and more pleasant to be 
intemperate? As Adeimantus goes on to explain, if one consults what is said by others, 
there is no need even to worry about being punished by the gods for one’s wrongdoings; 
Homer himself assures us that the gods can be moved to forgiveness through prayers and 
sacrifices (364d-e). Adeimantus even goes so far as to raise the possibility that there are 
no gods at all, or at least none who care for human things (365d). But even if they do 
exist, if everything that is said about them suggests that they can be “persuaded and 
perverted by sacrifices” (365e), then they pose no real threat or deterrent to the unjust and 
immoderate. One could always, as Cephalus is trying to do, buy them off at the end of 
one’s life. 
In the wake of these attacks, Socrates is left with the explicit task of defending 
justice, although we have seen that moderation is as much in need of a defense. It is 
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worth noting how strange the demands of Glaucon and Adeimantus on behalf of justice in 
particular have become. As mentioned above, Glaucon began by describing three kinds of 
goods. Adeimantus closes his statement to Socrates by asking him to show that justice is 
among the highest kind, “those that are worth having for what comes from them but much 
more for themselves, such as seeing, hearing, thinking, and of course being healthy” 
(367d, emphasis added). This “much more” was not part of Glaucon’s original 
description (357b), and, as we saw, Glaucon’s version is even more extreme than 
Adeimantus’. In his desire to have justice shown to be nearly the opposite of that which is 
desired on account of its good consequences, Glaucon imagined justice accompanied by 
the worst consequences imaginable. It would seem that in wanting to see justice “extolled 
all by itself,” he wants to see it shown to be the first kind of good, a good that is desired 
simply for its own sake. But he had described these kinds of goods as akin to harmless 
pleasures. The good he is now asking Socrates to show justice to be is a good unlike any 
of those he had previously described. Justice must somehow be shown to be a good 
which, far from being a harmless pleasure, could be accompanied by the greatest and 
most painful harms, and yet still somehow be desired “in itself,” as the source of our 
greatest happiness. 
Whether Glaucon’s demands of justice can be satisfied remains to be seen. But it 
is important for our purposes to ask if the same demands would ever be made of 
moderation, or whether moderation ever places the same demands upon us. While 
moderation may call for restraint, it does not seem, as justice often does, to call for 
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sacrifice. Unlike justice, moderation never seems to demand positive action on behalf of 
others. For this reason, the confusion and tension between the noble and the good that 
accompanies our understanding of a virtue like justice is less present in the case of 
moderation, which presents itself as more closely and clearly connected to the good of 
the individual who possesses it.223 Still, insofar as moderation involves self-denial, does it 
truly do so for the sake of the individual’s own greatest good? Does it actually contribute 
to the happiness of its possessor, or is it, as many suspect, nothing more than an artificial 
restraint, denying us the pursuit of our full happiness? Will moderation prove to be a 
good like seeing and hearing and being healthy, one that should be desired both for its 
own sake and for what comes from it? We can begin to find answers to these questions 
by following the development of moderation through the city in speech.  
 
 
The City in Speech 
 
The Healthy City  
In an attempt to satisfy the demands of Glaucon and Adeimantus, Socrates 
proposes that they build a city in speech. Just as it would be helpful for someone of poor 
                                                 
223 For an especially clear case of this tension between the noble and the good in the case 
of courage see Rabieh, Courage, 49. As Weiss puts it, “Moderation’s advantage over 
justice is that it can be defended as something desirable in itself for oneself—in the sense 
that it is good for one to be healthy or fit in both body and soul” (Philosophers in the 
Republic, 187).  
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vision to be able to see a bigger version of letters before having to examine smaller ones, 
so too might it be easier first to investigate and observe justice in a city, where it is 
bigger, so as to better recognize it in the individual. Socrates himself hints at difficulties 
with this procedure. As he says when using the example of the letters, seeing larger ones 
before smaller ones would be of use only “if…they do happen to be the same” (368d). 
This is by no means a minor qualification, and we must be cautious of ways in which the 
comparison could prove as misleading as it is helpful. At any rate, having established that 
they will turn to cities, Socrates then suggests that if they were to watch a city coming 
into being, they would see along with it the coming into being of justice and injustice. 
Adeimantus agrees that this is probably the case (369a), and with that they embark upon 
the building of a city in speech. 
According to Socrates, cities arise because individuals are not self-sufficient; we 
all have basic needs such as food, shelter, and clothing, and we are ill equipped to 
provide for these necessities on our own. Contrary to Glaucon’s picture of men as 
naturally competitive, Socrates describes a city as arising from cooperation, men 
gathering together “as partners and helpers” (369c), and working collectively, not in a 
spirit of sacrificial devotion to the common good, but simply as the best way to secure 
their individual needs. Tasks are divided up on the principle of a division of labor, under 
the assumption that one man will do a finer job if he devotes himself to one task as 
opposed to many. On this basis, the first city in speech grows until it includes everyone 
from farmers to cobblers to weavers to merchants. 
163 
 
This first city that Socrates builds is called the healthy city. And wherever the best 
place to look for justice might be, one wonders whether it might not have been best to 
look for moderation here. But would it be right to view it as the model of this virtue, from 
which all other cities stray? Everything about the city is certainly measured; it does not 
admit of excess. But insofar as that is the case, there is something both attractive and 
repellent about it. The city is eminently sensible. It sees perfectly to its citizens’ needs 
and in doing so even leaves room for simple pleasures. Everything is kept within sensible 
bounds. Even the frequency of sex is limited so that couples do not “produce children 
beyond their means, keeping an eye out against poverty and war” (372b). If a city sticks 
simply to its needs, it seems its needs can be met. If the raison d’etre of the city is to 
provide for our basic needs, then perhaps this is why the healthy city is, as Socrates calls 
it, the true city (372e). 
And yet, there is something in human nature that screams, “Reason not the need!” 
As Shakespeare’s King Lear protests, “Allow not nature more than nature needs, / Man’s 
life’s as cheap as the beast’s” (King Lear, II.iv).224 This same thought will ultimately 
                                                 
224 One might even wonder whether the distinctly human ability to indulge to excess is 
connected to our distinct ability to reason, as one poet puts it, “Let brutes and vegetals, 
that cannot think, / So far as drought and nature urges, drink; / A more indulgent mistress 
guides our sprites, / Reason, that dares beyond our appetites, / (She would our care, as 
well as thirst, redress) / And with divinity [i.e., Bacchus] rewards excess.” II.7-12 of 
Waller’s “For Drinking of Healths” quoted in Joshua Scodel, Excess and the Mean in 
Early Modern Literature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), 213. As Scodel 
notes, Waller, far from seeing reason as counseling the restraint of excessive appetite, 
“represents [reason] as encouraging the truly rational man to go beyond mere thirst into 
an ‘excess’ that brings contact with inebriating ‘divinity.’ For Waller the rational man is 
also the courageous man who ‘dares’ to transcend not only animal nature but also silly 
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prompt Glaucon to call the healthy city a city of sows, not of men. Interrupting Socrates’ 
account, Glaucon says, “You seem to make these men have their feasts without relishes” 
(372c). So Socrates allows for relishes, and even desserts for the citizens of his healthy 
city, and yet he continues to keep all this, including their drinking, “in measure” (372d) 
so that they may “live out their lives in peace and health.” “Dying as old men,” he 
concludes, “they will hand down other similar lives to their offspring” (372d). But this 
does not satisfy Glaucon, who gives voice to that within us that ever longs for more.225 
Men ought to live with relish in more ways than one. With what else, he asks Socrates, 
will he fatten his city of sows (372d)? 
Giving in to Glaucon’s many desires, Socrates concedes that they are moving now 
from an account of how a healthy city comes into being, to one of how a luxurious or 
feverish city develops (372e). From couches and tables to courtesans and poets, the 
feverish city expands until it is “gorged with a bulky mass of things” (373a). With this 
expansion comes want and war. No longer able to stay within its means, the city will 
                                                                                                                                                 
cultural norms.” See Scodel, Excess, 213. On this point see also Clor, On Moderation, 
98-99. 
 
225 Robert Meister notes that proponents of capitalism “openly [avow] that the relentless 
superannuation of products and desires is a strength, not a weakness,” arguing that the 
austerity and “‘satisfaction’ promised by socialists and Greens alike is a form of living 
death.” In a quotation taken from a “self-proclaimed ‘survivor’ of [Communism’s] 
austerity” measures, Meister captures the grim outlook of a society in which, like 
Socrates’ healthy city, the future merely perpetuates the past: “What Communism 
instilled in us was precisely this immobility, this absence of a future, the absence of a 
dream, of the possibility of imagining our lives differently. … [W]e learned to think: This 
will go on forever…” See Robert Meister, “Is Moderation a Virtue? Gregory Vlastos and 
the Toxins of Eudaemonism,” Apeiron 26 3/4 (1993): 113-114.  
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have to expand, taking its neighbors’ land (373d). Thus, the city will have need of an 
army. Having established a need for what he calls the guardian class, Socrates goes on to 
discuss what nature its members must have and what education they must undergo. This 
education will amount to what Socrates later calls a purging of the gorged, luxurious city 
(399e).  
Before looking in detail at this education and the moderation it achieves, it is 
important to note that however austere this new city becomes, Socrates never expects 
there to be a return to the healthy city. As he says when they move to the luxurious city, 
the healthy city simply will not satisfy everyone (372e-373a). It seems that once the 
existence of human longing is acknowledged, the healthy city is no longer possible. Or 
even if it could be possible, one sees that it is not fully desirable. The healthy city may be 
without poverty or war, but for all that it fails to be fully human. Crude as his expression 
of it might have been, Glaucon’s rejection of the healthy city betrays a deeper 
dissatisfaction with a way of life in which the present merely perpetuates the past, leaving 
no room for the exceptional or the transcendent. The healthy city, while it sees to the 
needs of the body, neglects those of the soul.  
Moderation as a human virtue, one that does not reduce us to easily satisfied 
animals, must be different from the moderation that could be said to exist within the 
healthy city. It cannot simply be a negation, removal, or, as we saw in the case of 
Cephalus, a withering away of that within us which strives and desires for more. That 
said, if all our longing amounts to is an augmentation of the desires and habits that we 
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share most with the animals, then it would be hard to see how its satisfaction makes us 
more human, as opposed to simply the worst of beasts. The task of moderation may then 
be to educate and elevate, as opposed to eliminate, human desire. In Socrates’ treatment 
of the guardian class, we will see one possible model for such an education.  
 
An Education in Moderation  
The guardian education is comprised of gymnastics for the body and music 
(which includes speeches) for the soul. The musical education of the young is of primary 
importance, for, as Socrates explains, the beginning of every work, especially anything 
young and tender, is the most important part: “For at that stage it’s most plastic, and each 
thing assimilates itself to the model whose stamp anyone wishes to give it” (377a-b).226 
Impressionable youths must be given only the best of models and, above all, they must 
not be exposed to opinions that are opposite to those they must maintain in their 
adulthood (377a-b). There must then be strict supervision of the makers of children’s 
tales. 
To begin with, the gods of these tales, if they are truly good, can only be the cause 
of good. If it must be said that gods punish, then it must be maintained that the one who 
is punished profits on account of it (380b). Moreover since a god, and all that belongs to 
him, is in the best condition, it follows that he should never change, since to change 
would be to move from a good and perfect condition to one that is less so (381b-c). Poets 
                                                 




should never write tales of gods changing shape and visiting the cities, and mothers 
should not be allowed to scare their children with stories of gods walking among men, 
disguised as strangers. Needless to say, the picture Socrates paints is a radical revision of 
the Homeric gods. The gods Socrates describes would seem to have little to do with 
human things.227 Especially if one follows through to its end the thought that what is 
perfect will never change or be moved by something external to it, one wonders whether 
it could still be maintained that the gods punish at all, even if in doing so they should not 
actually be seen as doing harm.  
On the whole, one can safely say that the divinity Socrates describes is much less 
fear-inspiring than the gods of whom Cephalus heard tales in his youth. This revision is 
striking when viewed from the standpoint of cultivating moderation. Fear of the gods 
would seem a natural ally to the virtue. Had fear of the divine gripped Cephalus sooner, 
he may have been more concerned with moderation in his youth than he appears to have 
been. Indeed, fear seems so clearly a support of moderation that Aquinas deems it to be 
the gift that accompanies the virtue. As he puts it, “man stands in the greatest need of the 
fear of God in order to shun those things which are most seductive, and these are the 
matter of temperance.”228 But gods who are thought to punish are often also thought to 
reward. Fear-inspiring gods are also hope-inspiring gods, and both fear and hope can be 
                                                 
227 See Bloom, Republic, 352 and Rabieh, Courage, 114.  
 
228 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica II-II Q141 A1 ad.3. Translation from Summa 
Theologica Vol. 3 Part 2, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: 
Cosimo, 2007).  
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great sources of immoderate, unreasonable action. As we saw, Cephalus’ great hope is 
that, as Adeimantus puts is, the gods can be “perverted by sacrifices.” Belief in gods who 
can be so easily swayed by human actions can inspire late-life repentance, but it does not 
lend itself to a sustained interest in and devotion to virtue throughout the whole of life. 
Rather than rely upon external threats and rewards, and the fears and hopes they 
engender, Socrates tries, through an elaborate education, to bring about a kind of 
moderation that stems from the inner inclinations of the individual.  
If children are to grow to be moderate adults, then the gods and heroes they 
worship in their youth must be depicted as moderate themselves. In Socrates’ description 
of the elements of poetry that must be banned and those that can remain, we find our first 
definition of the virtue, although it is a sketch that requires some filling in. He identifies 
“the most important elements of moderation according to the multitude (hos plethe)” as 
“being obedient to the rulers, and being themselves rulers of the pleasures of drink, sex 
and eating” (389e). In this way, moderation governs one’s relation both toward others 
and toward oneself. Each facet of moderation appears to have something to do with an 
ability to recognize and remain within certain limits. But how are these limits determined 
and what is the source obedience in each case? As we look to the poetic examples 
Socrates goes on to provide, we will see that this picture of moderation becomes more 
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complex, pointing the way from the mere elements identified here to a more holistic 
definition of moderation found in Book IV.229  
First, regarding being obedient to rulers, Socrates states that it would be “fine to 
say the sort of thing Diomedes says in Homer, ‘Friend, keep quiet, and obey my word,’ 
and what’s connected with this, ‘Breathing might the Achaeans went, / In silence, afraid 
of their leaders’” (389e). Here fear seems to reemerge as an inducer of moderation. If not 
fear of the rulers of the cosmos, then perhaps fear of the rulers of this world is to be the 
source of obedience. But the scene to which Socrates refers in his opening quotation 
suggests another possibility, and is worth looking at more closely. At this point in the 
Iliad, the Achaeans are in the midst of battle with the Trojans. Agamemnon is rallying his 
men, goading them with insults to rile their spirits, prompting them to prove themselves 
in battle. He lets loose on Diomedes, accusing him of being shy behind the lines, not half 
the man his father was in war. In response, Homer tells us that Diomedes remained silent, 
respectful of the king. By contrast Sthenelus, Diomedes’ compatriot, rails against 
Agamemnon’s taunting, calling him a liar and claiming that he and Diomedes are far 
greater than their fathers ever were. 
It is in response to this outburst that Diomedes reproaches his friend as Socrates 
quotes. After ordering him to be silent, Diomedes explains that he does not blame 
Agamemnon for goading the Argives on in this way, for the glory is Agamemnon’s to 
                                                 
229 For an alternate reading of the meaning of these passages see Seth Benardete, 
Socrates’ Second Sailing: On Plato’s Republic (Chicago: The University of Chicago 
Press, 1989) 67-69. 
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win if they prosper, and the grief is his to bear if they are massacred. With this, Diomedes 
rouses his troops as Agamemnon wishes. He does this not because he is taken in by his 
chiding, but because he understands the necessity that prompts it, appreciating 
Agamemnon’s attempt to spur his army to battle. In this, Diomedes bests even Odysseus, 
who takes Agamemnon’s bait and reacts to his insults with anger (perhaps more than 
even Agamemnon anticipated). But if Diomedes is a model of moderation in his 
obedience, it is important to note that the source of this obedience is different from that of 
the Achaeans to whom Socrates refers in the second part of his quotation. In Diomedes’ 
case, obedience stems from an understanding of what is prudent and necessary in war 
along with a recognition and acceptance of the difference between Agamemnon’s 
position and his own. As we see later in the Iliad, no fear prevents Diomedes from 
standing up to Agamemnon, but he does so only at the appropriate time and place, when 
they are gathered together in an assembly and not in the midst of battle (Iliad IX), where 
insubordination can prove deadly. Thus, while conventional obedience in the case of the 
many may stem from fear, in Diomedes’ case we see the alternative of obedience guided 
by reason.  
This brings us to the second of Socrates’ examples that address moderation as 
obedience to rulers. While the example of Diomedes is fine or noble, the lines “‘Heavy 
with wine, with eyes of a dog and the heart of a deer,’ And what comes right after, and all 
the rest of the youthful insolence of private men to rulers,” are not (389e-390a). Here 
again, the context is worth considering. The words are those of Achilles, and just the 
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beginning of a long list of insults he hurls at Agamemnon. His rage has been prompted by 
Agamemnon’s decision to take for himself Achilles’ war prize, Briseis. Achilles is deeply 
insulted and does not hold back from saying so. While Achilles’ immoderation will be 
discussed further below, it is important first to see that this example points to a difficulty 
beyond Achilles’ immoderation, raising a complication for the virtue of moderation that 
did not arise in Diomedes’ case. 
As was noted above, Diomedes remains obedient to Agamemnon because he sees 
the shared good toward which Agamemnon’s actions aim, namely, victory in battle. In 
the Achilles example matters are much less clear. In taking Briseis from Achilles, 
Agamemnon acts solely for his own selfish good, doing harm to Achilles and by 
extension all of the Argives. His decision to take Briseis is so spiteful and petty that it is 
hard to blame Achilles when he says, “I have no mind to linger here disgraced, brimming 
your cup and piling up your plunder” (Iliad I.163-90).230 To the extent that Agamemnon 
is as shameless and greedy as Achilles describes, one wonders whether obedience to such 
a king is a virtue.231 Is not the first half of moderation, obedience to rulers, only sensible 
if those rulers possess the other half of moderation, being rulers themselves over pleasure 
and their own desire to grasp for more? If they are incapable of ruling themselves, can 
they be capable or respectable rulers of others? As Achilles puts it, only “worthless husks 
                                                 
230 All translations of the Iliad are from The Iliad of Homer, trans. Robert Fagles (New 
York: Penguin Books, 1990).  
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of men” would be obedient to a “King who devours his people” (Iliad I.221-52). This 
difficulty will be averted in the city in speech through the rule of philosopher kings, who 
are, unlike Agamemnon, both moderate and wise.232 But what is the status of obedience 
in all actual cities, where leaders fall short of being philosopher kings?233 
Leaving aside for now the question of whether or not obedience can in all cases 
be seen as a virtue, we turn to Socrates’ discussion of the second part of moderation, 
mastery over the pleasures of drinking, sex, and eating. This version of moderation as a 
form of temperance is one with which we are more familiar. In the clearest examples he 
provides, Socrates refers to the gods being overcome by sexual desire, Zeus so enthralled 
by Hera that he forgets all else, including his shame, as well as the adultery of Ares and 
Aphrodite. As Glaucon will soon concede, there is no pleasure greater, keener, or madder 
than sex (403a). Indeed, the education of the guardians will culminate in a radical attempt 
to control sexual desire. Suffice it to say for now that if even gods are depicted as driven 
to act with such abandon, it is hard to find reason to believe human beings could do much 
better.  
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233 For an alternate interpretation of this passage see David Bolotin, "The Critique of 
Homer and the Homeric Heroes in Plato's Republic," in Political Philosophy and the 
Human Soul, eds. M. Palmer and T. L. Pangle (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 
1995), 89. On the whole, Bolotin takes Socrates to be tacitly encouraging blind 
obedience, as some degree of it will be needed even by the guardians, who will fail fully 
to understand and therefore be tempted to rebel against the philosopher kings. This seems 
right to me, but if blind obedience is salutary in the city ruled by philosopher kings, our 




While pleasure is clearly at issue in the above examples, the rest of the cases 
Socrates cites in this section prove more interesting, fitting less clearly within the 
definition of moderation as having to do with rule over pleasure. Reflecting upon them, 
we see the scope of moderation grow. To begin with, in addressing the matter of food and 
drink, Socrates starts by criticizing what appears to be Odysseus’ excessive praise of a 
great feast with full cups and tables as the finest of all things (390a-b).234 He then quotes 
Eurylochus, one of Odysseus’ men, asking his companions whether hunger isn’t the most 
pitiful way to die (390b). The idea behind the two quotations seems to be that we should 
never think food and drink so important as to believe that having them is the best thing 
and being without them the worst. This point will be in keeping with the general 
movement of the education of the guardians insofar as it teaches them to privilege the 
soul over the body.  
But further consideration of the second quotation brings out an aspect of 
moderation that had hitherto been overlooked. In context, Eurylochus is trying to 
persuade Odysseus’ men to eat the forbidden cattle of Helios, despite Tireseus’ warning 
against it. Marooned on an island, having exhausted the ship’s stores, Odysseus’ men are 
tired of scavenging for their food, suffering from hunger, and imagining the fate of 
starvation; in this state, they give in and slaughter the god’s cattle. The situation of 
                                                 
234 As Bloom points out, here and elsewhere Socrates gives less credit to Homer’s heroes 
than they deserve. Odysseus praises not so much the food as he does the harmony among 
men that results from gathering together and listening to music. See Bloom, Republic, 
452. On the whole, Socrates’ unfair denigration of Homer’s heroes may be part of Plato’s 
overall effort to make way for new ones.  
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Odysseus’ men appears as less a matter of unrestrained or excessive desire for pleasure 
than it is a lack of endurance in the face of the pain (of hunger) and fear (of an eventual 
death by starvation). 
This is not to say that pleasure is not at all involved. After all, the hungrier we are, 
the more vividly we anticipate the satisfaction of a meal, and the more intensely we enjoy 
it. In fact, the example helps to bring out how inseparable pleasure and pain tend to be, 
pleasures often being most tempting when they promise the relief of pain, and each 
becoming more intense by virtue of their contrast.235 But this means that the weaker we 
are when it comes to enduring pain, the more easily we will succumb to temptation. 
Moderation then must be as much a matter of endurance in the face of pain as it is 
restraint when pleasure in is reach.236 Indeed, in his one positive statement in this section 
on self-mastery, Socrates says that what must be seen and heard in poetry are “speeches 
and deeds of endurance by famous men in the face of everything” (390d, emphasis 
added). The example he goes on to provide of such endurance sheds further light upon 
the scope and nature of moderation. 
Socrates quotes again from the Odyssey, this time the words of Odysseus himself: 
“Smiting his breast, he reproached his heart with word. ‘Endure, heart; you have endured 
worse before’” (390d). At this point in the Odyssey, Odysseus has finally returned home, 
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only to find his house overrun by suitors, and he is so full of rage that he considers 
slaughtering the women who had been lying with them. Homer describes Odysseus’ state 
of mind in the following way: “[A]s a bitch stands over her tender whelps growling, 
when she sees a man she does not know, and is eager to fight, so his heart growled within 
him in his wrath at their evil deeds” (XX 10-15).237 It is at this point that Odysseus 
reproaches his heart, commanding himself to endure as he has endured before. In keeping 
with Socrates’ initial description of the proper guardian nature (375a ff.), moderation 
would seem to be that which curbs the spiritedness of the dog.  
But there is more to the example than meets the eye. For while Odysseus succeeds 
in keeping his heart “bound within him to endure steadfastly,” his rage is only stored 
away, later to be unleashed with great ferocity. His heart continues to seethe and his mind 
continues to race, “pondering how he might put forth his hand upon the shameless 
wooers,” without getting himself killed, one man against many. Insofar as Odysseus is 
able to keep himself from acting impetuously, remaining level-headed enough to 
recognize his situation and think through his best plan of attack, he might seem to 
embody the sound-mindedness that is moderation. But to what end does one keep a level-
head?238 While we might sympathize with Odysseus’ anger, is there not something 
potentially problematic about keeping one’s composure only as a means to better carry 
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out what still amounts to an extreme, rage-driven act?239 Must not a more genuine 
moderation shape the very ends toward which one is driven? 
Leaving aside this larger question for now, we can pause to see that the 
moderation we are speaking of is no longer the moderation of the desires for the 
pleasures of food, sex, or drink. What is in need of moderation is Odysseus’ spiritedness. 
And, as Bloom points out, spiritedness is the common thread that runs through Socrates’ 
critique of Achilles as well.240 The thread is buried, however, beneath Socrates’ claim 
that Achilles, along with being brazenly disobedient to gods and men, is an excessive 
lover of money. Socrates insists that the city’s guardians must not be allowed to believe 
that the hero Achilles “was so full of confusion as to contain within himself two diseases 
that are opposite to one another—illiberality accompanying love of money, on the one 
hand, and arrogant disdain for gods and human beings, on the other” (391c). Socrates 
suggests that Achilles allows himself to be a slave to his desire for money, and yet he 
refuses to be ruled by gods or men.  
As described by Socrates, Achilles would embody the exact opposite of 
moderation, being neither a ruler himself over his desire nor willing to be obedient to any 
                                                 
239 Examples of this limited version of moderation, which seems especially to 
characterize a number of famous fictitious villains, abound. To take a clear case in which 
the capacity for self-possession is not equivalent to moderation in the fullest sense, one 
might consider the “moderation” of a man like Nabakov’s Humbert Humbert, who 
claims, “Years of secret sufferings had taught me superhuman self-control.” Here too we 
see an ability to maintain outward composure despite being “suffocated” inwardly by a 
“mounting fury.” See Vladimir Nabokov, Lolita, ed. Alfred Appel, Jr. (New York: First 
Vintage Books, 1991), 27.  
 
240 See Bloom, Republic, 354 ff. 
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ruler. Love of money is doubtless a great source of immoderation for many. Money can 
buy pleasure, but unlike pleasure, money has no natural limit, making the pursuit of it 
subject to limitless desire. For these reasons, Plato may have considered it the greatest, at 
least in the sense of the most widespread, enemy of virtue. Generally speaking, Socrates’ 
accusation of an honor-loving man as a lover of money prefigures his later analysis of the 
timocratic soul, which still harbors a love of money, even if it pays honor to it only 
“under the cover of darkness” (548a). But, as several commentators have noted, it seems 
obviously unfair to accuse Achilles of being petty in this way.241 What may be the case 
for most hardly seems to be the case for Achilles, who appears first and foremost as a 
lover of honor.  
In a sense, Achilles’ love of honor truly brings out his confusion, for it reveals a 
desire for the recognition of his worth from the very men and gods he appears to disdain. 
Still, there are things that Achilles loves and covets even more than honor. As both 
Bloom and Bolotin note, in accusing Achilles of being a lover of money, Socrates directs 
us to the connection between Achilles’ spiritedness and what could be called his 
covetousness.242 As Bolotin makes especially clear, while Achilles may not be 
immoderately attached to money, he is immoderately attached to certain “things.”243 
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Achilles’ spiritedness is provoked when he perceives himself to be deprived of something 
or someone that he loves and that he believes belongs to him, first Briseis and then 
Patroclus. In the first case, he rages against Agamemnon, in the second, against Hector, 
and, it seems, the whole cosmos.  
Bolotin takes Socrates’ underlying critique of Achilles to be part of his attempt to 
make the guardians more self-sufficient, moving them away from the belief in punitive 
and ruling gods toward the more rational theology discussed above. As Bolotin explains, 
“our attachment to other people—or to property, or to life itself for that matter—leads to 
the belief in gods who enforce that right.”244 As we saw before, Socrates’ new theology 
greatly decreases both the fear and the hope that the gods would inspire. It is especially 
against the backdrop of his belief in a universe governed by caring gods that Achilles’ 
loss of Patroclus comes as such an unbearable, unacceptable shock, one of cosmic 
proportions. While Socrates’ theology requires a certain toughness insofar as one must 
accept a universe largely indifferent to human suffering and loss, it also spares those who 
believe in it the pain of shattered expectations and hopes, and the immoderate backlash of 
spiritedness that such pain evokes.  
Through a closer examination of Socrates’ examples we have come a long way 
from the conventional and partial definition of moderation with which we began: being 
obedient to rulers and being a ruler oneself over the pleasures of food, drink, and sex. We 
saw that although fear could be the source of obedience, Diomedes represents a more 
                                                 




thoughtful form of obedience that stems from understanding. Reflection on Agamemnon 
gave us further cause to believe that obedience, if it is to be a virtue, cannot simply be 
blind. Moreover, we saw that moderation requires endurance, not only in the face of 
pleasure, but also in the face of pain. In the case of Achilles, we see endurance is needed 
in the face of the greatest pains, namely, the loss of a beloved, and that belief in Socrates’ 
new theology would help one acquire the toughness necessary for this endurance. In 
general, we have seen that the reach of moderation is much wider than the conventional 
understanding captures, and that the spirited part of the soul is as much in need of 
moderation as the desiring part.245 This reflection upon Socrates’ examples has paved the 
way to the broader and deeper definition of moderation that we will find in Book IV. 
There Socrates will propose in his own name a more comprehensive understanding of 
moderation, one that incorporates what is strikingly absent in the conventional 
understanding of the virtue: on one hand, the essential role played by reason in 
moderation; and, on the other hand, a vision of moderation as a virtue which involves the 
whole soul, both its appetitive and spirited elements. Before turning to Book IV’s account 
of moderation, we will turn briefly to the key elements that remain to be discussed with 
regard to the musical education of the guardians’ souls. 
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A Habituation in Harmony  
The less than fully fleshed out account of moderation presented on the surface of 
Book III is in keeping with the early guardian education insofar as it is an education 
given largely through images and examples as opposed to clearly articulated, reasoned 
speeches. What is most important is that the gods and heroes appear moderate; the exact 
working out of what lies behind this appearance comes later. In this way, the structure of 
the Republic is in keeping with the structure of the guardian’s education.  
Before arriving at Book IV’s reasoned speech about moderation, there is one 
more crucial element to the guardian education to discuss: the precise role of music and 
harmony. As noted above, the proper portrayal of the gods and heroes is crucial because 
of the integral role imitation plays in education, specifically in the early formation of 
habits and character: what is young and tender “assimilates itself to the model whose 
stamp anyone wishes to give it” (377a-b).246 To this one could add that what is young and 
tender assimilates itself to every stamp it is given, whether those stamps are given 
intentionally or not. Socrates’ insistence that the young guardians be provided with only 
proper models to imitate would seem especially extreme and unnecessary if it were not 
for the fact that children cannot be trusted to copy only the good and not the bad. As 
anyone who has spent any time with children has noticed, they have no such filter, 
imitating indiscriminately. By the time they might able to understand the difference 
between the good and the bad, it is likely to be too late. As Socrates puts it, “imitations, if 
                                                 




they are practiced from youth onwards, become established as habits and nature in body 
and sounds and in thoughts” (395d).247  
For these reasons, Socrates envisions an ideal education that completely controls 
the environment in which children are raised. Care must be taken even with regard to the 
smallest of things, lest “reared on images of vice as it were on bad grass, every day 
cropping and grazing on a great deal little by little from many places, they unawares put 
together some one big bad thing in their soul” (401b).248 Beauty and grace must surround 
the guardians in all things, from the products of the poets to those of the craftsmen, so 
that “dwelling as it were in a healthy place, [the young] will be benefited by everything; 
and…fine works will strike their vision or their hearing, like a breeze bringing health 
from good places” (401b-d).  
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In this effort to infuse children with proper habits and what we might call a 
second nature in body and mind, nothing is more effective than music.249 For the 
inculcation of moderation, children must be exposed to a harmonic mode and rhythm that 
is akin to the virtue. Of this mode Socrates says the following: 
“[L]eave...[a] mode for a man who performs a peaceful deed, one that is not 
violent but voluntary, either persuading someone of something and making a 
request—whether a god by prayer or a human being by instruction and 
exhortation—or, on the contrary, holding himself in check for someone else who 
makes a request or instructs him or persuades him to change, and as a result acting 
intelligently, not behaving arrogantly, but in all these things acting moderately and 
in measure and being content with the consequences.” (399b-c)  
 
It is worth noting how well this description captures the actions of Diomedes described 
above. Also, although Socrates here makes a concession to conventional piety, prayer, if 
it must persist, can remain moderate insofar as it is accompanied by an overall ability to 
endure and accept the consequences, whatever they might be—an ability we saw 
Achilles, in his immoderation, lacked. But what role exactly does a musical mode, with 
its particular rhythm and harmony, play in bringing about or supporting this kind of 
action?  
Music involves and captivates one’s whole being, body and soul.250 As Socrates 
explains, rhythm and harmony “most insinuate themselves into the inmost part of the 
                                                 
249 On the importance of musical education for producing moderation see Bourgault, 
“Prolegomena,” 135-137. 
 
250 Aristides Quintilianus describes the unique character and capacity of music as follows: 
“[P]ainting and sculpture teach only through vision and the likeness both excites and 
amazes the soul; how then could music fail to captivate, since it makes its mimesis not 
through one sensory perception but through many? …Only music teaches both by word 
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soul…bringing grace with them” (401d). But most importantly music helps in the 
development of aesthetic judgment that is rooted in and inseparable from sentiment. 
When the rhythm is off, one feels it before one even knows how to think it. Human 
beings respond instinctually to discord and dissonance, order and harmony, pained by the 
one and pleased by the other. As can be seen in the infant calmed by being rocked and 
sung to, from the earliest age we find comfort in rhythm and harmony.251 An education in 
music nurtures the seed of this innate capacity so that it may grow to inform the whole of 
life. The natural attraction to harmony and aversion to discord can, if properly nurtured 
and developed, provide a basis for, as Socrates puts it, loving and hating in the right way 
in all things, taking pleasure in what is fine and being pained by what is not.252  
These feelings of pleasure and pain can then translate into a form of judgment. As 
Socrates emphasizes, the proper education in rhythm and harmony gives one “the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and by the counterparts of actions, not through motionless bodies or those fixed in a 
single form, but through animate bodies, of which it alters both the figure and the motion 
to the kindred form in accord with each of the actions recited.” Quoted in Thomas J. 
Matheisen, “Harmonia and Ethos in Ancient Greek Music,” Vol. 3, No.3 (1984): 267-8. 
Matheisen describes Quintilainus’ treatise De musica as “unquestionably provid[ing] the 
most detailed and comprehensive ancient treatment of the subjects of harmonia and 
ethos.” See, Matheisen, “Harmonia,” 264-5. 
 
251 See Laws 653c ff. and 790c ff. As the Athenian stranger puts it, “Whereas all other 
creatures are devoid of any perception of the various kinds of order and disorder in 
movement (which we term rhythm and harmony), to men the very gods, who were given, 
as we said, to be our fellows in the dance, have granted the pleasurable perception of 
rhythm and harmony, whereby they cause us to move and lead our choirs, linking us one 
with another by means of songs and dances” (654a). All translations of the Laws are from 
The Laws of Plato, trans. Thomas Pangle (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1980). 
 
252 See also Laws 653 ff.  
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sharpest sense for what’s been left out and what isn’t a fine product of craft or what isn’t 
a fine product of nature” (401e). The importance of this aesthetic instinct, expanded and 
finely tuned through an early and careful cultivation in music, can be seen once one 
recognizes that the guardians themselves are the masterworks of the education Socrates 
has crafted; they are to be models of refinement and grace, embodiments of harmony. 
With souls that have been treated with the same care and attention that any artist would 
bring to his or her craft, striving to have every detail align toward perfection, the 
guardians will love most of all the beauty they find in themselves and in each other. Their 
“musicality” culminates in an ability to recognize the forms of the virtues, and the fairest 
and most lovable sight of all will be the individual in whom these forms coincide (402c-
d).  
Love of a beautiful soul is something with which Glaucon is familiar, and this is 
part of why he so enthusiastically embraces Socrates’ education of the guardians. He 
eagerly concedes that those with beautiful souls are “by far” the fairest of sights, and 
even adds that a soul’s beauty can make up for a body’s defect. Nevertheless, one who 
loves a beautiful person is likely to want to possess him or her, body and soul. But 
Glaucon admits that the pleasure of sex, a pleasure greater and keener than any other 
pleasure he knows, tends toward madness and licentiousness, ugliness not in keeping 
with a beautiful beloved. But the beauty of the love of beauty is the internal check this 
love can place upon the form desire takes insofar as it is a love that strives to be in 
keeping with and worthy of its beloved. Glaucon readily concedes that the pleasure of 
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sex, apparently immoderate in its very nature, must never approach the right kind of love. 
One must “love in a moderate and musical way what’s orderly and fine” (403a). And so, 
with Glaucon’s agreement, they set down a law in their city to this effect, and the musical 
education is complete (403c). 
The musical education appeals to and elevates the longings of individuals like 
Glaucon, directing them toward a love of the beautiful that sets its own limits upon 
desire. As Bloom puts it, this path to virtue is “gentler, surer, and more humane” than one 
reached through either coercion or fear of divine punishment.253 Although surer, one 
could add that it is not entirely certain. If it were, it would not require a law for its 
support. But perhaps a law is necessary because the keystone to the guardian’s education 
is still missing. The musical education is an education in sentiment, forming souls that are 
in some sense moderate before they even know it, preparing the ground for the full 
flourishing of virtue. But this means we have yet to see what moderation understood as 
moderation actually is. As Socrates puts it, the musical education above all forms the soul 
in such a way that a person will “blame and hate the ugly in the right way while one’s 
still young, before one is able to grasp reasonable speech. And when reasonable speech 
comes, the one who is reared in this way would take most delight in it, recognizing it on 
account of its being akin” (401e-402a).254 We have been given a sense of how 
moderation appears, but have not yet looked in detail at the speech that explains it. We 
                                                 
253 Bloom, Republic, 360. 
 
254 Notice, the guardian’s embrace of this reasonable speech depends on its being “akin.” 
In other words, the success of this education in virtue trades on a love of one’s own.  
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find this speech in Book IV, where Socrates provides the Republic’s definitive 
understanding of moderation: a harmony of soul orchestrated by reason.  
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CHAPTER 4: HARMONY OF CITY AND SOUL 
 
Harmony or Mastery of the Soul? 
The definition of moderation as a harmony of soul arises in Book IV as part of the 
process of elimination by which Socrates and Glaucon hope to find justice. With the 
completion of the education of the guardians, they have purged and concluded their city 
in speech. If they can locate within it the other virtues—wisdom, courage, and 
moderation—then justice, they trust, will appear as whatever is left over. Having located 
wisdom within the ruling part of the city (428e-429a), and courage within the defending 
part (429a), Socrates notes that there are two virtues left: moderation and justice. Instead 
of moving directly to moderation, he asks Glaucon, “How could we find justice so we 
won’t have to bother about moderation any further?” (430a). That Socrates would want to 
skip straight to justice is odd, especially since doing so would seem to ruin their entire 
method of inquiry. Why he wants to do this remains a puzzle—one we will return to at 
the end of the chapter—but at least this much is clear: if there is a way to find justice 
without finding moderation, Glaucon does not want to know it. Over the course of their 
conversation, Socrates has aroused in Glaucon such an interest in moderation that he says 
“I would not want [justice] to come to light before, if we aren’t going to consider 
moderation any further” (430d).255  
                                                 
255 Here I differ from Weiss (Philosophers in the Republic, 186) who reads Glaucon as 
having valued moderation from the start.  
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Socrates agrees to gratify Glaucon and discuss moderation, “so as not to do an 
injustice” (430e). Having resolved to consider moderation, Socrates says that while 
wisdom and courage are found within particular parts of the city (428e-429a), moderation 
is, by contrast, “more like a kind of accord and harmony [of parts]” (430e). How this is 
the case is not immediately apparent to Glaucon (430e), so he and Socrates proceed to 
hunt down a definition of moderation.256 Socrates begins by describing how people speak 
about it: 
Moderation is surely a certain kind of order and mastery of certain kinds of 
pleasures and desires, as men say when they use—I don’t know in what way—the 
phrase ‘stronger than himself’; and some other phrases of the sort are used that 
are, as it were, its tracks. (430e) 
 
These tracks recall the half of moderation described in Book III as the mastery of 
pleasure. But while they might point us in the right direction, Socrates insists that there is 
also something ridiculous about the phrase “stronger than himself,” “if the same himself 
is referred to in all of them” (431a). The problem of contradiction that Socrates points to 
here is discussed at length when he turns to a closer investigation of the soul. It would 
seem that one cannot be both stronger and weaker at the same time, with respect to the 
same part, and in relation to the same thing. Making stricter sense of a common statement 
                                                 
256 Lorch views the definition of moderation as a harmony as representative of Glaucon’s 
view of the virtue, not Socrates’. He argues that “the definition of moderation as a 
harmonious condition of the soul is derived two separate times in Book IV,” and that 
“[o]n each occasion Glaucon is responsible for the definition.” But here I think we see 
that far from being responsible for introducing the notion of a harmony, Glaucon does not 
even understand what it might mean. See Lorch, “Choice of Lives,” 238. 
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like being “stronger than oneself,” Socrates explains such an expression “wants to say” 
the following:  
[C]oncerning the soul, in the same human being there is something better and 
something worse. The phrase ‘stronger than himself’ is used [as praise] when that 
which is better by nature is master over that which is worse. And when, from bad 
training or some association, the smaller and better part is mastered by the inferior 
multitude, then this, as though it were a reproach, is blamed and the man in this 
condition is called weaker than himself and licentious. (431a-b) 
 
Here Socrates refines the common saying by making a distinction between parts of the 
soul and then assigning to them a qualitative difference.257 We associate ourselves with 
what we consider to be the better part (or parts) of our nature, even when this aspect of 
ourselves might prove weaker by being overpowered by the worse. From the standpoint 
of moderation, when desire gets the best of us, it is a sign, we would like to think, of our 
weakness rather than strength, despite the fact that the overpowering desire is none other 
than our own.  
But what exactly are the parts of the soul that Socrates refers to here, and in what 
sense are they harmonious? Thus far Socrates has spoken only of the mastery of one part 
of the soul over another.258 The aspect of harmony comes to the fore only when Socrates 
turns to moderation in the city, where the exact nature of moderation does seem clearer. 
The city, he claims, is rightly deemed “stronger than itself” insofar as the “desires and 
                                                 
257 One sees a similar movement in Plato’s Laws. Kleinias asserts that “there is a war 
going on in us, ourselves against ourselves” (626e). The Athenian Stranger refines 
Kleinias’ assertion, suggesting that this strife is one between the inferior and superior 
aspects of ourselves (627b). 
 
258 For a discussion of this difference see Lorch, “Choice of Lives,” 237 ff. 
190 
 
prudence of the more equitable few” rule over the “motley desires” of the common many 
(431c-d). As it stands, it would seem that the city is moderate simply by virtue of the 
moderate individuals who comprise its ruling class. Socrates explains: “The simple and 
measured desires, pleasures and pains, those led by calculation accompanied by 
intelligence and right opinion, you will come upon in few, and those the ones born with 
the best natures and best educated” (431c). In the city Glaucon and Socrates have built, 
“the desires in the common many are mastered by the desires and the prudence in the 
more equitable few” (431c-d).  
But this moderation as mere mastery is not yet the harmony of a whole that 
Socrates had initially emphasized. Reiterating the point that moderation should not be 
thought to reside in only one class of the city, as do the virtues of wisdom and courage, 
he stresses that the virtue “stretches throughout the whole,” insofar as all elements of the 
city “sing the same chant together” (432a).259 Both the rulers and the ruled are of the 
same opinion as to who should rule, and moderation is the accord that exists between 
them—the “unity of opinion among the rulers and ruled” (433c). Moderation on the level 
of the city consists in a manner of ruling and being ruled that, because it rests on this 
shared understanding or agreement, conduces to peace and friendship. Socrates does not 
here describe how this agreement is achieved, but we did see an indication of it earlier. 
Recall in Socrates’ description of the kind of harmonic mode and rhythm that best 
                                                 
259 Craiutu provides a helpful summary of the connection between political moderation 
and harmony in Cicero’s thought, but does not seem to recognize the origin of this idea in 
Plato. Compare page 24 of A Virtue for Courageous Minds with the paragraph devoted to 
Plato on page 20.  
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captures the virtue of moderation, he described what we can now recognize as a certain 
way of ruling and being ruled. This moderate mode was characterized by voluntary 
action, rather than violence, achieved through persuasion, instruction and exhortation (see 
399b-c) on the part of those ruling, and an openness and absence of arrogance on the part 
of those ruled. In this way, the unity that characterizes the moderate city is one in which 
rule is maintained through peaceful rather than coercive means, allowing for friendship 
rather than faction. 
 We have then a basic understanding of the city’s moderation, but the precise 
meaning of moderation within the soul remains unclear. Not only has Socrates failed to 
specify the exact nature of the parts within the soul, but he has also said little about how 
they are harmonious. In discussing the soul, he spoke primarily of the mastery of one part 
over another, using language that suggests a relationship falling short of friendship or 
harmony.260 To be sure, if we were to follow the procedure for the very construction of 
the city in speech, it would seem that we could simply transpose the definition of 
harmony given for the city onto the soul. But at this point in the dialogue, Socrates insists 
on testing the assumption upon which the analogy between the soul and city had been 
drawn in the first place. As noted when the analogy was first introduced (see 368d), a 
comparison between the two is useful only to the extent that they are actually similar. 
                                                 
260 This important difference between mastery and harmony, faction and concord, is 
noted by Bourgault in “Prolegomena,” 127: “To be truly moderate, an individual’s battle 
against the flesh (so vividly described by the likes of Augustine) must not remain a battle. 
Socrates repeatedly insists that sophrosyne does not call for a tyranny of reason over the 
appetites (as the likes of H. Arendt have suggested), but rather, for a voluntary concord 
between them (Republic 442d).”  
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Does the soul have within it “affections and habits” that correspond to the three “classes 
of natures” found in the city (435b)? To confirm whether or not our understanding of 
moderation in the soul can be modeled after our understanding of moderation in the city, 
we must look to Socrates’ proof of the tripartite nature of the soul.  
 
The Tripartite Soul 
Socrates has shown that the common understanding of moderation depends upon 
a conception of the soul as divided into parts in some sense, but the nature of these parts, 
and especially of how they must be ordered for a soul to be harmonious, has remained 
unclear. For this reason, Socrates’ account of the tripartite soul is crucial for our 
understanding of moderation within the individual. As we saw in the Charmides, self 
knowledge is an important component of moderation. In better understanding the 
structure of our souls, we can better understand what constitutes a moderate one.  
In its essentials, Socrates’ argument for the tripartite soul can be broken down 
into, as it happens, three parts. First, he establishes the principle of non-contrariety: “the 
same thing won’t be willing at the same time to do or suffer opposites with respect to the 
same part and in relation to the same thing” (436b). Second, he distinguishes between 
classes of opposing affections and actions of the soul: acceptance as opposed to refusal; 
longing as opposed to rejecting; embracing as opposed to thrusting away.261 Third, he 
                                                 
261 Interpreting Socrates’ initial principle as one of non-contradiction rather than one of 
non-contrariety has led some commentators to see the second step in Socrates’ argument 
as a logical mistake. See Rosen, Republic, 152-153. As Rosen points out, opposing 
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takes the particular example of thirst and argues that it is, strictly speaking, a desire for 
nothing other than drink (439a).  
With these three elements of his argument in place, Socrates establishes that the 
soul has parts by drawing upon the experience of someone who is thirsty but refrains 
from drinking. Since the same thing cannot do or suffer opposites with respect to the 
same part and in relation to the same thing, if one part of the soul is experiencing thirst, 
and thirst is nothing other than a desire for drink, then it must be some other part of the 
soul acting in opposition to the desire by refusing the drink. Socrates quickly concludes 
that this other part of the soul must be the rational, calculating part, which forbids and 
masters the loves, hungers, and thirsts of the irrational, desiring part of the soul. Using 
the same assumptions, Socrates establishes the spirited part of the soul as yet another 
distinct element by taking a second example of opposition to desire. In the case of 
Leontius, who struggles against his desire to look at corpses, and then curses his eyes 
when he is overpowered by their desire, Socrates argues that “anger sometimes makes 
war against the desires as one thing against something else” (440a). In this way, Socrates 
confirms that there are three parts in the soul akin to those in the city and is thereby able 
to maintain the integrity of his premise that the city is the soul writ large.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
actions like embracing and thrusting away, which are contraries, allow for an 
intermediary (remaining indifferent) in a way that moving and standing still, which are 
contradictories, do not. But even if one sees Socrates as sliding from a point about 
contradiction to a point about contrariety, the fact that he does so would not seem to 




A Longer and Further Road 
Socrates’ “proof” of the tripartite nature of the soul allows him to argue that 
moderation in both the city and the soul is the “friendship and accord of these parts—
when the ruling part and the two ruled parts are of the single opinion that the calculating 
part ought to rule and don’t raise faction against it” (442c-d). Although the tripartite 
account provides a clear description of what moderation in the soul entails, a closer look 
at this division reveals a soul that is in fact more characterized by faction than harmony, 
and within which reason shows little promise to rule.262 
The parts of the soul as Socrates presents them in his tripartite account seem 
particularly unlikely to form what could be thought of as a harmony. On one hand, the 
                                                 
262 There is nothing particularly novel about the critiques of the tripartite account to 
follow, versions of which have been made by many commentators, most notably Bernard 
Williams. That the tripartite account as it stands is inadequate for understanding the 
human soul is rarely a matter of debate. The more interesting question is why we are 
given this presentation and how best to understand the revisions that follow later in the 
Republic. In contrast to Williams, I agree with those commentators who believe we 
cannot ignore the huge grain of salt with which Socrates introduces his tripartite account, 
and that we must ultimately incorporate the significant revisions that follow. (For a 
concise gathering of these divisions in the scholarship see David Roochnik, Beautiful 
City, The Dialectical Character of Plato's "Republic" [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
2003], 17-18.) Roochnik is right in pointing out that those who take this view should take 
seriously the question of why “it is legitimate to refer to later books of the Republic in 
order to bolster the psychology of book 4.” Roochnik’s general argument that the 
Republic develops dialectically, and that Socrates’ account of the soul in particular begins 
(as Socrates often does) with how people speak about virtue is a persuasive one. I would 
add emphasis on the fact that the strict tripartite division of Book IV is also a feature of 
Socrates’ need at this point in the dialogue to draw a clear correspondence between the 
city and the soul, and that one can find buried within Book IV’s account indications of 
the major emendations (i.e. that each “part” of the soul has its own desires, pleasures, and 




calculating part of the soul is given a rather limited role with respect to the appetitive, 
desiring part. As Socrates describes it, it is capable of no more than placing a check upon 
the desire which “leads and draws” the soul (439d). How it does this remains entirely 
unclear. In what way would the part of the soul that loves, desires, hungers, and thirsts, if 
it is wholly alogos—without reason or speech—be responsive to the speech of the 
reasoning part of the soul? To borrow a phrase from Cato, “it is a hard matter to argue 
with the belly…since it has no ears.”263 On the other hand, the strict division Socrates 
draws between the rational and non-rational parts of the soul creates what one might call 
a “motivational deficit” within the reasoning part. Without any desire of its own, it is 
difficult to see how this part of the soul could have the power or incentive to lead, let 
alone rule. Just as the philosophers will be compelled to rule within the city (519d ff.), it 
appears the reasoning part of the soul would have to be similarly compelled, having been 
divested of any desire of its own.  
In light of these difficulties, spiritedness enters the picture as a potential solution, 
only to prove even more problematic. As Socrates describes it, the spirited part of one’s 
soul makes war against the soul’s desires when they threaten to overpower the calculating 
part of the soul. Spiritedness could be the means by which calculation’s otherwise 
ineffectual decrees are enforced. But even if spiritedness could be made reason’s ally, it 
is important to see that whatever order might be brought to the soul as a result, it would 
                                                 
263 Plutarch, Marcus Cato 8.1. Translation from Plutarch’s Lives, trans. Bernadotte Perrin 




fall short of a harmony among the parts. Spiritedness is needed as an ally precisely 
insofar as there exists faction within the soul, the desiring part rebelling against reason’s 
rule. The alliance between reason and spiritedness thus testifies to, rather than cures, 
faction within the soul.  
Moreover, the alliance of reason and spiritedness seems to be an especially 
precarious one.264 Socrates’ examples of how spiritedness often operates within the soul 
show it to be a double-edged sword, just as likely to cut against reason as to defend it. In 
the first place, his insistence that spiritedness never allies itself with desire is patently 
false. Insofar as thumos is a reaction to thwarted desire, its very existence is, so to speak, 
on desire’s behalf. We saw in the case of Achilles how problematic this combination 
could become. Moreover, spiritedness can take on a life of its own, especially when it 
“form[s] an alliance for battle with what seems just” (440c-d), and becomes willing to 
suffer anything until it has “succeeded, or death intervenes, or before it becomes gentle, 
having been called in by speech like a dog by a herdsman” (440d).265 This last point 
would seem to suggest that the reasoning part of the soul has some power over the 
spirited, an ability to rein it in. But as an example Socrates cites Homer’s description of 
Odysseus smiting his breast and reproaching his heart with word, claiming that this is a 
clear presentation of “that which has calculated about better and worse [rebuking] that 
                                                 
264 Compare Bloom, Republic, 375-379. 
 
265 It is worth pointing out that by describing spiritedness as having to “form an alliance” 
with what “seems just,” Socrates indicates that spiritedness is not in itself the moral 




which is irrationally spirited as though it were a different part” (441b-c). While this helps 
to reinforce the distinction between the reasoning and spirited part of the soul, we saw 
that a closer look at this Homeric example only reveals calculation playing a disturbingly 
limited role in directing the soul. Odysseus’ calculations as to better or worse are made in 
the service of an end decided upon by the spirited part of his soul, revenge, over which 
reason has no influence.266 The calculating part is at this moment a mere tool used to 
execute more effectively spiritedness’ designs.  
Reason’s weakness seems in large part due to its having been divested of any 
ruling or motivating desire of its own. Indeed, this is a part of the tripartite account that 
Socrates significantly revises later in the dialogue. In Book IX, he takes back entirely the 
suggestion that desire is limited to the appetitive part of the soul, stating that there are in 
fact desires, pleasures, and a form of rule peculiar to each part of the soul (580d ff.).267 In 
this sense, the tripartite account fails to capture the full potential of the reasoning part. 
But in divorcing reason from desire, the tripartite account does capture an actuality, 
namely what small a role reason plays in most souls. For the vast majority of human 
beings, Socrates seems to suggest, reason is more likely to be put in the service of loves 
and passions other than its own. As later books will confirm, reason’s full potential is 
                                                 
266 Benardete, Socrates’ Second Sailing, 69.  
 
267 Indeed, the seeds of this emendation can even be found within the tripartite account. 
Leontius’ desire to look at the corpses may be an intellectual desire, a spirited desire, or a 
mixture of the two—in any case, it does not appear to be a desire of the appetites. For a 
note on other indications within Book IV of the tripartite model’s insufficiencies see 
Laurence Cooper, “Beyond the Tripartite Soul: The Dynamic Psychology of Plato’s 
‘Republic’”, The Review of Politics 63, 2 (2001): 343, fn. 6. 
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realized only in the philosophic few, those rare individuals whose souls are characterized 
primarily by a love of learning. Socrates’ tripartite account of the soul, the one by which 
he maintains the argument that moderation is attained when reason rules the soul, 
surprisingly points to just how difficult moderation is to achieve.  
 
Desire and the Good 
 
How, we are left wondering, could reason ever come to play a greater role in a 
soul where both the appetites and spiritedness have powerful desires and designs of their 
own? As Socrates says before making his argument for the tripartite soul, a true analysis 
of the soul would require traveling down a much longer road. In his attempt to establish 
strict divisions within the soul, Socrates takes a problematic shortcut with his argument 
that thirst is for nothing other than drink. This argument allows him to divide the soul 
into parts, but in doing so it ignores the complexity of our desires and obfuscates an 
essential connection between the parts of the soul, namely their shared desire for the 
good. This shared desire must be made clear if we are to see the essential role reason 
ought to play in the soul, and how it could begin to play this role, whatever the odds 
might be against it. To restore the connection between desire and the good, we must look 
more closely at Socrates’ isolation of thirst as nothing other than a desire for drink.  
Glaucon follows Socrates’ argument on this matter up to a point, agreeing that 
“desire for this or that kind [of drink] depends on additions” (437e). But Socrates pushes 
the point even further: 
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Now let no one catch us unprepared…and cause a disturbance, alleging that no 
one desires drink, but good drink…for everyone, after all, desires good things; if, 
then, thirst is a desire, it would be for good drink whatever it is, and similarly with 
the other desires. (438a) 
 
Glaucon finds such an objection fairly persuasive (438a). But Socrates is determined to 
argue against the idea that thirst is for good drink and does so by going through a long 
and largely linguistic argument on the character of relations (438a-439b): the greater is 
greater than the less; the much greater is greater than the much less; the once greater than 
the once less; the going to be greater than the going to be less; more to fewer; double to 
half; heavier to lighter; faster to slower—the list goes on (438b-438c). Socrates concludes 
from this that, “a particular sort of thirst is for a particular kind of drink, but thirst itself is 
neither for much nor little, good nor bad, nor, in a word, for any particular kind, but thirst 
itself is naturally only for drink” (439a).  
This argument is convincing insofar as it seems impossible to argue that the 
concept of thirst itself relates to anything other than drink itself. But this argument based 
upon an abstract conception of thirst distracts from desire as we experience it.268 As 
Roslyn Weiss puts it, while “thirst pure and simple is, logically speaking, for drink pure 
and simple, there may very well not be an actual thirst that is not qualified in some 
                                                 
268 Compare Benardete: “Speech, because it admits of greater precision than fact, 





way.”269 In other words, as embodied beings, we experience not “thirst itself” but 
particular thirsts, colored by whatever particular context we happen to be in—the very 
particular thirsts which Socrates admits here are for particular kinds of drink. A particular 
thirst is not thirst pure and simple—still less is it thirst in general, a concept derived 
precisely by abstracting from the character of our particular and diverse experiences of 
thirst.270  
One could make an argument on the basis of certain experiences that thirst is just 
for drink. When experienced at the level of a pure, elementary impulse, thirst might seem 
to be simply for drink, a dryness in the throat that calls unqualifiedly for liquid. But what 
is important to notice is that Socrates does not make this kind of phenomenological 
argument. It seems he steers clear of descriptions of actual experiences of desire because 
the simple, unqualified form he isolates here is hardly the character of all our desires, 
much less the most problematic of them. To return to an example from earlier in the 
dialogue, the kinds of desires that are problematic from the point of view of moderation 
are not the desires of the healthy city, but those of the feverish city: desires that extend 
beyond our most basic bodily impulses. Socrates’ argument, while logically persuasive, 
                                                 
269 Roslyn Weiss, “Thirst as Desire for Good,” in Akrasia in Greek Philosophy: From 
Socrates to Plotinus, ed. Christopher Bobonich and Pierre Destrée (Boston: Brill Press, 
2007): 174 fn. 9. Weiss confines this point to a footnote, whereas I take it to be a crucial 
weakness of the argument. 
 




distracts from the complex nature of the experience of desire, at the very least those 
desires most prone to immoderation.  
If we admit that desires are more complex than simply the impulse of thirst for the 
object of drink, then we see can see that most importantly thirst is not just for drink, but 
for good drink. Socrates’ argument that the particular desire that is thirst corresponds to 
the particular object of desire that is drink distracts from the fact that mixed in with every 
particular desire is a general desire for the good. Thirst would seem fairly obviously to be 
a desire for drink precisely because drink appears as what is good for quenching thirst. 
Moreover, it seems unlikely that Socrates (or Plato for that matter) is abandoning the 
view that all desire is for the good, since within this same conversation, he declares that 
the good is “what every soul pursues and for the sake of which it does everything” 
(505e).271 Socrates’ isolation of thirst as nothing but desire for drink seems more a 
spurious means by which he can establish the strict divisions of the tripartite soul, than an 
                                                 
271 According to a conventional reading ascribing to an early, middle, and late Plato, the 
view that all human desire is for the good is the excessively intellectualist Socratic 
position which Plato abandoned in favor of a more complex psychology, the very turning 
point being this passage in the Republic. Not only is this view dubious for interpreters 
like myself, who are inclined to see the Platonic corpus as an integrated whole, but it is 
perhaps even more difficult for those who ascribe to an early, middle, and late Plato, to 
maintain, since elements of this supposedly Socratic intellectualism persist throughout 
the whole of Plato’s works. See Bobonich & Destree, Akrasia, xvi-xix. As Rachel Barney 
notes, the thesis can be found not only in the Republic itself but also in purportedly “late” 
dialogues like the Philebus and Timaeus. I share Barney’s suspicion that the thesis that all 
desire is for the good, while its exact meaning remains a question, “is a sustained and 
foundational principle of Platonic moral psychology.” See Rachel Barney, “Plato on the 
Desire for the Good,” in Desire, Practical Reason, and the Good, ed. Sergio Tenenbaum 




accurate or informative description of desire. The tripartite division allows Socrates to 
maintain his city-soul analogy, but in making this move he obscures the point of 
communication between the various “parts” of the soul, namely a shared desire for the 
soul’s good.272  
If we reintroduce the notion that all desire is for the good, then we can see that 
faction within the soul is at the deepest level the result of competing claims to the soul’s 
greatest and truest good. Any part of the soul contending for rule over the whole must 
and will make a case in favor of its own ability to secure the soul’s greatest good. In other 
words, we desire what we desire, be it money, sex, honor, rule, or wisdom, in part 
because of the opinions or hopes we hold that this object, whatever it is, is good for us.273 
That each part of the soul has its own opinions, i.e. a form of logos, has already been 
indicated—after all, Socrates defined moderation as a matter of all parts of the soul 
coming to share the same opinion as to which part ought to rule. Thus, not only does each 
part of the soul have desires, but each part of the soul has speech. Our appetitive and 
spirited desires are open to reason insofar as they are accompanied by the arguments we 
make in their favor. To reply to Cato, the stomach and the spirit have ears after all.  
But at this point, we must recognize that to the extent that we continue to speak of 
“parts” of the soul, we are no longer distinguishing them along the lines of Socrates’ first 
                                                 
272 Consider Annas, An Introduction, 131 ff.: “All three parts have enough cognitive 
capacity to recognize one another, conflict or agree, and push their own interests.”  
 
273 On the connection between thought and desire (or opinion and passion), and desire 




division. Recall the initial division depended upon isolating reason, spirit, and desire as 
mutually exclusive parts of the soul. Now we see the parts of ourselves are better 
understood as the distinct, and at times warring passions that exist within us.274 Socrates 
clarifies this more accurate basis for division in Book IX. There he reiterates the analogy 
between the city and the soul, but now explains the threefold division of the soul as one 
made on the basis of three kinds of “pleasures…desires and forms of rule” (580d). The 
“desiring part” of the soul is characterized by “the intensity of the desires of eating, 
drinking, and all their followers”—its love is of gain (580e-581a). The spirited part of the 
soul is that part which is “wholly set on mastery, victory and good reputation”—its love 
is victory and honor (581a-b). Finally, there is the part with which we learn, the one 
characterized most by its love of the truth—its love is learning and wisdom (581b). As 
Socrates puts it, there are three classes of men, distinguished by which love rules in their 
soul—the love of wisdom, victory, or gain (581c).  
The faction that exists in our souls is a result of our competing loves. But once 
this is granted, it becomes clear that only the part of us with which we learn would be 
capable of articulating and evaluating competing claims for rule in the soul. Thus, insofar 
as “no one voluntarily wishes to lie about the most sovereign things to what is most 
sovereign in himself” (382a), one need not begin with a philosopher’s overwhelming love 
of learning to recognize a need, and thereby develop a desire, to cede rule to the 
reasoning part of one’s soul, if only to learn what one’s true good really is.  
                                                 
274 For a longer discussion see Cooper, “Beyond the Tripartite Soul,” 346. 
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This is the opportunity afforded to one by Socratic refutation—the chance to 
recognize one’s own ignorance, and, in the ideal case, embark upon a philosophic life. A 
complete vindication of the primacy of the philosophic life is beyond the scope of this 
dissertation, but one can see at least a picture of the harmony of the philosopher’s soul in 
a description Socrates provides in Book IX. There Socrates suggests that the philosopher 
is able, so far as is possible, to bring his or her person into the genuine harmony that 
characterizes moderation. This is accomplished not by denying or repressing the other 
parts of oneself, but by giving them their proper due and place—not by forcefully 
winning a war within oneself, but by coming to an understanding with oneself through 
persuasion.275 One sees a picture of this harmony in Socrates’ description of how the 
philosophic soul deals with the strong and unlawful desires that may remain within it: 
“Those,” he says,  
that wake up in sleep when the rest of the soul—all that belongs to the calculating, 
tame and ruling part of it—slumbers, while the beastly and wild part, gorged with 
food or drink, is skittish, and pushing sleep away, seeks to go and satisfy its 
dispositions…in such a state it dares to do everything as though it were released 
from, and rid of, all shame and prudence. (571c)  
 
Socrates goes on to describe, in contrast to this picture, the achievement of moderation in 
a philosophic soul in terms that resemble how moderation is achieved in the imagined 
city:  
[A person with] a moderate relationship to himself…first…awakens the 
calculating part and feasts it on fair arguments and considerations, coming to an 
understanding with himself; second, he feeds the desiring part in such a way that 
                                                 
275 As Reeve (Philosopher-Kings, 142) puts it, reason “is not an enlightened despot 
governing through force majeure.” 
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it is neither in want nor surfeited—in order that it will not disturb the best part by 
its joy or its pain, but rather leave that best part alone pure and by itself, to 
consider and to long for the perception of something it doesn’t know, either 
something that has been, or is, or is going to be; and third, he soothes the spirited 
part in the same way and does not fall asleep with his spirit aroused because there 
are some he got angry at. When a man has silenced these two later forms and set 
the third—the one in which prudent thinking comes to be—in motion, and only 
then takes his rest, you know that in such a state he most lays hold of the truth and 
at this time the sights that are hostile to law show up least in his dreams. (571d-
572b) 
 
In this picture Socrates still employs the metaphor of parts. But what is important to see 
is that in the philosophic soul we find an image not of parts dueling with one another, but 
of multiple desires peacefully coexisting, their proper fulfillment being mediated and 
ordered by reason. Moderation, far from being a denial of desire, leaves the philosopher 
free to pursue his greatest desire and with it his greatest pleasure.276  
 
Conclusion: Moderation and Justice 
Our study of the Republic has aimed to show that enmeshed in the dialogue’s 
famous treatment of justice is an equally important treatment of moderation. In 
conclusion, it is fitting to say something about the relationship between these two virtues. 
These virtues are so closely linked in this dialogue that it is difficult even to distinguish 
between the definitions Socrates ultimately provides for them. When Socrates and 
Glaucon are finally ready to hunt down their definition of justice, Socrates says “it’s been 
                                                 
276 Compare what Socrates says to Antiphon in Xenophon’s Memorabilia: “Do you think 
that anything is more responsible for my not being enslaved to stomach or sleep or lust 
than that I have other things more pleasant than these that delight not only in their use but 
also by providing hopes that they will benefit always?” (I.6.8). 
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rolling around at our feet from the beginning...As men holding something in their hand 
sometimes seek what they’re holding, we too didn’t look at it but turned our gaze 
somewhere far off, which is also perhaps just the reason it escaped our notice” (432d-e). 
Given how Socrates goes on to define justice, one wonders whether they did indeed 
already have it in their hands, namely, as moderation. 
Socrates begins by claiming that justice is none other than the initial organizing 
principle of their city: doing one’s own things. Here we finally receive an explanation of 
how best to understand this phrase, which we saw as a contending definition for 
moderation in Plato’s Charmides. Socrates says that doing one’s own things, “when it 
comes into being in a certain way, is probably justice” (433b emphasis mine). The 
“certain way” in which Socrates goes on to define the meaning of doing one’s own things 
sounds a lot like the actions of someone who is moderate. We can see this near conflation 
of moderation and justice in Socrates’ concluding remark about justice. There he expands 
upon the notion of “doing one’s own things,” saying the following about the just man: 
He doesn’t let each part in him mind other people’s business or the three classes 
in the soul meddle with each other, but really sets his own house in good order 
and rules himself; he arranges himself, becomes his own friend, and harmonizes 
the three parts, exactly like three notes in a harmonic scale, lowest, highest, and 
middle. And if there are some other parts in between, he binds them together and 
becomes entirely one from many, moderate and harmonized. (443c-e) 
 
These terms are nearly identical to those previously used to characterize moderation. To 
see the similarity, it is worth quoting in full the characterization of moderation that 
Socrates gives just before he defines justice:  
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Moderation…stretches throughout the whole, from top to bottom of the entire 
scale, making the weaker, the stronger, and those in the middle—whether you 
wish to view them as such in terms of prudence, or, if you wish, in terms of 
strength or multitude or money or anything else whatsoever, sing the same chant 
together. So we would quite rightly claim that this unanimity is moderation, an 
accord of worse and better, according to nature, as to which must rule in the city 
and in each one. (432a-432b) 
 
Consider also 442b where Socrates says one is “moderate because of the friendship and 
accord of these parts—when the ruling part and the two ruled parts are of the single 
opinion that the calculating part ought to rule and don’t raise faction against it.”277 
What is the meaning of the near equation of these two virtues? To arrive at the 
answer, I would like to begin by reviewing what we have learned about moderation by 
tracing its development through Book IV of the Republic. By bringing out more clearly 
Socrates’ defense of moderation in the Republic, I hope to show that this defense is a 
large part of Socrates’ response to the challenge to justice. 
Our study of the Republic began with two critiques of moderation. The first 
critique of moderation came with our initial image of it in the Republic: Cephalus—an 
old man who appeared moderate, having been freed by time from the “mad masters” of 
                                                 
277 Here I am in agreement with Weiss, who draws attention to the two passages quoted 
above (Philosophers in the Republic, 174) and provides a detailed account of the way in 
which Socrates’ “characterization of justice as internal is not a distinct virtue but a 
replication of moderation” (181). Weiss notes (176 fn. 41) that many scholars agree that 
nothing is “left over” after the first three virtues are defined, but fewer focus on the fact 
that justice is then defined as moderation. Where I depart from Weiss is in her view that 
Socrates provides in Book IV “distorted definitions of both moderation and justice” (180, 
emphasis mine). I agree that the definition of justice is a distortion, but not the definition 
of moderation. As I show in Chapter 3, the way to Book IV’s definition of this virtue is 
paved in earlier books of the Republic, showing it to be neither a surprise nor a distortion, 
but a genuine understanding of Socratic moderation.  
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his youth. Although Cephalus was enthusiastic about his newfound freedom, we saw little 
reason to be enthusiastic about this unappealing and uninspiring version of the virtue. 
Cephalus captured well the enervated virtue that many think of when they think of 
moderation. This first impression led us to believe that if moderation is truly a virtue, it 
needs to be something other than the deadening of desire.  
Cephalus’ brand of moderation explains why this virtue would be of little interest 
to a passionate young man like Glaucon—Glaucon’s initial interest was in justice. Recall 
that Glaucon had wanted to be convinced that it is in every way better to be just than 
unjust. Part of why he wants so much to be persuaded of this is that he does not know an 
argument against a vision of the good life that entails extreme injustice. It was in 
Glaucon’s tale of the ring of Gyges that we found, bound up in a critique of justice, our 
second critique of moderation. A closer look at the tale of Gyges revealed that the life of 
injustice that the shepherd embarks upon is one largely driven by his immoderation. The 
force of the ring of Gyges story depends upon its presumption that the good life entails an 
unleashing of desires formerly kept in check by a fear of punishment for one’s misdeeds. 
According to this account, once the fear of reprisal is absent, desire leads all individuals 
to do the same immoderate deeds.  
Socrates was far from confident that he could defend justice against the attack 
voiced by Glaucon. In fact, he went so far as to say that he was incapable of it (368b). 
But he resolved to try, and did so by building a city in speech in which they might see 
what justice is. He began with the healthy city, where, as we noted, one might expect to 
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find the best understanding of moderation. But Glaucon’s rejection of the healthy city, a 
city in which strong passions or longings simply seem to be absent, reaffirmed what we 
saw in our analysis of Cephalus. To reiterate the conclusions drawn from a study of the 
opening of the Republic, moderation must entail not the eradication or suppression of 
desire, but its education and elevation.278  
Socrates moved from the healthy city to the feverish city, and then to the feverish 
city’s purging—unleashing desire and then refining it through an elaborate education. In 
this education, Socrates resisted depending upon fear of divine punishment to instill or 
support moderation. In fact, Socrates’ revision of poetry about the Greek gods aimed at 
decreasing their perceived influence on humanity altogether. Rather than rely on external 
incentives or threats for moderation, Socrates aimed at inculcating an inner desire for the 
virtue. He did this through an education that draws on and expands the natural human 
love of beauty and harmony. Socrates’ education of the guardians ended with an 
emphasis upon the preliminary nature of this education, one which forms habits and 
desires, preparing the guardians to be able to recognize a reasoned account of the virtue 
they had already learned to love. 
Generally speaking, we saw in Book III that Socrates expands upon the 
conventional understanding of moderation, building toward the definition we will find in 
Book IV. The movement is from a definition of moderation as two-pronged virtue 
                                                 
278 That Plato does not ultimately mean to repress desire, even sexual desire, is 
recognized by Bourgault in “Eros, Viagra, and the Good Life,” 12 and 18: “Genuine 
sophrosyne (sexual or otherwise) is not about repressing completely one’s passions or 
about avoiding pleasure, nor it is about achieving some kind of complete purity.”  
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entailing self-rule over pleasure and obedience to the rule of others, to a harmony of the 
whole soul. But recall that before he arrives at this definition of moderation, Socrates 
wanted to avoid it entirely. Indeed, Socrates was hoping to move straight to justice and 
not have to bother with moderation any longer. Having now seen how he defines both 
moderation and justice, we can understand why. Had Socrates been allowed by Glaucon 
to move straight to a definition of justice, justice would have seemed to be accomplishing 
more in its own right.279 But Glaucon insists that Socrates cover moderation first. “If you 
want to gratify me,” Glaucon says, “consider this [moderation] before the other [justice]” 
(430d). “But I do want to,” Socrates responds, “so as not to do an injustice” (430e).  
With this response, Plato has Socrates playfully gesture toward the strategy at 
work: once moderation is present, one is less likely to do an injustice. Our purpose here is 
not to provide anything close to a full account of justice in the Republic—a task beyond 
this dissertation’s focus on moderation—but simply to draw attention to the fact noted by 
those who do take as their primary aim a study of this virtue in the dialogue: justice, as 
Socrates defines it in the Republic, is largely a byproduct of what has already been 
accomplished by moderation.280 This is not to say that with moderation comes perfect 
                                                 
279 As Weiss puts it (Philosophers in the Republic, 178), “What reason could Socrates 
have for proposing that they bypass moderation and proceed directly to justice other than 
that he knows full well that once he defines moderation, precious little will be left for 
justice?”  
 
280 See, for example, Rosen, Republic, 160. Annas acknowledges that justice appears as 
redundant, as it “requires no new range of actions other than what is required by the other 
virtues, only a refraining from certain things. However,” Annas insists, “it would be 
wrong to think of justice too negatively in this way. For the other three virtues on their 
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justice. In Cicero’s words, here we find only “one sort of justice…do[ing] no positive 
wrong to anyone.”281 Moderation does not go so far as to provide justice in the sense of a 
positive devotion to the common good. But of course this is precisely what is missing 
from justice as Socrates defines it here. This absence has led some commentators to 
wonder if what Socrates calls justice really captures the virtue—a virtue Socrates had 
earlier said he would be unable to defend.282  
Perhaps it is because of the difficulty Socrates foresees in defending a more 
devotional form of justice that he uses another strategy. Rather than make a direct and 
complete defense of justice, Socrates makes a case for moderation, thereby uprooting a 
major cause of injustice: immoderation. In making a case for moderation, Socrates opens 
up the possibility for another outcome to Glaucon’s ring of Gyges story. A person 
wearing the ring of Gyges need not be fully persuaded of the goodness of justice to avoid 
                                                                                                                                                 
own would not be virtues of a whole. Justice is a virtue of the city as a unity, for it 
requires of each citizen a recognition of his or her own role as contributing in some 
characteristic way to the common good.” In the first place, Socrates had stressed 
moderation as a virtue that “stretches throughout the whole” city and soul, and the unity it 
creates within each. Second, Annas’ stress on the common good seems imported into the 
text. See An Introduction 119.  
 
281 Cicero goes on to say that Plato’s philosophers, those who do no positive wrong, “fall 
into the opposite injustice; for hampered by their pursuit of learning they leave to their 
fate those whom they ought to defend. And so, Plato thinks, they will not even assume 
their civic duties except under compulsion” (Cicero, De Officis, 1.9.28). All translations 
of Cicero are from M. Tullius Cicero, De Officis, trans. Walter Miller (Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1913).  
 
282 See Stauffer, Introduction to the Question of Justice, 118-120 and Chapter 3, 




a path of injustice if he or she is convinced of the goodness of moderation. This is 
precisely what Socrates accomplishes with Glaucon. As we have seen, by the time we are 
ready to find justice in Book IV, Glaucon is interested in finding moderation. In this way, 
Plato has the drama of the dialogue mirror its content. Socrates has achieved with 
Glaucon the exact process he describes achieving with the guardians of their city. 
Socrates draws out Glaucon’s own love of beauty and harmony, such that he is eager to 
hear and accept as akin the account of moderation as a harmony of the soul. The very 






The aim of this dissertation was to study moderation as it is revealed in Plato’s 
Charmides and Republic. Through the interplay between these two dialogues we see a 
comprehensive picture of the virtue emerge, suggesting that the Charmides is not merely 
an early dialogue to be left behind as we move to the Republic. By way of conclusion, I 
will return to several questions from our introduction—What is moderation? Is 
moderation attainable? Is it good?—and address how the study of these two dialogues has 
made progress in answering them.  
The first task of this dissertation was to find in Plato a definition for moderation. 
We noted that scholars often turn to Aristotle’s doctrine of the mean for a classical 
understanding of this virtue. But when it comes to the actual virtue of sōphrosunē, 
Aristotle provides a strikingly narrow definition, confining it solely to the regulation of 
pleasures of the body. Sōphrosunē in its classical contexts—not to mention moderation in 
its contemporary uses—ordinarily has a much broader scope. The hope was to find an 
understanding of sōphrosunē as not just a mean or a virtue related only to pleasures of the 
appetites. Our analysis aimed to recover the rich and unifying vision of the virtue found 
in Plato’s thought.   
The difficulties that attend understanding moderation are treated in detail in the 
Charmides, Plato’s aporetic dialogue devoted to the virtue. We are not given an actual 
definition for moderation in the Charmides, but find Socrates stressing the importance of 
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knowing oneself. In the Republic, Socrates provides us with a model of the soul through 
which we may better know both ourselves and moderation. Moderation is the harmony 
that is achieved when all three “parts” of the soul, the spirited, appetitive, and reasoning, 
agree that the reasoning part should rule. Rather than confining the virtue either to 
curbing spiritedness on one hand, or regulating appetites on the other, we find a virtue 
that entails the proper ordering of one’s whole person. The tripartite model, while (or by) 
simplifying the soul, provides a way of understanding and ordering our desires. Even for 
those of us unlikely to take the longer road that ends in philosophic moderation, Socrates’ 
tripartite model provides a useful guide, encouraging us to strive for the harmony we may 
achieve through reason’s guidance.  
But we had wondered in our introduction whether or not moderation as a harmony 
of the soul is actually attainable. Is it possible to have all one’s passions, desires, opinions 
and wishes align with what we reason to be good? Can our souls actually come to have 
the unity promised by moderation, or will we always be divided by warring factions 
within? And if this moderation is possible, how is it achieved? Socrates himself speaks to 
this important question by often switching between discussing moderation as a harmony 
of the soul and moderation as a mastery of the soul. The tension between the two is 
present in Socrates’ education of the guardians. As we saw, the city’s education of the 
guardian class draws attention the important role of proper habituation in the making of 
moderate souls. But it seems no amount of habituation can safely secure a perfectly 
reliable moderation. The guardian education inculcated a love of the beauty of harmony, 
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but failed to provide a reasoned account as to why the soul should be ordered this way. 
The suggestion of the Republic is that moderation as a harmony is truly achieved only in 
souls fully guided by reason, and not just by habit: the souls of the philosophers. But 
what exactly is the nature of a philosopher’s moderation? Here it is especially by 
considering the Charmides in light of the Republic that we may come to answer this 
question.  
Socrates’ moderation—or lack thereof—is nowhere more vividly displayed than 
in the scene of the Charmides where Socrates is momentarily pulled “outside of himself” 
after looking into Charmides’ eyes, and then seeing inside Charmides’ cloak. With this 
scene, Plato, who is often faulted for abstracting from the body, provides a dramatic 
reminder of Socrates’ body. Socrates finds himself vulnerable to physical desire for an 
object of beauty, as he is momentarily swept up in the hopes such beauty inspires. But, as 
we saw, Socrates recovers himself almost immediately. He recognizes that the desire 
threatening to overwhelm him may be fueled by false opinions or hopes that would not 
survive stricter scrutiny. His desire to possess Charmides fades as his desire to know 
Charmides grows, and he recovers himself as he turns to an investigation of Charmides’ 
soul.  
Reflecting on this scene of the Charmides in light of what we learn in the 
Republic, we can better understand the nature of Socrates’ moderation and how it is 
achieved. We see that Socrates’ moderation is not perfect, if by perfect one means 
uninterrupted. Even Socrates is vulnerable to conflicting impulses and desires. That said, 
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he is far from being at war with himself. Socrates is easily able to reestablish the 
harmony of his soul insofar as he has a clear picture of who he is and the desire with 
which he most identifies—his desire to know. Socrates’ moderation is maintained not by 
any fear of external punishment or reprisal, but by his own fear of ignorance—of thinking 
he knows something he doesn’t know. This fear is part and parcel of his philosophic 
moderation. Socrates is able to recognize that he may be wrong about the good, and that 
someone else may be wiser than himself.  
In this way, the Charmides and Republic shed light on the questions of what 
individual moderation is and what it entails, especially insofar as they provide the model 
of ideal moderation in the form of the philosophic soul. These two dialogues also address 
the question of what political moderation entails, and what kind of moderation can be 
expected in a populace at large. In using Charmides and Critias, two future tyrants, as 
Socrates’ interlocutors, the Charmides raises the issue of the connection between 
philosophic and political moderation. In Socrates’ person we see a truly philosophic 
spirit, one animated by an awareness of ignorance and a corresponding desire to know, in 
particular a desire to know the good. In Critias, by contrast, we see the seeds of political 
immoderation in his philosophic immoderation—a dogmatic tendency toward what has 
been described by other scholars as an “epistemic absolutism.”283 Critias understands 
philosophy not as an activity in which one engages, but as a science to be possessed and 
applied toward political ends. Applying the tripartite model to Critias, we see a soul 
                                                 
283 See Schmid, The Socratic Ideal of Rationality, 50. 
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dominated by a love of honor, with reason put in service of its ends. But behind this love 
of honor, Critias, as is characteristic of honor-loving men, harbors desires of the lower 
appetites—desires Socrates describes honor-loving men as pursuing “under the cover of 
darkness” (548a). When Critias comes to rule in Athens, these desires see the light of 
day, revealing the full immoderation of his person.   
The Charmides also alludes to the danger of the kind of utopian rule that appeals 
to Critias, who is tempted by the idea of knowers ruling in a city. Lessons learned from 
the Charmides must be remembered when we turn to the Republic. There Plato explores 
an even more tempting form of utopianism—a city ruled not by mere technocrats, but 
actual philosophers. Socrates and Glaucon pursue in their city in speech the desire to 
make a city perfectly virtuous through reason’s rule. We ended our discussion of the 
Republic by emphasizing the progress Glaucon makes in coming to appreciate the beauty 
of the harmony that may be achieved through reason’s rule. But bearing in mind the 
problem raised by Critias’ immoderation and its source, there remains a more general 
lesson to be learned from the Republic regarding political moderation, particularly the 
moderation of those who rule in cities.  
When Glaucon and Socrates are finished with their education of the guardians, 
and with it their purging of the city, Glaucon remarks that these efforts have been a sign 
of their own moderation as creators of the city. Socrates does not comment, but it is 
important for us as readers to recognize that Glaucon is wrong. Recall that the 
moderation of the city was characterized above all by the unity and friendship among the 
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classes, a social cohesion obtained through agreement and shared opinion, not coercion. 
But the purging of the city and education of the guardians is oppressive to say the least, 
and even this education is incapable of ensuring perfect moderation within the guardian 
class. As we saw, the education must be accompanied by laws. And as the dialogue 
continues, further measures must be taken to insure the cohesion of the city, measures 
entailing further compulsion of its citizens. From the communism of women and children 
to philosophers themselves being compelled to rule, reflecting on the city in speech, we 
see that a city may only be forced to be moderate through immoderate means. In 
identifying this problem, we see if not the impossibility, at least the undesirability of 
trying to establish perfect moderation (and, of course, perfect justice) within a city. The 
presentation of moderation we find in the idealized city points to moderation’s political 
limits. Plato’s Republic, properly understood, should temper such utopian ambitions, not 
inspire them.  
 
* * * * * 
 
The Charmides and the Republic taken together underscore just how difficult 
moderation is to achieve both in the city and in the soul. In moderating our hopes for a 
world in which reason reigns in the soul and in the city, we see the need for cultivating 
self and civic restraint in the absence of a perfectly harmonious whole. But if this is the 
case, to address one final point from the introduction, why retain the model of harmony at 
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all? If moderation is so difficult, and in some cases impossible to achieve, why not, as is 
the approach of modern thinkers discussed above, simply focus on how best to achieve 
desirable forms of self-restraint? We find in modern thought an ingenious approach to 
civic order that focuses on unleashing certain passions while redirecting and restraining 
others. Why not jettison the idea of moderation as a harmony in favor of a more 
practicable form of moderation: pragmatic restraint?  
The difficulty is that self-restraint is unappealing as an end in itself. Self-restraint 
appears most immediately as a matter of taking less of what we want, which means that 
we are taking less of what we deem to be good. In itself, such restraint is nothing that 
anyone in his or her right mind would desire. In focusing solely on moderation 
understood as self-restraint or self-control, we are left without an attractive, compelling 
vision of a virtue—of something good. Plato’s insights into this problem suggest that our 
contemporary struggles with immoderation result in part from the loss of a virtue toward 
which we would actually want to aspire. Consider, for instance, the following observation 
made by Baumeister and Tierney in their recent book Willpower:  
Ask people to name their greatest personal strengths, and they’ll often credit 
themselves with honesty, kindness, humor, creativity, bravery, and other virtues—
even modesty. But not self-control. It came in dead last among the virtues being 
studied by researchers who have surveyed more than one million people around 
the world. Of the two dozen ‘character strengths’ listed in the researchers’ 
questionnaire, self-control was the one that people were least likely to recognize 
in themselves. Conversely, when people were asked about their failings, a lack of 
self-control was at the top of the list.284 
 
                                                 




This widespread lack of appreciation for self-control comes as no surprise when one 
recognizes that restraint in itself is not a virtue—it is what we need when we lack 
virtue.285 We want self-control because we are aware of the disasters that result in its 
absence, but this still leaves us far from wanting it for its own sake. Self-control is, in 
Glaucon’s schema of goods, the least desirable kind. It is a good chosen not for itself but 
for its consequences—a good like medicine. Left only with self-control, but without a 
compelling vision of moderation, not only is it hard to achieve self-control, it is difficult 
for us to want to achieve it.286  
What we need is a virtue that is desired both in itself and for its consequences. If 
self-control is medicine for the soul, moderation, properly understood—as Plato 
understands it—is the soul’s health. Platonic moderation, far from being a restriction on 
our pursuit of the good, promises its genuine attainment. With a restored understanding 
of moderation, we find a virtue to which we may aspire. Moderation, as Socrates 
promises Charmides, is a virtue which may make one, to the extent that one possesses it, 
that much happier.  
                                                 
285 Baumeister & Tierney try to paper over the undesirability of self-control by titling 
their work “Willpower,” which does have more immediate appeal. But willpower is still 
nothing more than a means to an undefined end.  
 
286 Scientific studies show that self-control is hard to achieve in the absence of what are 
called “high-level construals,” i.e. long-term, abstract goals—in Baumeister and 
Tierney’s words, “lofty thoughts” (Willpower, 164). Moderation can qualify as such a 
lofty thought, not self-control. See Kentaro Fujita and Yaacov Trope, “Construal Levels 
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